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Itay Shani 《Axiomathes》2007,17(2):155-183
Extensionalism, as I understand it here, is the view that physical reality consists exclusively of extensional entities. On
this view, intensional entitities must either be eliminated in favor of an ontology of extensional entities, or be reduced
to such an ontology, or otherwise be admitted as non-physical. In this paper I argue that extensionalism is a misguided philosophical
doctrine. First, I argue that intensional phenomena are not confined to the realm of language and thought. Rather, the ontology
of such phenomena is intimately entwined with the ontology of properties. After providing some evidence to the popularity
of extensionalism in contemporary analytic philosophy, I investigate the motivating reasons behind it. Considering several
explanations, I argue that the main motivating reason is rooted in the identification of matter with extension, an identification
which is one of the hallmarks of the mechanistic conception of nature inherited from the founding fathers of our modern scientific
outlook. I then argue that such a conception is not only at odds with a robust ontology of properties but is also at odds
with our best contemporary physics. Rather than vindicating extensionalism contemporary science undermines the position, and
the lesson to be drawn from this surprising fact is that extensionalism needs no longer be espoused as a regulative ideal
of naturalistic philosophy. I conclude by showing that the ontological approach to intensional phenomena advocated throughout
the paper also gains support from an examination of the historical context within which ‘intension’ was first introduced as
a semantic notion.
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Itay ShaniEmail: |
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This paper situates an original model of reentrant oscillatory multiplexing within the philosophy of time consciousness to argue for an extensionalist theory of the specious present. I develop a detailed differential latency model of apparent motion to show how the ordinality of experiential content is isomorphic to the ordinality of relevant brain processes. I argue that the theory presented has resources to account for other key features of the specious present, including the representational discreteness between successive conscious moments as well as the phenomenological continuity between them. This work not only shows the plausibility of an extensionalist philosophical theory, it also illustrates the utility of differential latency views in squaring temporal illusions with empirically supported neurodynamics. 相似文献
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