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Patricia Marino 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2006,9(5):517-533
On an expressivist view, ethical claims are understood as expressions of our attitudes, desires, and feelings. A famous puzzle for this view concerns the use of logic in ethical reasoning, and two standard treatments try to solve the puzzle by explaining logical inconsistency in terms of conflicting attitudes. I argue, however, that this general strategy fails: because we can reason effectively even in the presence of conflicting moral attitudes – in cases of moral dilemmas – avoiding these conflicts cannot be a ground for correct moral reasoning. The result is a dilemma for expressivists: if they take all kinds of attitudes to be under consideration, then conflict cannot play the required role, since attitudes can fail to be compatible in cases of moral conflict. If they restrict attention to ‘all-in attitudes’ or to intentions or plans, then there is an important notion of obligation, used in standard arguments – one for which conflicts are allowed – that they fail to capture. I explain why expressivists should be especially tolerant of conflicting attitudes, and I conclude that they should pursue a different strategy for grounding logical normativity.
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Patricia MarinoEmail: |
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According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions
are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that
moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive
moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that
Mackie’s approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark Kalderon has argued that moral
fictionalism is attractive quite independently of Mackie’s error-theory. Kalderon argues that the Frege–Geach problem shows
that we need moral propositions, but that a fictionalist can and should embrace propositional content together with a non-cognitivist
account of acceptance of a moral proposition. Indeed, it is clear that any fictionalist is going to have to postulate more
than one kind of acceptance attitude. We argue that this double-approach to acceptance generates a new problem – a descendent
of Frege–Geach – which we call the acceptance–transfer problem. Although we develop the problem in the context of Kalderon’s
version of non-cognitivist fictionalism, we show that it is not the non-cognitivist aspect of Kalderon’s account that generates
the problem. A closely related problem surfaces for the more typical variants of fictionalism according to which accepting
a moral proposition is believing some closely related non-moral proposition. Fictionalists of both stripes thus have an attitude
problem.
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Graham OddieEmail: |
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CHRISTOPHER ARROYO 《Metaphilosophy》2011,42(4):353-359
Abstract: This essay examines two interpretations of Kant's argument for the formula of humanity. Christine M. Korsgaard defends a constructivist reading of Kant's argument, maintaining that humans must view themselves as having absolute value because their power for rational choice confers value on their ends. Allen Wood, however, defends a realist interpretation of Kant's argument, maintaining that humans actually are absolutely valuable and that their choices do not confer value but rather reflect their understanding of how the objects of their choices fulfill their needs and wants and contribute to their flourishing. Though Korsgaard's reading is more consistent with Kant's prioritizing of the right over the good, this essay raises a metaethical question regarding her constructivist position, namely, “What is meant by her claim that rational choice ‘confers’ value on objects?” In developing this question, it presents a realist account of goodness that is taken from Peter Geach's “Good and Evil.” 相似文献
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CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD 《Metaphilosophy》2011,42(4):381-394
Abstract: In response to Arroyo, I explain my position on the concept of “natural goodness” and how my use of that concept compares to that of Geach and Foot. An Aristotelian or functional notion of goodness provides the material for Kantian endorsement in a theory of value that avoids a metaphysical commitment to intrinsic values. In response to Cummiskey, I review reasons for thinking Kantianism and consequentialism incompatible, especially those objections to aggregation that arise from the notion of the natural good previously described. In response to Moland, I explain why I think Hegelian worries about the supposed emptiness of the Kantian self do not apply to my account. And in response to both Moland and Bird‐Pollan, I argue that, contrary to the view of some Hegelians, the intersubjective normativity of reason is not something developed through actual social relations; rather, it is something essential to an individual's relations with himself or herself. 相似文献
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