QUINTUPLE EXTENSION: MIND, BODY, HUMANISM, RELIGION, SECULARISM

Extension of the system that includes the key substrates for sensation, perception, emotion, volition, and cognition, and all representational sources for cognition, supports the view that there is an extended mind and an extended body. These intellectual views can be made practical in a humanist system based on extensions and in religious systems based on extensions. Independently, there is also an institutional extension of secularism. Hence, I maintain, there are five principal forms of extension.     

MINDS, INTRINSIC PROPERTIES, AND MADHYAMAKA BUDDHISM

Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the traditional view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory (MBI). This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC). Now there is a growing controversy over whether these data actually require extending the mind out beyond the brain. Such arguments, despite their empirical diversity, have an underlying form. They all are disputes over where to draw the line between intrinsic and relational causal powers. The second-century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna deals with similar issues when he argues for a middle way between the two positions that were known in his time by the terms eternalism and nihilism. Eternalism, like MBI, asserts that the mind is a permanent enduring substance (although the two theories disagree as to how long mind endures). Nihilism argued that the mind had no intrinsic existence, and today some argue that HEC could lead us to a similar conclusion. Nagarjuna's argument for a middle way between these two extremes is similar to an argument that can be made for HEC. We can accept that neither the brain nor any other single physical item is identical to the mind without falling down the slippery slope that leads to "The mind does not really exist, and therefore we are one with everything." Nagarjuna was correct to say that the mind has conventional reality—that the mind exists even though there is no sharp border between the mind and the world.     

MORAL APES, HUMAN UNIQUENESS, AND THE IMAGE OF GOD

Recent advances in evolutionary biology and ethology suggest that humans are not the only species capable of empathy and possibly morality. These findings are of no little consequence for theology, given that a nonhuman animal as a free moral agent would beg the question if human beings are indeed uniquely created in God's image. I argue that apes and some other mammals have moral agency and that a traditional interpretation of the imago Dei is incorrectly equating specialness with exclusivity. By framing the problem in terms of metaphor, following the work of Paul Ricoeur and Sallie McFague, I propose that the concept of the imago Dei could be extended to accommodate moral species other than our own.     

A HARD PROBLEM INDEED

Owen Flanagan's The Really Hard Problem provides a rich source of reflection on the question of meaning and ethics within the context of philosophical naturalism. I affirm the title's claim that the quest to find meaning in a purely physical universe is indeed a hard problem by addressing three issues: Flanagan's claim that there can be a scientific/empirical theory of ethics (eudaimonics), that ethics requires moral glue, and whether, in the end, Flanagan solves the hard problem. I suggest that he does not, although he provides much that is of importance and useful for further reflection along the way.     

Establishing Derived Manding for Specific Amounts with Three Children: An Attempt at Synthesizing Skinner’s Verbal Behavior with Relational Frame Theory

The Psychological Record - Participants were 2 typically developing children, aged 9 and 10 years, and 1 child, aged 4 years, with a reported severe speech delay. Five specific mand functions were...     

The consequences of effortful emotion regulation when processing distressing material: A comparison of suppression and acceptance

The present study investigated the consequences of different forms of emotion regulation. Eighty nine healthy participants viewed a distressing video of the aftermath of road traffic accidents under either suppression (of both felt and expressed affect), acceptance, or no-regulation control instructions and the immediate and longer-term consequences on emotion, mood, and memory were examined. Suppression (relative to control) led to reduced subjective experience of fear when viewing the video, but did not alter electrodermal (EDA) or heart rate (HR) response. Subsequently, suppression led to a less marked subjective emotional reaction to positive but not negative emotional images, reduced free recall memory of the video, and a greater likelihood of experiencing zero intrusions of the video's content. Acceptance (relative to control) had no impact when viewing the video, was associated with a less marked increase in EDA activity in the 5 min period immediately after viewing the video, a more marked HR deceleration and EDA response to both positive and negative images, and elevated negative affect at one week follow-up. These findings suggest, contrary to the current clinical zeitgeist, that emotion suppression can successfully lead to an ongoing down-regulation of emotion and memory, whereas acceptance may elevate subsequent emotionality.     

DERIVED MORE‐LESS RELATIONAL MANDS IN CHILDREN DIAGNOSED WITH AUTISM

In Experiment 1, more and less relations were trained for arbitrary Stimuli A1 and A2 with 3 children with autism. The following conditional discriminations were then trained: A1‐B1, A2‐B2, B1‐C1, B2‐C2. In subsequent tests, participants showed derived more‐less mands (mand with C1 for more and mand with C2 for less). A training procedure reversed the B‐C conditional discriminations, and participants then showed derived reversed more—less mands (mand with C1 for less, C2 for more). Baseline B‐C relations were retrained, and participants subsequently demonstrated a return to the original derived manding. A second experiment with 1 prior participant and 1 naive participant removed a possible confounding effect. Establishing derived manding may be an advantageous component when teaching a mand repertoire in applied settings.     

The Effectiveness of Family History Questionnaires in Cancer Genetic Counseling

The number of individuals receiving genetic counseling for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer syndrome has steadily risen. To triage patients for genetic counseling and to help reduce the amount of time needed by a genetic counselor in direct patient contact, many clinics have implemented the use of family history questionnaires. Although such questionnaires are widely used, scant literature exists evaluating their effectiveness. This article explores the extent to which family history questionnaires are being used in Ontario and addresses the utility of such questionnaires in one familial cancer clinic. By comparing the pedigrees created from questionnaires to those updated during genetic counseling, the accuracy and effectiveness of the questionnaires was explored. Of 121 families recruited into the study, 12% acquired changes to their pedigree that led to a revised probability estimate for having a BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation and 5% acquired changes that altered their eligibility for genetic testing. No statistically significant difference existed between the eligibility for genetic testing prior to and post counseling. This suggests that family history questionnaires can be effective at obtaining a family history and accurately assessing eligibility for genetic testing. Based on the variables that were significantly associated with a change in probability estimate, we further present recommendations for improving the clarity of such questionnaires and therefore the ease of use by patients.     

Sensitization and habituation regulate reinforcer effectiveness

We argue that sensitization and habituation occur to the sensory properties of reinforcers when those reinforcers are presented repeatedly or for a prolonged time. Sensitization increases, and habituation decreases, the ability of a reinforcer to control behavior. Supporting this argument, the rate of operant responding changes systematically within experimental sessions even when the programmed rate of reinforcement is held constant across the session. These within-session changes in operant responding are produced by repeated delivery of the reinforcer, and their empirical characteristics correspond to the characteristics of behavior undergoing sensitization and habituation. Two characteristics of habituation (dishabituation, stimulus specificity) are particularly useful in separating habituation from alternative explanations. Arguing that habituation occurs to reinforcers expands the domain of habituation. The argument implies that habituation occurs to biologically important, not just to neutral, stimuli. The argument also implies that habituation may be observed in “voluntary” (operant), not just in reflexive, behavior. Expanding the domain of habituation has important implications for understanding operant and classical conditioning. Habituation may also contribute to the regulation of motivated behaviors. Habituation provides a more accurate and a less cumbersome explanation for motivated behaviors than homeostasis. Habituation also has some surprising, and easily testable, implications for the control of motivated behaviors.