The cognitive act and the first-person perspective: an epistemology for constructive type theory

The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is apt for constructive type theory, and for epistemology in general. Instead of taking knowledge attributions as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’ that needs to be given an account of, and understanding a first-person knowledge claim as a special case of knowledge attribution, the account of knowledge that is given here understands first-person knowledge claims as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’. This means that a cognitive act is an act that counts as cognitive from a first-person point of view. The method of linguistic phenomenology is used to explain or elucidate our epistemic notions. One of the advantages of the theory is that an answer can be given to some of the problems in modern epistemology, such as the Gettier problem.     

Lasting effects of alcohol: Subliminal alcohol cues,impairment expectancies,and math performance

Many people believe that drinking alcohol reduces cognitive performance, and prior research has shown such expectancy‐related impairment even when people merely thought that the (non‐alcoholic) drink they consumed contained alcohol. This study tested whether subliminal priming with alcohol‐related cues would similarly result in expectancy‐consistent cognitive performance decrements. Additionally, the moderating role of alcohol use was examined. After assessing participants' baseline math performance, participants were primed with alcohol‐related or neutral words and then completed a post‐treatment math task. Whereas impairment expectancies had no influence on math performance in control participants, expectancies predicted math performance for participants primed with alcohol‐related words. As hypothesized, expectancy‐consistent impairment in performance was only observed among high alcohol users. The current findings suggest that, in the presence of alcohol‐related cues in the environment, some people may perform less on cognitive tasks even in the absence of actual or assumed alcohol consumption and without being aware of it. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Linking self and ingroup: Self‐anchoring as distinctive cognitive route to social identification

The present paper investigates how cognitive projection processes instigate social identification. We complement the classical self‐stereotyping approach (i.e., conforming to prototypical group norms) by investigating self‐anchoring (i.e., projection from self to group) as a distinct cognitive route to social identification. Self‐anchoring has mainly been investigated as predictor of intergroup differentiation. Surprisingly, no reliable link has been provided yet between self‐anchoring and social identification. In Study 1, we provide first evidence for this positive link. In Study 2, we add self‐stereotyping to our model and show that self‐anchoring is still positively related to social identification when controlling for self‐stereotyping. Additionally, we show that self‐anchoring is positively related to affective components of identification, while self‐stereotyping is positively related to cognitive components. Moreover, we examined the impact of self‐concept stability on self‐anchoring. Self‐concept stability was positively related to self‐anchoring, and hence to social identification (Study 1), independently from self‐stereotyping (Study 2). In the discussion, we argue that disentangling self‐anchoring from self‐stereotyping is important as it increases our insight in how people identify, and how this may vary depending on self‐concept and group context. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

At face value: Categorization goals modulate vigilance for angry faces

The present research demonstrates that the attention bias to angry faces is modulated by how people categorize these faces. Since facial expressions contain psychologically meaningful information for social categorizations (i.e., gender, personality) but not for non-social categorizations (i.e., eye-color), angry facial expression should especially capture attention during social categorization tasks. Indeed, in three studies, participants were slower to name the gender of angry compared to happy or neutral faces, but not their color (blue or green; Study 1) or eye-color (blue or brown; Study 2). Furthermore, when different eye-colors were linked to a personality trait (introversion, extraversion) versus sensitivity to light frequencies (high, low), angry faces only slowed down categorizations when eye-color was indicative of a social characteristic (Study 3). Thus, vigilance for angry facial expressions is contingent on people's categorization goals, supporting the perspective that even basic attentional processes are moderated by social influences.     

Biased allocation of faces to social categories

Three studies show that social categorization is biased at the level of category allocation. In all studies, participants categorized faces. In Studies 1 and 2, participants overallocated faces with criminal features--a stereotypical negative trait--to the stigmatized Moroccan category, especially if they were prejudiced. On the contrary, the stereotype-irrelevant negative trait stupid did not lead to overallocation to the Moroccan category. In Study 3, using the stigmatized category homosexual, the previously used negative trait criminal--irrelevant to the homosexual stereotype--did not lead to overallocation, but the stereotype-relevant positive trait femininity did. These results demonstrate that normative fit is higher for faces with stereotype-relevant features regardless of valence. Moreover, individual differences in implicit prejudice predicted the extent to which stereotype-relevant traits elicited overallocation: Whereas more negatively prejudiced people showed greater overallocation of faces associated with negative stereotype-relevant traits, they showed less overallocation of faces associated with positive stereotype-relevant traits. These results support our normative fit hypothesis: In general, normative fit is better for faces with stereotypical features. Moreover, normative fit is enhanced for prejudiced individuals when these features are evaluatively congruent. Social categorization thus may be biased in itself.     

Adaptive memory: Stereotype activation is not enough

Studies have shown that survival processing leads to superior memorability. The aim of the present study was to examine whether this survival recall advantage might result from stereotype activation. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a pilot study and two experiments in which participants were primed with stereotypes (Experiment 1, professor and elderly person; Experiment 2, survival-stereotype). In Experiment 1, 120 undergraduates were randomly assigned to a survival, professor stereotype, elderly person stereotype, or moving scenario and rated words for their relevance to the imagined scenario. In Experiment 2, 75 undergraduates were given a survival, survival-stereotype (based on our pilot study), or moving scenario. Both experiments showed that survival processing leads to a greater recall advantage over the stereotype groups and control group. These data indicate that the mere activation of stereotypes cannot explain the survival recall advantage.     

Emotional Dynamics in the Development of Early Adolescent Psychopathology: A One-Year Longitudinal Study

This study examined the role of the level and variability of happiness, anger, anxiety, and sadness in the development of adolescent-reported anxiety disorder symptoms, depressive symptoms, and aggressive behavior in 452 adolescents (250 male) followed from age 13 to 14. Level and between-day variability of emotions were assessed through adolescent report at 3-month intervals across a 1 year period. Level and variability of the four emotions contributed to changes in anxiety disorder and depressive symptoms more consistently than to changes in aggressive behavior. All four emotions were predictive of changes in internalizing problems, while anger played the most prominent role in the development of aggressive behavior. Variability of emotions contributed to changes in anxiety disorder symptoms, while heightened levels of negative emotions and diminished happiness contributed to changes in depression. Results suggested somewhat stronger effects of negative affect on aggressive behavior for females than for males. Results underscore the role of emotion dysregulation in the development of psychopathology.     

Psychopathic Traits of Dutch Adolescents in Residential Care: Identifying Subgroups

The present study examined whether a sample of 214 (52.8% male, M age = 15.76, SD = 1.29) institutionalized adolescents could be classified into subgroups based on psychopathic traits. Confirmatory Factor Analyses revealed a relationship between the subscales of the Youth Psychopathic traits Inventory (YPI) and the three latent constructs of the original model on which it is based. Latent Class Analyses showed that adolescents showing psychopathic traits could be classified into three subgroups. The first group showed low scores on the grandiose/manipulative dimension, the callous/unemotional dimension, and the impulsive/irresponsible dimension (normal group). The second group scored moderate on the grandiose/manipulative dimension and the callous/unemotional dimension and high on the impulsive/irresponsible dimension (impulsive, non-psychopathic-like group). The third group scored high on all three dimensions (psychopathy-like group). The findings revealed that the impulsive, non-psychopathic like group scored significantly higher on internalizing problem behavior compared to the normal group, while the psychopathy-like and the impulsive, non-psychopathic-like group both scored higher on externalizing problem behavior compared to the normal group. Based on a self-report delinquency measure, it appeared that the psychopathy-like group had the highest delinquency rates, except for vandalism. Both the impulsive and psychopathy-like group had the highest scores on the use of soft drugs.     

Corvid caching: Insights from a cognitive model

Caching and recovery of food by corvids is well-studied, but some ambiguous results remain. To help clarify these, we built a computational cognitive model. It is inspired by similar models built for humans, and it assumes that memory strength depends on frequency and recency of use. We compared our model's behavior to that of real birds in previously published experiments. Our model successfully replicated the outcomes of two experiments on recovery behavior and two experiments on cache site choice. Our "virtual birds" reproduced declines in recovery accuracy across sessions, revisits to previously emptied cache sites, a lack of correlation between caching and recovery order, and a preference for caching in safe locations. The model also produced two new explanations. First, that Clark's nutcrackers may become less accurate as recovery progresses not because of differential memory for different cache sites, as was once assumed, but because of chance effects. And second, that Western scrub jays may choose their cache sites not on the basis of negative recovery experiences only, as was previously thought, but on the basis of positive recovery experiences instead. Alternatively, both "punishment" and "reward" may be playing a role. We conclude with a set of new insights, a testable prediction, and directions for future work.