Character-Principlism and the Particularity Objection

This paper is a response to particularist critics of the normative force of moral principles. The particularist critique, as I understand it, is a rejection not only of principle-based accounts of moral deliberation and justification, but also of accounts of character in which principles play a central role. I focus on the latter challenge and counter it with a view I call character-principlism .
I begin by discussing in a general way what motivates the particularity objection to principles and then contrast two views – both of which insist on the importance of attentiveness to particularity – about the relative normative status of principles and particular cases. I present some reasons for believing that we need a more normatively robust conception of the role of moral principles than the particularists provide. In the main portion of the paper, I discuss how character-principlism sees principles functioning in our lives and the lives we lead with others. I contrast this with some other accounts of desirable character that particularists can embrace, and argue that these are seriously flawed because, unlike character-principlism, they cannot satisfactorily explain how a person could possess the constancy of character that moral integrity requires.     

Has 60 Years of Research in Psychology Really Gone Astray?

The author presents several arguments against Toomela’s (Culture of science: Strange history of the methodological thinking in psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2007a, doi:, History of methodology in psychology: Starting point, not the goal. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2007b, doi:) pessimistic thesis: “The last 60 years of research in psychology seems to have gone astray.” Nevertheless he admits that Toomela’s article despite the excessively categorical assessments contained in it and the undue pessimism crowing its conclusion, represents a substantial contribution to the highlighting of socio-cultural impact on various models of psychological cognition, which lurks behind the international unification of globalizing science.

Impulse processing: a dynamical systems model of incremental eye movements in the visual world paradigm

The Visual World Paradigm (VWP) presents listeners with a challenging problem: They must integrate two disparate signals, the spoken language and the visual context, in support of action (e.g., complex movements of the eyes across a scene). We present Impulse Processing, a dynamical systems approach to incremental eye movements in the visual world that suggests a framework for integrating language, vision, and action generally. Our approach assumes that impulses driven by the language and the visual context impinge minutely on a dynamical landscape of attractors corresponding to the potential eye-movement behaviors of the system. We test three unique predictions of our approach in an empirical study in the VWP, and describe an implementation in an artificial neural network. We discuss the Impulse Processing framework in relation to other models of the VWP.     

A connectionist model of a continuous developmental transition in the balance scale task

A connectionist model of the balance scale task is presented which exhibits developmental transitions between ‘Rule I’ and ‘Rule II’ behavior [Siegler, R. S. (1976). Three aspects of cognitive development. Cognitive Psychology,8, 481–520.] as well as the ‘catastrophe flags’ seen in data from Jansen and van der Maas [Jansen, B. R. J., & van der Maas, H. L. J. (2001). Evidence for the phase transition from Rule I to Rule II on the balance scale task. Developmental Review, 21, 450–494]. The model extends a connectionist model of this task [McClelland, J. L. (1989). Parallel distributed processing: Implications for cognition and development. In R. G. M. Morris (Ed.), Parallel distributed processing: Implications for psychology and neurobiology (pp. 8–45). Oxford: Clarendon Press] by introducing intrinsic variability into processing and by allowing the network to adapt during testing in response to its own outputs. The simulations direct attention to several aspects of the experimental data indicating that children generally show gradual change in sensitivity to the distance dimension on the balance scale. While a few children show larger changes than are characteristic of the model, its ability to account for nearly all of the data using continuous processes is consistent with the view that the transition from Rule I to Rule II behavior is typically continuous rather than discrete in nature.     

State‐Trace Analysis: Dissociable Processes in a Connectionist Network?

Some argue the common practice of inferring multiple processes or systems from a dissociation is flawed (Dunn, 2003). One proposed solution is state‐trace analysis (Bamber, 1979), which involves plotting, across two or more conditions of interest, performance measured by either two dependent variables, or two conditions of the same dependent measure. The resulting analysis is considered to provide evidence that either (a) a single process underlies performance (one function is produced) or (b) there is evidence for more than one process (more than one function is produced). This article reports simulations using the simple recurrent network (SRN; Elman, 1990) in which changes to the learning rate produced state‐trace plots with multiple functions. We also report simulations using a single‐layer error‐correcting network that generate plots with a single function. We argue that the presence of different functions on a state‐trace plot does not necessarily support a dual‐system account, at least as typically defined (e.g. two separate autonomous systems competing to control responding); it can also indicate variation in a single parameter within theories generally considered to be single‐system accounts.     

Are multi‐layer backpropagation networks catastrophically amnesic?

Connectionist models with a backpropagation learning rule are known to have a serious problem. Such models exhibit catastrophic interference (or forgetting) with sequential training. Having learned a set of patterns, if the model is trained on another set of patterns, its performance on the first set can dramatically deteriorate very rapidly. The present study reconsiders this issue with four simulations. The model learned arithmetic facts sequentially, but the interference was only modest with random (hence approximately orthogonal) inputs. Essentially the same result was obtained when the inputs are made less orthogonal by adding irrelevant elements. Reducing the number of hidden units did not have major effects. This study suggests that the interference problem has been somewhat overstated.