Conscientious objection and person-centered care

Person-centered care offers a promising way to manage clinicians’ conscientious objection to providing services they consider morally wrong. Health care centered on persons, rather than patients, recognizes clinicians and patients on the same stratum. The moral interests of clinicians, as persons, thus warrant as much consideration as those of other persons, including patients. Interconnected moral interests of clinicians, patients, and society construct the clinician as a socially embedded and integrated self, transcending the simplistic duality of private conscience versus public role expectations. In this milieu of blurred boundaries, person-centered care offers a constructive way to accommodate conscientious objection by clinicians. The constitutionally social nature of clinicians commits and enables them, through care mechanisms such as self-care, to optimize the quality of health care and protect the welfare of patients. To advance these conditions, it is recommended that the medical profession develop a person-centered culture of care, along with clinician virtues and skills for person-centered communication.     

Schrödinger logics

Schrödinger logics are logical systems in which the principle of identity is not true in general. The intuitive motivation for these logics is both Erwin Schrödinger's thesis (which has been advanced by other authors) that identity lacks sense for elementary particles of modern physics, and the way which physicists deal with this concept; normally, they understandidentity as meaningindistinguishability (agreemment with respect to attributes). Observing that these concepts are equivalent in classical logic and mathematics, which underly the usual physical theories, we present a higher-order logical system in which these concepts are systematically separated. A classical semantics for the system is presented and some philosophical related questions are mentioned. One of the main characteristics of our system is that Leibniz' Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles cannot be derived. This fact is in accordance with some authors who maintain that quantum mechanics violates this principle. Furthermore, our system may be viewed as a way of making sense some of Schrödinger's logical intuitions about the nature of elementary particles.The authors very much would like to thank the anonymous referee for his quite interesting suggestions, which contributed significantly to improve the paper.Presented byJan Zygmunt;     

A new formulation of discussive logic

S. Jakowski introduced the discussive prepositional calculus D ₂as a basis for a logic which could be used as underlying logic of inconsistent but nontrivial theories (see, for example, N. C. A. da Costa and L. Dubikajtis, On Jakowski's discussive logic, in Non-Classical Logic, Model Theory and Computability, A. I. Arruda, N. C. A da Costa and R. Chuaqui edts., North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1977, 37–56). D ₂has afterwards been extended to a first-order predicate calculus and to a higher-order logic (cf. the quoted paper). In this paper we present a natural version of D ₂, in the sense of Jakowski and Gentzen; as a consequence, we suggest a new formulation of the discussive predicate calculus (with equality). A semantics for the new calculus is also presented.     

Aggression in dyadic interaction

It is shown that the notions of aggressive behavior as ‘intentional emission of noxious stimulation’ (Buss, 1961, 1963, 1966, 1971) and that of ‘injuriating goal response’ (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mower and Sears, 1939) are identical. The usefulness of these theories to predict S's reaction to the reception of a given noxious stimulation is questioned. It is suggested that S's reactions to noxious stimulation may or may not be aggressive, depending on whether the noxious stimulation S receives is interpreted as being a behavior justified by the nom in the situation, or as reflecting an aggressive intent of O. It is hypothesized that the norms established in the situation depend on (i) victim's perception of the noxious stimulation received as being instrumental for O's goal attainment, (ii) victim's perception of the value of O's goal, and (iii) the value of victim's own goal. The establishment of norms regulating the exchange of noxious stimulation between Ss is operationalized in two experiments. Aggression, defined as an infringement of these norms, is measured. In Experiment I, participate 56 female students, and in Experiment 2, 80 male students. Subject is alternately victim (he performs a sensorimotor task and receives an electric shock) and aggressor (he shocks the other S). In Experiment I it is found that Ss counteraggress faster and more frequently if they interpret the shock received from the partner as an infringement of the norm. In Experiment 2, Ss do not counteraggress more frequently, but they do counteraggress faster and evaluate O more negatively. It is concluded that the results clearly contradict current positions and favor the authors' cognitive reformulation of the determinants of aggressive behavior.     

Use of anvils by the Great Kiskadee (Aves,Tyrannidae): a description based on citizen science data

Animal Cognition - The use of anvils to strike prey is a behavior observed in some species of birds around the world. Here, I investigated the use of anvils by the Great Kiskadee (Pitangus...     

G. H. Mead in the history of sociological ideas

My aim is to discuss the history of the reception of George Herbert Mead's ideas in sociology. After discussing the methodological debate between presentism and historicism, I address the interpretations of those responsible for Mead's inclusion in the sociological canon: Herbert Blumer, Jürgen Habermas, and Hans Joas. In the concluding section, I assess these reconstructions of Mead's thought and suggest an alternative more consistent with my initial methodological remarks. In particular, I advocate a reconstruction of Mead's ideas that apprehends simultaneously its evolution over time and its thematic breadth. Such a historically minded reconstruction can be not only a useful corrective to possible anachronisms incurred by contemporary social theorists, but also a fruitful resource for their theory-building endeavors. Only then can meaningful and enriching dialogue with Mead begin.     

Quasi-truth,paraconsistency, and the foundations of science

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it’s perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it’s not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality.     

The Influence of Bloomfield's Linguistics on Skinner

Bloomfield''s “Linguistics as a Science” (1930/1970), Language (1933/1961), and “Language or Ideas?” (1936a/1970), and Skinner''s Verbal Behavior (1957) and Science and Human Behavior (1953) were analyzed in regard to their respective perspectives on science and scientific method, the verbal episode, meaning, and subject matter. Similarities between the two authors were found. In particular both asserted that (a) the study of language must be carried out through the methods of science; (b) the main function of language is to produce practical effects on the world through the mediation of a listener; and (c) a physicalist conception of meaning. Their differences concern the subject matter of their disciplines and their use of different models for the analysis of behavior. Bloomfield''s linguistics and Skinner''s functional analysis of verbal behavior are complementary approaches to language.