Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual task

In a recent article, [Sergent, C. &; Dehaene, S. (2004). Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink, Psychological Science, 15(11), 720–729] claim to give experimental support to the thesis that there is a clear transition between conscious and unconscious perception. This idea is opposed to theoretical arguments that we should think of conscious perception as a continuum of clarity, with e.g., fringe conscious states [Mangan, B. (2001). Sensation’s ghost—the non-sensory “fringe” of consciousness, Psyche, 7, 18]. In the experimental study described in this article, we find support for this opposite notion that we should have a parsimonious account of conscious perception. Our reported finding relates to the hypothesis that there is more than one perceptual threshold [Merikle, P.M., Smilek, D. &; Eastwood, J.D. (2001). Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology, Cognition, 79, 115–134], but goes further to argue that there are different “levels” of conscious perception.     

Incremental validity of the Ego Impairment Index: it's fine when it's there

The results published by W. Perry (2001) demonstrate that with a different criterion more incremental validity can be achieved with the Ego Impairment Index than R. M. Dawes (1999) found using the criterion available to him. Attempting to find statistical rationale for various Rorschach characteristics is, indeed, desirable, especially as a basis for the statistical use of the test. The degree of predictability indicated by most of these statistics, however, still presents a sizable gap between well established validity and much practice, particularly in legal settings. Further, both W. Perry (2001) and D. J. Viglione and M. J. Hilsonroth (2001) raise the issue of evaluating incremental validity in a context where there is some degree of multicolinearity and nesting. The logical equivalence of a nested with a non-nested analysis is established algebraically, and it is noted that the standard concerns about multicolinearity involve the estimations of the coefficients of predictive models--not the degree of predictability per se.     

BELIEF IS NOT THE ISSUE: A DEFENCE OF INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION

Defences of inference to the best explanation (IBE) frequently associate IBE with scientific realism, the idea that it is reasonable to believe our best scientific theories. I argue that this linkage is unfortunate. IBE does not warrant belief, since the fact that a theory is the best available explanation does not show it to be (even probably) true. What IBE does warrant is acceptance: taking a proposition as a premise in theoretical and/or practical reasoning. We ought to accept our best scientific theories since they are the theories that are most likely to lead to the goal of science, which is that of knowledge. In support of this claim I invoke Bill Lycan's Panglossian reflections regarding Mother Nature. 1     

Neurostructural and Neurophysiological Correlates of Multiple Sclerosis Physical Fatigue: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Cross-Sectional Studies

Neuropsychology Review - Fatigue is one of the most debilitating symptoms for people with multiple sclerosis (PwMS). By consolidating a diverse and conflicting evidence-base, this systematic review...     

How Not to Individuate Destiny: a Critique of Segun Ogungbemi’s Conception of Destiny

Philosophia - The social nature of human beings and individualistic characterizing destiny of individuals is contradictory and call for philosophical interrogation. Segun Ogungbemi has...