What Can the Systems Community Contribute to Ensure the Survival of Civilization

Much of what we need to plan for our survival is already known, but what we know, how we know, and who knows is divided up between disciplines. Thus much of the problem of ensuring our survival is a matter of learning across the disciplines. We identify four modes through which we bring disciplinary knowledge together: the unity of science, integrated assessment, heuristic models, and distributed learning networks. Although none of them are perfect, we can learn how to put our knowledge together across the disciplines much better than we do.     

New Roles for Rhetoric: From Academic Critique to Civic Affirmation

The classical conception of rhetoric as the method of reasoned political judgment survived into the Renaissance but was reduced to academic critiques of style and "empty" public rhetoric with the rise of modern science and its representationalist theories of language. Recently, however, rhetoric, textuality, and the "linguistic turn" generally, have become central metaphors in the human sciences. This renewed rhetorical perspective not only fosters a critique of positive philosophy and of scientism in public discourse, it also offers affirmative methods by which persons can construct their civic lives.     

Social epistemology and reflexivity: Two versions of how to be really useful

This essay argues that the really useful character of reflexivity is that it enables a radical critique of representation and its conventional material and rhetorical practices. It is uniquely able to produce paradox and thus disrupt discourses by undermining authorial privilege. Because Fuller's social epistemology is insensitive to its own reflexive implications, and limits itself to normative questions about knowledge policy, it is too limited — and limiting — to provide a context that can nurture reflexivity.     

Dis-Illusioning Psychology: Epistemology and the Contextual Psychology of Ellyn Kaschak

ABSTRACT

Ellyn Kaschak is a pioneer feminist therapist whose contributions to feminist theory, practice, education, and advocacy have spanned the globe over the past 40?+?years. From being a founder of one of the first feminist counseling services in the country in the early 1970s, Kaschak has influenced decades of feminist, family and multi-cultural therapists through her teaching and countless others through her feminist epistemology and theory development and the Mattering Map. This article describes Kaschak’s life and work and the lasting contributions she has made to the field of feminist psychology.     

Divine Action,Resurrection, and the Transformation of the Universe

Abstract

The article examines the notion of self-organization and explores the reality of biological processes from an epistemological point of view. First, I briefly analyze what is currently regarded as one of the most important discoveries not only in physics, but also in biology—namely, complex systems and deterministic chaos; secondly, I offer some reflections on the new frontiers of contemporary biology— namely, functional genomics and systems biology. The central part of the article focuses on the epistemological transition from genetic determinism to the new conception of “meaning” as emergence.     

“Doing justice” in psychological methodology: From science and experiments to anecdotes

Methodology is intrinsically related to “object” and its quality is based on the degree to which a method is doing justice to the object, demonstrating the entanglement of ontic, epistemic, and ethical considerations. The intent of “doing justice” is at the core of methodology and is the de facto guiding principle for conducting research and for producing knowledge. Objects in psychology can range from subjectivity to science and conflicts emerge because of giving primacy to particular objects. Using this perspective, various meanings of doing justice, critics’ challenges, deviations from doing justice to an object, ethical-political dimensions and the dialectics of doing justice in relation to objects are discussed. If doing justice is at the core of methodology, then the issue becomes under what circumstances a particular method is doing justice in relation to a particular object. Contrasting the experiment with anecdotes, it is shown dialectically that the former has no privileged status in psychology, and that experiments that are not replicated only do justice as anecdotal evidence.     

Husserl’s Way to Authentic Being

In a journal entry from 1906, Husserl complains of lacking “internal stability” and of his desire to “achieve” it. My claim in this paper is that the “phenomenological method,” which he made public in his 1907 lectures Die Idee der Phänomenologie was, and is, a means to achieve the inner harmony that Husserl longed for. I do not provide an analysis of why Husserl might have felt the way he did; my aim is to show what internal stability might be and how one might achieve it. I conclude that the phenomenological method is the means, the “how,” to internal stability, which I characterize as “clarity” and “harmony” regarding our beliefs and, and ultimately, our authentic comportment.     

‘Foolishness to Greeks’: Plantinga and the Epistemology of Christian Belief

A central theme in the Christian contemplative tradition is that knowing God is much more like ‘unknowing’ than it is like possessing rationally acceptable beliefs. Knowledge of God is expressed, in this tradition, in metaphors of woundedness, darkness, silence, suffering, and desire. Philosophers of religion, on the other hand, tend to explore the possibilities of knowing God in terms of rational acceptability, epistemic rights, cognitive responsibility, and propositional belief. These languages seem to point to very different accounts of how it is that we come to know God, and a very different range of critical concepts by which the truth of such knowledge can be assessed. In this paper, I begin to explore what might be at stake in these different languages of knowing God, drawing particularly on Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief. I will argue that his is a distorted account of the epistemology of Christian belief, and that this has implications for his project of demonstrating the rational acceptability of Christian faith for the 21st century.

The biological foundations of cognitive science

Cognitive Science originated in reactions against behaviorism that were motivated in significant part by the example of the computer. The computer raised the exciting possibility that mind could be understood almost entirely independently of brain: if the operations of the mind are akin to the execution of a program, then almost all the relevant aspects of mind would be captured by that program, independently of whatever was running it, be it transistors or neurons. This presumed independence of cognitive science from biology has waned considerably in recent decades, but in this paper, I argue that there is at least one crucial aspect of biology that has yet to be appreciated for its relevance to mental and other normative processes—the thermodynamics of living systems. In particular, I argue that the emergence of normativity in general—and normative function and representation in particular—depends on special systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium; these form the interface between the factual world of atoms and molecules and the normative world of mind. The nature of that emergence, in turn, imposes strong constraints on how the central nervous system functions, and, therefore, on how cognition is realized.     

Three challenges (and three replies) to the ethics of belief

In this paper I look at three challenges to the very possibility of an ethics of belief and then show how they can be met. The first challenge, from Thomas Kelly, says that epistemic rationality is not (merely) a form of instrumental rationality. If this claim is true, then it will be difficult to develop an ethics of belief that does not run afoul of naturalism. The second challenge is the Non-Voluntarism Argument, which holds that because we cannot believe at will and because ought implies can, there can be no ethics of belief. The third challenge comes from Richard Feldman, who claims that there is no such thing as ought all-things-considered. He says, for example, that moral oughts can be weighed against other moral oughts and that epistemic oughts can be compared to each other, but that there is no way to weigh moral oughts against epistemic oughts. If this is true, then norms about what one ought to believe are not nearly as important as one might have hoped or as philosophers have traditionally thought. In answering these three challenges, I try to show how and why the project of developing epistemic norms might be a promising avenue of research, despite claims to the contrary.