Developmental dyslexia and word retrieval deficits

Developmental dyslexics, selected on the basis of very slow naming rates on the Rapid Automatic Naming Tasks (RAN), were compared to normal readers on oral language, picture categorization, and reading tasks. Findings indicated that the dyslexics' word retrieval deficits were one symptom of a more generalized, however subtle, oral language deficit which involved both receptive and expressive oral language functioning. The dyslexics' word retrieval problem also seemed chiefly related to language processing and not to deficits in semantic memory as there were no significant differences between dyslexics and controls on a nonverbal semantic memory task (picture categorization). In naming and identifying printed words, the dyslexics appeared to rely considerably upon the "indirect" or "assembly-of-phonology" route; they were slower in naming irregularly spelled words compared to regularly spelled words and on a lexical decision task, the dyslexics were slower in making negative decisions for "pseudohomophones" (e.g., "braik") than for other matched nonwords. Results are discussed in terms of the logogen model with some consideration of a developmental model as well.     

A linguistic deficit resulting from right-hemisphere damage

The ability of right-brain-damaged (RBD) subjects to correctly insert a word into a well-formed stimulus sentence was tested. Subjects also performed three evaluative tasks designed to establish their degree of general cognitive impairment. The performance of RBD subjects on these tasks was compared to that of left-brain-damaged (LBD) and non-brain-damaged (NBD) subjects. Although RBD subjects outperformed LBD subjects on the language-related evaluative tasks, the RBD group was significantly more impaired on a subset of the insertion task. This subset included items which required reassignment of the syntactic status of elements in the stimulus sentence in order for the insertion to be carried out. The results of this study permit refinement of the common characterization of RBD individuals as rigid in their interpretation of meaning and indicate right-hemisphere involvement in aspects of the grammar previously thought to be inaccessible to it.     

A developmental study of the auditory Stroop effect

A pediatric auditory version of the Stroop procedure was developed and administered to 48 normal children from 3 to 6 years of age. Our purpose was to define the developmental course characterizing interaction between auditory and semantic speech dimensions in young children. The procedure was a reaction time (RT) task that required children to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible to words spoken by a male or a female voice. Children were instructed to ignore what was said and to push the "Mommy" button if Mommy was talking or the "Daddy" button if Daddy was talking. Performance was obtained for words with neutral, congruent, and conflicting semantic content. Preschool children manifested processing dependencies that were similar to those observed in adults on the visual Stroop procedure. Conflict between semantic and auditory dimensions significantly increased RT and congruence between the two dimensions significantly decreased RT relative to the neutral condition. The pattern of results indicated that the meaning of words was processed automatically in the normal children. The magnitude of the Stroop effect reflected developmental change with increasing age.     

The foundations of epistemological probability

Epistemological probability is the kind of probability relative to a body of evidence. Many philosophers, including Henry Kyburg and Roderick Chisholm, hold that all epistemological probabilities reflect a relation between an evidential body of propositions and other propositions. But this article argues that some epistemological probabilities for empirical propositions must be relative to non-propositional evidence, specifically the contents of non-propositional perceptual states. In doing so, the article distinguishes between internalism and externalism regarding epistemological probability, and argues for a version of awareness internalism. The article draws three main concluding lessons. First, epistemological probability is not to be identified with the sort of objective, experience-independent probability that is familiar from statistical and propensity interpretations of probability. Second, it is doubtful that epistemological probability is measurable, in any useful way, by real numbers, even if it admits of comparative assessments. Third, contrary to the familiar claim of C. I. Lewis, epistemological probability should not be viewed as requiring a basis of certainty.     

Powers, causation, and modality

A complex theory concerning powers, natures, and causal necessity has emerged from the writings of P. H. Hare, E. H. Madden, and R. Harré. In the course of rebutting objections that other critics have raised to the power account of causation, I correct three of its genuine difficulties: its attempt to analyze power attributions in terms of conditional statements; its characterization of the relation between something's powers and its nature; and its doctrines concerning conceptual necessity. The resulting interpretation of causal modalities is then subsumed under a more general power account of modality, related at a number of points to considerations concerning powers, and further illustrating their philosophical importance.     

Memory and awareness in a patient with multiple personality disorder

We studied an individual with multiple personality disorder in whom each of several personalities claimed to have no direct awareness of the others and to be unable to consciously remember the experiences of other personalities. A broad selection of implicit and explicit memory tests was used to determine the extent to which one personality had access to knowledge acquired by another and the circumstances in which that knowledge would be expressed. The implicit assessment of memory was a necessary but not sufficient condition for demonstrating interpersonality access. The degree of compartmentalization of knowledge in this patient depended largely on whether the interpretation of presented information was likely to differ across personalities.