Some evidence for correlated separate activation in a simple letter-detection task

This study investigates the separate activation versus coactivation issue for redundant targets in a simple letter-detection paradigm with latency as the dependent variable. The results of a one-response visual-search task are reported. Since, on single-target trials, only the target was presented and no accompanying noise element, no “distraction decrement” caused by irrelevant noise elements (Grice et al., 1984) was to be expected. The data obtained showed a clear redundantsignal effect. Subsequent detailed analysis of the latency data using Miller’s (1982) procedure indicated that the results were consistent with a separate activation model and failed to provide convincing evidence in favor of coactivation models. A further analysis of the data indicated that, in the present study, the separate channels were negatively correlated for a range of fast RTs and positively correlated for intermediate and larger RTs. No evidence in favor of Grice et al.’s (1984) distraction-decrement hypothesis was found. The conclusions of this study are that (1) a separate activation model summarizes the essential features of information processing in this simple visual search task, and (2) no convincing evidence in favor of coactivation in visual search tasks has been reported in the literature up to now.     

Time courses in visual-information processing: Some empirical evidence for inhibition

Summary In the literature two different views on the time course of activation of recognition units — hypothetical units that represent identity information — are proposed. The first view assumes that the recognition units accumulate activation gradually over time. The second assumes that the activation levels increase fast initially and then start to decrease. Hagenzieker and Van der Heijden (1990) have proposed a more general information-processing model, which is compatible with both views. In this model a treshold determines what type of time course will be obtained. For below-threshold-activation values a gradual accumulation of activation will be found; for above-threshold values activation levels will first increase and then, because of inhibition, decrease. This model served as a starting-point for the present paper. Elaboration of this model led to two testable hypotheses with regard to identification performance. The first prediction is that evidence for inhibition should be observed only under relatively bright luminance conditions. The second is that, given inhibition, the amount of the effect of this inhibition should increase over time. A partial-report bar-probe task was used to test the predictions. The experiment involved two luminance conditions and the information was sampled at two different moments in time. To control for possible localization artefacts a digit-naming task was also used. Evidence for inhibition was found in both luminance conditions. In accordance with the model the amount of the effect of inhibition increased over time.     

Knowledge of Rules,Causal Systematicity,and the Language of Thought

Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined. It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads to a counterintuitive consequence: it groups together distributed connectionist systems with look-up tables. To avoid this consequence, a modified construal of causal systematicity is proposed and Davies' argument for the causal systematicity of thought is shown to be question-begging. It is briefly sketched how the modified construal links up with multiple dispositions of the same categorical base. Finally, the question of the causal efficacy of single rules is distinguished from the question of their psychological reality: implicit rules might be psychologically real without being causally efficacious. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Evaluating a dual‐process model of risk: affect and cognition as determinants of risky choice

In three studies we addressed the impact of perceived risk and negative affect on risky choice. In Study 1, we tested a model that included both perceived risk and negative affect as predictors of risky choice. Study 2 and Study 3 replicated these findings and examined the impact of affective versus cognitive processing modes. In all the three studies, both perceived risk and negative affect were shown to be significant predictors of risky choice. Furthermore, Study 2 and Study 3 showed that an affective processing mode strengthened the relation between negative affect and risky choice and that a cognitive processing mode strengthened the relation between perceived risk and risky choice. Together, these findings show support for the idea of a dual‐process model of risky choice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A phase transition model for the speed-accuracy trade-off in response time experiments

Most models of response time (RT) in elementary cognitive tasks implicitly assume that the speed-accuracy trade-off is continuous: When payoffs or instructions gradually increase the level of speed stress, people are assumed to gradually sacrifice response accuracy in exchange for gradual increases in response speed. This trade-off presumably operates over the entire range from accurate but slow responding to fast but chance-level responding (i.e., guessing). In this article, we challenge the assumption of continuity and propose a phase transition model for RTs and accuracy. Analogous to the fast guess model (Ollman, 1966), our model postulates two modes of processing: a guess mode and a stimulus-controlled mode. From catastrophe theory, we derive two important predictions that allow us to test our model against the fast guess model and against the popular class of sequential sampling models. The first prediction--hysteresis in the transitions between guessing and stimulus-controlled behavior--was confirmed in an experiment that gradually changed the reward for speed versus accuracy. The second prediction--bimodal RT distributions--was confirmed in an experiment that required participants to respond in a way that is intermediate between guessing and accurate responding.     

The duration of response inhibition in the stop-signal paradigm varies with response force

In a previous study, we have found that the speed of stopping a response is delayed when response readiness is reduced by cuing the probability of no-go trials [Acta Psychol. 111 (2002) 155]. Other investigators observed that responses are more forceful when the probability to respond is low than when it is high (e.g. [Quart. J. Exp. Psychol. A 50 (1997) 405]). In this study, the hypothesis was tested that low probability responses are more forceful than high probability responses and that these responses are more difficult to stop. Subjects performed on a choice reaction task and on three tasks with respectively 100%, 80%, and 50% response probabilities. Stop signals were presented on 30% of the trials, instructing subjects to withhold their response. Response force on non-signal (go) trials and the duration of response inhibition on signal (stop) trials increased as response probability decreased. This pattern of findings was interpreted to support the hypothesis predicting that stopping is more difficult when response readiness is low than when it is high.     

The Supervenience Argument and the Generalization Problem

This paper tries to show that Kims strategy of preventing the problem of generalization of mental causation is not successful and that his original supervenience argument can be applied to cases of nonmental macrolevel causation, with the effect that nonmental macroproperties which only supervene on, but are not identical with, configurations of microproperties turn out to be epiphenomenal after all.