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Nicholas C. DiDonato 《Theology & Science》2013,11(4):409-424
AbstractAlthough currently unpopular, it will be argued that theology can still be regarded as the “queen of the sciences” because it can provide a basis for scientific realism (in the same way that it has in the past). This argument will unfold in three steps. First, it will be shown that scientific antirealism offers serious objections to scientific realism. Second, the basics of Neoplatonic theological metaphysics will be explained. Finally, it will be argued that Neoplatonic theological metaphysics dissolves (rather than solves) the arguments of scientific antirealism and succeeds in grounding scientific realism, thereby restoring theology as the queen of science. 相似文献
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Anjan Chakravartty 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):149-158
Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic
induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006,
Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the
underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. In this paper,
I contend that while Stanford does present a novel antirealist argument, a successful response to the pessimistic induction
would likewise defuse the problem of unconceived alternatives, and that a more selective and sophisticated realism than that
which he allows is arguably immune to both concerns.
相似文献
Anjan ChakravarttyEmail: |
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Deborah C. Smith 《Synthese》2007,157(1):129-139
Crispin Wright champions the notion of superassertibility as providing a truth predicate that is congenial to antirealists
in many debates in that it satisfies relevant platitudes concerning truth and does so in a very minimal way. He motivates
such a claim by arguing that superassertibility can satisfy the equivalence schema: it is superassertible that P if and only
if P. I argue that Wright’s attempted proof that superassertibility can satisfy this schema is unsuccessful, because it requires
a premise that has not been properly motivated and is prima facie implausible. I further argue that, even if the dubious premise
is accepted, the resulting proof is intuitionistically invalid. This is problematic, because a proponent of superassertibility
as a truth predicate has independent reasons to affect a logical revision in the direction of intuitionism. The resulting
dilemma suggests that superassertibility may not be an adequate truth candidate for any significant ranges of discourse.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992 相似文献
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Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):229-246
Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional
fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on
a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be
abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed
in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof
invalid. My conclusion is that no reductio of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.
相似文献
Luca MorettiEmail: |
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Arthur Fine 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):135-139
In the concluding chapter of Exceeding our Grasp Kyle Stanford outlines a positive response to the central issue raised brilliantly by his book, the problem of unconceived
alternatives. This response, called "epistemic instrumentalism", relies on a distinction between instrumental and literal
belief. We examine this distinction and with it the viability of Stanford's instrumentalism, which may well be another case
of exceeding our grasp. 相似文献
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