Do novel associative word stem completion and cued recall share the same memory retrieval processes?

The aim of this study was to determine whether word stem completion for novel associations between cue and target words was mediated by automatic unconscious memory processes or effortful memory processes under conscious control. This was done by applying full and divided attention conditions at test to stem completion, cued recall, and recognition, and by administering a questionnaire that probed the memory strategies used by subjects during the completion test. Divided attention had no effect on stem completion performance, but did reduce associative cued recall. Recognition performance was weakened overall by divided attention, but the associative effect was similar under both attention conditions. This suggested that novel associative word stem completion was mediated by automatic retrieval processes. However, the results of the questionnaire indicated that only subjects who attempted to remember the words from the study phase during the completion task showed any novel associative effect. It is concluded that novel association word stem completion and cued recall share automatic retrieval processes, which nevertheless give rise to the experience of remembering.     

The human element in car following models

This commentary distinguishes between the engineering-inspired formalisms used by Brackstone, M., and McDonald, M. (Transportation Research Part F (1999)) and the psychological knowledge of, and assumptions about human behaviour when car following. It outlines a preliminary mathematical model, based on psychological knowledge about car following behaviour by human drivers, which could be applied in traffic engineering, as a means of bringing these two ways of studying car following closer together.     

Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to do Otherwise

In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it -- since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this.     

Exocentric pointing in three-dimensional space

A study is reported of an exocentric pointing task in all three dimensions, in near space, with only two visible luminous objects--a pointer and a target. The task of the subject was to aim a pointer at a target. The results clearly show that visual space is not isotropic, since every set direction appeared to consist of two independent components--one in the projection onto a frontoparallel plane (tilt), the other in depth (slant). The tilt component shows a general trend across subjects, an oblique effect, and can be judged monocularly. The slant component is symmetrical in the mid-sagittal plane, requires the use of binocular information, and shows considerable differences between subjects. These differences seem to depend on the amount of binocular information used by each subject. There was a remarkably high level of consistency in the exocentric pointing, despite the absence of environmental cues. The within-subject consistency in the settings of the pointer corresponds to a consistency of about 1 min of arc in disparity of its tip, even though the pointer and target are separated by more than 5 deg.     

The Identity Status Approach: In Need of Fundamental Revision and Qualitative Change

This article is a response to the commentaries of Waterman (this issue) and Berzonsky and Adams (this issue) on my review of the identity status field (van Hoof, this issue). The commentaries illustrate that the identity status researchers attribute different meanings to the identity statuses and identity status research; while Waterman finds it difficult to recognize the field in my review, Berzonsky and Adams agree with several of my conclusions. The two commentaries represent two pillars on which the status approach rests. The difference between the review and the commentaries is that the first includes both pillars, whereas each commentary consists primarily of a selective presentation of assumptions and data. This response focuses on two main points of the commentaries: (a) are the statuses sufficiently validated? and (b) to what extent are they suitable for testing developmental identity hypotheses? Using specific examples I show that the line of reasoning in the commentaries and the data proposed in support of these arguments in fact often support the conclusions of my review, for I demonstrate that the statuses are insufficiently validated and that the statuses are unsuitable for measuring identity development. These conclusions call for a fundamental revision of the identity status approach and a qualitative change in identity theory and research. Finally, the alternative approaches presented by Berzonsky and Adams are evaluated with respect to their contribution to an indispensable qualitative change in the identity status field.     

Relative mislocalization of briefly presented stimuli in the retinal periphery

We studied the ability to localize flashed stimuli, using a relative judgment task. When observers are asked to localize the peripheral position of a probe with respect to the midposition of a spatially extended comparison stimulus, they tend to judge the probe as being more toward the periphery than is the midposition of the comparison stimulus. We report seven experiments in which this novel phenomenon was explored. They reveal that the mislocalization occurs only when the probe and the comparison stimulus are presented in succession, independent of whether the probe or the comparison stimulus comes first (Experiment 1). The size of the mislocalization is dependent on the stimulus onset asynchrony (Experiment 2) and on the eccentricity of presentation (Experiment 3). In addition, the illusion also occurs in an absolute judgment task, which links mislocalization with the general tendency to judge peripherally presented stimuli as being more foveal than they actually are (Experiment 4). The last three experiments reveal that relative mislocalization is affected by the amount of spatial extension of the comparison stimulus (Experiment 5) and by its structure (Experiments 6 and 7). This pattern of results allows us to evaluate possible explanations of the illusion and to relate it to comparable tendencies observed in eye movement behavior. It is concluded that the system in charge of the guidance of saccadic eye movements is also the system that provides the metric in perceived visual space.     

Splitting a Difference of Opinion: The Shift to Negotiation

Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way.