Mechanisms underlying satiation of feeding behavior of the mollusc Aplysia

Animals filled almost to satiation by nonnutritive bulk do not satiate when they ingest a small amount of seaweed. This suggests that satiation is not triggered by chemostimulation of an anteriorly located "hot spot." Inflation of a balloon placed in the gut of the animal results in satiation as reflected in a number of different parameters of feeding behavior. The suppressive effect of a relatively brief inflation is rapidly and fully reversible, although repeated inflation and deflation appeared to produce slowly reversible or irreversible effects. The parameters of the changes in feeding during gut inflation are comparable to those of normal animals that are slowly fed individual pieces of food. The inflation volume needed to satiate the animal is a function of the rate of inflation--more rapid inflations requiring larger volumes. Cutting of the esophageal nerves results in a significant increase in the volume needed to satiate the animals, but nevertheless they eventually cease feeding and generally do not show a burst gut. The evidence indicates that the satiation that eventually occurs in nerve-sectioned animals, at least in part, is due to depression of feeding following very prolonged sensory stimulation. The data suggest that for a rapidly consumed meal, satiation results primarily due to distension-related gut signals conveyed by the esophageal nerves, whereas for very slowly consumed meals, the former factor interacts with a process associated with sensory stimulation, such as receptor adaptation. The current results indicate that balloon distension can serve as a reasonable stimulus in experiments in simplified preparations in which the nervous system can be studied.     

Anger and irrational thought: Questionnaire and interview ratings

From an initial pool of 96 students, 36 subjects were selected based on Novaco Anger Scale scores to form high-, moderate-, and low-anger groups (n=12). They completed self-report questionnaires and participated in a structured interview designed to elicit cognitive and affective responses to hypothetical situations involving interpersonal conflict. High- and moderate-anger groups scored significantly higher than low-anger subjects on a questionnaire measure of irrational thinking. High-anger subjects scored higher than low-anger subjects on general anxiety, suspiciousness, fear of negative evaluation, hostility, and criticism of themselves and others. Interview ratings showed that there were no group differences in self-reports of anger or ability to cope with conflict, yet raters judged high-anger subjects to display more anger than low-anger subjects in their stated response actions. Estimates of coping ability varied inversely with reports of anger experienced. Generally, results support a relationship between irrational thinking patterns and anger in feeling and action. Implications for treatment are discussed.     

Counseling Centers and Accountability: Immovable Objects,Irresistible Forces

The concept of accountability has been resisted by some college and university counseling center personnel. Typical arguments about accountability are discussed, and a further endorsement of the value of developing accountability systems in counseling centers is provided.     

Peer-group affiliation and adolescent self-esteem: an integration of ego-identity and symbolic-interaction theories

To evaluate expectations derived from ego-identity theory and symbolic-interaction theories about the association between self-concept and peer-group affiliations in adolescence, we examined the self-esteem of 221 7th through 12th graders associated by peers with one of five major school crowds and 106 students relatively unknown by classmates and not associated with any school crowd. Among crowd members, self-esteem was directly related to the position of one's crowd in the peer-group status hierarchy (based on both peer-rated and self-perceived crowd affiliation). Outsiders' self-esteem differed in relation to the accuracy of their reflected appraisal of and the salience they attached to crowd affiliation. Crowd members as a whole exhibited higher self-esteem than outsiders as a whole. Differences, however, were mediated by crowd status, salience of crowd affiliation, and the accuracy of reflected appraisals. An adequate interpretation of the findings required an integration of Festinger's (1954, 1957) social comparisons and cognitive-dissonance theories, Cooley's (1902) notions of reflected appraisal, and Newman and Newman's (1976) extrapolations from ego-identity theory.     

Effects of delayed conditioned reinforcement in chain schedules.

The contingency between responding and stimulus change on a chain variable-interval 33-s, variable-interval 33-s, variable-interval 33-s schedule was weakened by interposing 3-s delays between either the first and second or the second and third links. No stimulus change signaled the delay interval and responses could occur during it, so the obtained delays were often shorter than the scheduled delay. When the delay occurred after the initial link, initial-link response rates decreased by an average of 77% with no systematic change in response rates in the second or third links. Response rates in the second link decreased an average of 59% when the delay followed that link, again with little effect on response rates in the first or third links. Because the effect of delaying stimulus change was comparable to the effect of delaying primary reinforcement in a simple variable-interval schedule, and the effect of the unsignaled delay was specific to the link in which the delay occurred, the results provide strong evidence for the concept of conditioned reinforcement.     

Testing the dimensionality of the self-consciousness scales

The self-consciousness scale of Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) was subjected to internal and external consistency tests based on the classical test theory model. The scale was found to have five underlying dimensions: two for private self-consciousness (viz., self-reflectiveness and internal state awareness), two for public self-consciousness, and one for social anxiety. The confirmatory factor analysis procedures employed by Burnkrant and Page (1984) are shown to be fallible as indicators of unidimensionality. Theoretical implications of newly identified dimensions in the public self-consciousness subscale are discussed.     

Invariance in the MMPI's component structure

Bernstein and Garbin (1985b) suggested that the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory's major clinical scales (excluding Scales ? and 5) can be approximated by an oblique three-component structure: (a) Profile Elevation, (b) Test-taking Attitudes, and (c) Optimism-Pessimism, collectively termed the salient weight model. In this study, we found that both this model and the MMPI's principal component structure remain invariant across race, sex, and, as previously noted, context of testing (job applicants vs. inmates in correctional institutions). We further noted that several alternative definitions of Profile Elevation provide equally satisfactory representation of the relations among the scales. This factor invariance is necessary, but not sufficient, for the MMPI to be viewed as unbiased.