排序方式: 共有2条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1
1.
We explored the degree of consensus and accuracy in observers’ ratings of targets’ traits and autobiographical narratives. Targets narrated life high, low, and turning points and reported their personality traits. The conceptual content of these stories had previously been quantified. Here, groups of observers provided ratings of targets’ traits, knowability (how well the observer felt they ‘knew’ the target), and story conventionality, after reading each narrative. Observers exhibited consensus in perceptions of traits, knowability, and story conventionality. These ratings corresponded with targets’ self-ratings of traits, to a modest degree. The knowability of narrators did not moderate this relation, nor did key scene type. The conceptual content of targets’ narratives partially accounted for the relation between observer-reported and target-reported traits. 相似文献
2.
Robert G. Hudson 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):511-523
It is often claimed that anti-realists are compelled to reject the inference of the knowability paradox, that there are no
unknown truths. I call those anti-realists who feel so compelled ‘faint-hearted’, and argue in turn that anti-realists should
affirm this inference, if it is to be consistent. A major part of my strategy in defending anti-realism is to formulate an
anti-realist definition of truth according to which a statement is true only if it is verified by someone, at some time. I
also liberalize what is meant by a verification to allow for indirect forms of verification. From this vantage point, I examine
a key objection to anti-realism, that it is committed to the necessary existence of minds, and reject a response to this problem
set forth by Michael Hand. In turn I provide a more successful anti-realist response to the necessary minds problem that incorporates
what I call an ‘agential’ view of verification. I conclude by considering what intellectual cost there is to being an anti-realist
in the sense I am advocating. 相似文献
1