Degrees of Causation

The primary aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of degrees of causal contribution for actual events and examine the way in which it can be formally defined. This should go some way to filling out a gap in the legal and philosophical literature on causation. By adopting the conception of a cause as a necessary element of a sufficient set (the so-called NESS test) we show that the concept of degrees of causation can be given clear and even empirical meaning. We then apply a game theoretical framework to derive a measure of causal contribution. Our favoured measure turns out to be a generalised version of the normalized Penrose–Banzhaf index of voting power.     

Inhibition,Reinforcement Sensitivity and Temporal Information Processing in ADHD and ADHD+ODD: Evidence of a Separate Entity?

This study compared children with ADHD-only, ADHD+ODD and normal controls (age 8–12) on three key neurocognitive functions: response inhibition, reinforcement sensitivity, and temporal information processing. The goal was twofold: (a) to investigate neurocognitive impairments in children with ADHD-only and children with ADHD+ODD, and (b) to test whether ADHD+ODD is a more severe from of ADHD in terms of neurocognitive performance. In Experiment 1, inhibition abilities were measured using the Stop Task. In Experiment 2, reinforcement sensitivity and temporal information processing abilities were measured using a Timing Task with both a reward and penalty condition. Compared to controls, children with ADHD-only demonstrated impaired inhibitory control, showed more time underestimations, and showed performance deterioration in the face of reward and penalty. Children with ADHD+ODD performed in-between children with ADHD-only and controls in terms of inhibitory controls and the tendency to underestimate time, but were more impaired than controls and children with ADHD-only in terms of timing variability. In the face of reward and penalty children with ADHD+ODD improved their performance compared to a neutral condition, in contrast to children with ADHD-only. In the face of reward, the performance improvement in the ADHD+ODD group was disproportionally larger than that of controls. Taken together the findings suggest that, in terms of neurocognitive functioning, comorbid ADHD+ODD is a substantial different entity than ADHD-only.     

Unconstraining theories of embodied cognition

The approach/avoidance effect refers to the finding that valenced stimuli trigger approach and avoidance actions. Markman and Brendl [Markman, A. B., & Brendl, M. (2005). Constraining theories of embodied cognition. Psychological Science, 16, 6-16] argued that this effect is not a truly embodied phenomenon, but depends on participants’ symbolic representation of the self.In their study, participants moved valenced words toward or away from their own name on the computer screen. This would induce participants to form a ‘disembodied’ self-representation at the location of their name, outside of the body. Approach/avoidance effects occurred with respect to the participant’s name, rather than with respect to the body.In three experiments, we demonstrate that similar effects are found when the name is replaced by a positive word, a negative word or even when no word is presented at all. This suggests that the ‘disembodied self’ explanation of Markman and Brendl is incorrect, and that their findings do not necessarily constrain embodied theories of cognition.     

Are there nontrivial constraints on colour categorization?

In this target article the following hypotheses are discussed: (1) Colour is autonomous: a perceptuolinguistic and behavioural universal. (2) It is completely described by three independent attributes: hue, brightness, and saturation: (3) Phenomenologically and psychophysically there are four unique hues: red, green, blue, and yellow; (4) The unique hues are underpinned by two opponent psychophysical and/or neuronal channels: red/green, blue/yellow. The relevant literature is reviewed. We conclude: (i) Psychophysics and neurophysiology fail to set nontrivial constraints on colour categorization. (ii) Linguistic evidence provides no grounds for the universality of basic colour categories. (iii) Neither the opponent hues red/green, blue/yellow nor hue, brightness, and saturation are intrinsic to a universal concept of colour. (iv) Colour is not autonomous.     

Evaluating expectations about negative emotional states of aggressive boys using Bayesian model selection

Researchers often have expectations about the research outcomes in regard to inequality constraints between, e.g., group means. Consider the example of researchers who investigated the effects of inducing a negative emotional state in aggressive boys. It was expected that highly aggressive boys would, on average, score higher on aggressive responses toward other peers than moderately aggressive boys, who would in turn score higher than nonaggressive boys. In most cases, null hypothesis testing is used to evaluate such hypotheses. We show, however, that hypotheses formulated using inequality constraints between the group means are generally not evaluated properly. The wrong hypotheses are tested, i.e.. the null hypothesis that group means are equal. In this article, we propose an innovative solution to these above-mentioned issues using Bayesian model selection, which we illustrate using a case study.     

On the foundations of beliefs in free will: intentional binding and unconscious priming in self-agency

The concept of an ability to make choices and to determine one's own outcomes fits well with experiences that most people have, and these experiences form the basis for beliefs in free will. However, the existence of conscious free will is challenged by modern research findings highlighting the unconscious origins of goal-directed behavior that gives rise to free-will beliefs. This report expands on these insights by revealing that both conscious and unconscious processes play an important role in free-will beliefs. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrates that free-will beliefs are strengthened when conscious intentions to produce action outcomes bind the perception of action and outcome together in time. Experiment 2 shows that these beliefs are strengthened when unconscious priming of action outcomes creates illusory experiences of self-agency when the primed outcomes occur. Together, these findings suggest that beliefs in free will are associated with self-agency and are enhanced by both conscious and unconscious information processing of goal-directed behavior.