Learning about occlusion: initial assumptions and rapid adjustments

We examined 6-month-olds abilities to represent occluded objects, using a corneal-reflection eye-tracking technique. Experiment 1 compared infants' ability to extrapolate the current pre-occlusion trajectory with their ability to base predictions on recent experiences of novel object motions. In the first condition infants performed at asymptote ( approximately 2/3 accurate predictions) from the first occlusion passage. In the second condition all infants initially failed to make accurate prediction. Performance, however, reached asymptote after two occlusion passages. This is the first study that demonstrates such rapid learning effects during an occlusion task. Experiment 2 replicates these effects and demonstrates a robust memory effect extending 24h. In occlusion tasks such long-term memory effects have previously only been observed in 14-month-olds (Moore & Meltzoff, 2004).     

Making things better and learning a lesson: experiencing wisdom across the lifespan

Autobiographical memory narratives concerning times in which individuals said, thought, or did something wise were collected from adolescents and young and old adults. This "wisdom of experience" procedure is shown to be a valid means of studying experienced wisdom in everyday lives across the life span. Results show that all age groups use experienced wisdom to transform negative to positive life situations and are equally likely to link these experienced wisdom events to larger temporal life periods. Young and older adults also relate wisdom experiences to the life story by explaining how they are connected to later life consequences or to the direction that their life has taken. Unlike adolescents, older and, especially, young adults report having learned lessons about themselves or having gained a life philosophy from the wisdom-related event. Thus, the wisdom-of-experience procedure highlights both similarities and differences in the life span manifestation of experienced wisdom.     

Kuhn’s notion of scientific progress: “Reduction” between incommensurable theories in a rigid structuralist framework

In the last two sections of Structure, Thomas Kuhn first develops his famous threefold conception of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms and, subsequently, a conception of scientific progress as growth of empirical strength. The latter conception seems to be at odds with the former in that semantic incommensurability appears to imply the existence of situations where scientific progress in Kuhns sense can no longer exist. In contrast to this seeming inconsistency of Kuhns conception, we will try to show in this study that the semantic incommensurability of scientific terms appears to be fully compatible with scientific progress. Our argumentation is based on an improved version of the formalization of Kuhns conception as developed in the 1970s by Joseph Sneed and Wolfgang Stegmüller: In order to be comparable, incommensurable theories need the specification of relations that refer to the concrete ontologies of these theories and involve certain truth claims. The original structuralist account of reduction fails to provide such relations, because (1) it is too structural and (2) it is too wide. Moreover, the original structuralist account also fails to cover important cases of incommensurable theories in being too restrictive for them. In this paper, we develop an improved notion of “reduction” that allows us to avoid these shortcomings by means of a more flexible device for the formalization of (partially reductive) relations between theories. For that purpose, we use a framework of rigid logic, i.e., logic that is based on a fixed collection of objects.     

Brain activation during upright and inverted encoding of own‐ and other‐age faces: ERP evidence for an own‐age bias

We investigated the neural processing underlying own‐age versus other‐age faces among 5‐year‐old children and adults, as well as the effect of orientation on face processing. Upright and inverted faces of 5‐year‐old children, adults, and elderly adults (> 75 years of age) were presented to participants while ERPs and eye tracking patterns were recorded concurrently. We found evidence for an own‐age bias in children, as well as for predicted delayed latencies and larger amplitudes for inverted faces, which replicates earlier findings. Finally, we extend recent reports about an expert‐sensitive component (P2) to other‐race faces to account for similar effects in regard to other‐age faces. We conclude that differences in neural activity are strongly related to the amount and quality of experience that participants have with faces of various ages. Effects of orientation are discussed in relation to the holistic hypothesis and recent data that compromise this view.