Luminance edges are not necessary for visual completion

Luminance edges seem to have an important role in visual feature binding and, more specifically, in visual completion because luminance differences are important for the perception of depth. We investigated this claim in two experiments in which the primed-matching paradigm was used. In Experiment 1, we investigated conditions under which either a partly occluded shape or an occluder was isoluminant with respect to the background. In Experiment 2, the partly occluded shape and the occluder were isoluminant with respect to each other. Evidence was found for visual completion in all cases, and we therefore conclude that luminance edges are not essential for visual completion.     

Prejudice as Self‐Control Failure1

Research has suggested that whereas stereotypical attitudes may be automatically activated, the response to these stereotypes can be controlled. Anything that interferes with self‐control may result in more biased behavior. The ego strength model hypothesizes that after exerting self‐control, subsequent self‐control performance will suffer. Hence, depletion of ego strength may lead to increased prejudice. In 2 studies, depletion was found only to affect individuals who normally try to control their prejudicial responses. Participants who do not normally try to control their use of stereotypes were equally prejudiced, regardless of their level of ego strength. The results have implications for prejudice and stereotyping, as well as models of self‐control.     

Children's judgments about their own self‐knowledge: The role of disclosure to other

Previous research has suggested that children of 5/6 years fail to understand that they are the authority on their own self‐knowledge. That is, when asked questions like, ‘Who knows best when you are feeling tired?’, they tend to cite their mother rather than themselves. Here we report a study that, rather than asking about generalities (‘Who knows best what you are thinking?’), presented 5‐, 7‐ 9‐ and 11‐year‐children with hypothetical vignettes about specific circumstances in which they were described as either disclosing or not disclosing a specified state to their mother. Children were subsequently asked to judge who would best know the state. Over all age groups children were significantly more likely to identify themselves as authorities on their own self‐knowledge when states had not been disclosed to mother than when they had. However, in the case of disclosed states, young children (though not older ones) asserted that, ‘mum knows best’. These findings are interpreted as suggesting not that young children entirely fail to understand first person authority, but instead that they make the relatively sophisticated assumption that mothers' interpretive competence is greater than their own.     

Uncertainty about perception and dissociation after compulsive-like staring: Time course of effects

Repeated and compulsive-like checking reduces confidence in memory for the last check. Obsessive-compulsive (OC) patients are not only uncertain about memory, but may also be uncertain about perception, while this perceptual uncertainty may be associated with prolonged visual fixation on the object of uncertainty. It was reported earlier that, among healthy participants, prolonged staring at light bulbs or gas rings induces OC-like uncertainty about perception and feelings of dissociation [van den Hout, M. A., Engelhard, I. M., de Boer, C., du Bois, A., & Dek, E. (2008). Perseverative and compulsive-like staring causes uncertainty about perception. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46, 1300–1304]. In that study, staring continued for 10 min. For patients, however, staring intervals seem to be considerably shorter. To test the clinical credibility of the paradigm as a model of the maintenance of OC perceptual uncertainty, we investigated whether the effects of staring materialize long before 10 min. Five groups of 16 undergraduates participated: one group did not stare at a gas stove while the others stared for 7.5, 15, 30 or 300 s. In the absence of staring, no pre-to-post increase in dissociation/uncertainty was reported, but after staring it was. The larger part of the observed dissociation/uncertainty after 5 min had occurred within 30 s, and around 50% of this maximal increase was reported between 7.5 and 15 s. Thus, even relatively short intervals of staring induce uncertainty about perception and dissociative experiences. Perseverative looking at objects may be a counter-productive OC strategy, which increases uncertainty about perception and may serve to maintain the disorder.     

Moral antitheodicy: prospects and problems

Proponents of the view which I call ‘moral antitheodicy’ call for the theistic discourse of theodicy to be abandoned, because, they claim, all theodicies involve some form of moral impropriety. Three arguments in support of this view are examined: the argument from insensitivity, the argument from detachment, and the argument from harmful consequences. After discussing the merits of each argument individually, I attempt to show that they all must presuppose what they are intended to establish, namely, that the set of premises advanced in any given theodicy will be untenable. I conclude by discussing what uses there might be for the moral critique of theodicy, if it cannot be used to ground a global rejection of theodical practice.     

What Does the Frame Problem Tell us About Moral Normativity?

Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals have significant import regarding both the nature of moral normativity and the human capacity for mastering moral normativity. The morals of the frame problem bode well, we argue, for the claim that moral normativity is not fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles, and for the correlative claim that such systematizability is not required in order for humans to master moral normativity.

Sex differences in the emergence of leadership during competitions within and between groups

This experiment investigated potential gender biases in the emergence of leadership in groups. Teams played a public-goods game under conditions of intra- or intergroup competition. We predicted and found a strong preference for female leaders during intragroup competition and male leaders during intergroup competition. Furthermore, during intragroup competition, a female leader was more instrumental than a male leader in raising group investments, but this pattern was reversed during intergroup competition. These findings suggest that particular group threats elicit specific gender-biased leader prototypes. We speculate about the evolutionary and cultural origins of these sex differences in the emergence of leadership.     

D-cycloserine facilitates context-specific fear extinction learning

D-cycloserine (DCS) may facilitate fear extinction learning, but the behavioral consequences and mechanisms behind this effect are not well understood at present. In this paper, we re-analyze data from previously reported null result experiments and find that rats showing above-median extinction learning during DCS treatment benefited from the drug, whereas rats showing below-median (and in this case little) extinction learning did not. Two additional experiments found that DCS facilitated extinction learning when specifically combined with a moderate, but not a small, number of extinction trials. DCS thus facilitates extinction learning only if the behavioral procedure first engages the extinction learning process. The benefits of the drug, however, were specific to the context in which extinction was learned--i.e., DCS did not prevent or influence the renewal of fear observed when the extinguished cue was tested in the original conditioning context.