全文获取类型
收费全文 | 244篇 |
免费 | 10篇 |
国内免费 | 1篇 |
专业分类
255篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 1篇 |
2022年 | 3篇 |
2021年 | 2篇 |
2020年 | 5篇 |
2019年 | 7篇 |
2018年 | 11篇 |
2017年 | 7篇 |
2016年 | 6篇 |
2015年 | 10篇 |
2014年 | 2篇 |
2013年 | 36篇 |
2012年 | 3篇 |
2011年 | 4篇 |
2010年 | 26篇 |
2009年 | 65篇 |
2008年 | 5篇 |
2007年 | 2篇 |
2006年 | 7篇 |
2005年 | 15篇 |
2004年 | 16篇 |
2003年 | 4篇 |
2002年 | 2篇 |
2001年 | 3篇 |
1998年 | 1篇 |
1997年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 3篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 1篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 2篇 |
1982年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有255条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
by DAVID B. MARTENS 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2010,91(1):118-136
This is a critical exposition and limited defence of a theory of first-person belief transiently held by Roderick Chisholm after giving up the early haecceity theory of Person and Object (1976) and before adopting the late self-attribution theory of The First Person (1981). I reconstruct that 'middle' theory as involving what I call a 'hard-core' approach to de re belief and I rebut objections concerning epistemic supervenience and abnormal consciousness. In my rebuttals, I sketch a variant of the middle theory according to which first-person belief essentially involves the believer's introspective acquaintance with herself. 相似文献
29.
by M. ORESTE FIOCCO 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2010,91(1):64-77
Some have concluded that the only appropriate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics is the view that familiar, concrete objects persist through time by perduring, that is, by having temporal parts. Many, including myself, believe this view of persistence is false, and so reject this conclusion. However, the most common attempts to resolve the problem and yet defend the view that familiar, concrete objects endure are self-defeating. This has heretofore gone unnoticed. I consider the most familiar such attempts, based on a strategy called tensing the copula , and present a general argument to demonstrate why this strategy – and any strategy based on relativization – fails. I then show how the considerations raised in this general argument undermine other attempts to resolve the problem while denying perdurance. All these attempts are undermined by an assumption essential to the problem of temporary intrinsics, to wit, that there are many moments of time and all have the same ontological status. As long as this assumption is maintained, the only solution to the problem is that familiar, concrete objects perdure. Thus, in order to defend the view that objects persist through time by enduring, one must adopt a different metaphysics of time (viz., presentism). I conclude that it is neither unreasonable nor impracticable to do so. 相似文献
30.
by Daniel A. Helminiak 《Zygon》2010,45(1):47-74
I take the APA publication A Spiritual Strategy for Counseling and Psychotherapy (Richards and Bergin 2005), along with a devoted issue of Journal of Psychology and Theology (Nelson and Slife 2006), as a paradigmatic example of a trend. Other instances include the uncritical use of "Eastern" philosophy in Humanistic and Transpersonal Psychology, almost normative appeal to the "Sacred" within the psychology of spirituality, talk of "God in the brain" within neurological research, the neologism entheogen referring to psychedelic drugs, and calls for new specializations such as neurotheology and theobiology. In response to the legitimate ethical requirements of respect and openness regarding clients' religious worldviews, the trend is to make God an essential component in psychological theory. The argument is that God is active in the universe and especially in human affairs to such an extent that any accurate account of strictly psychological matters, not just a comprehensive, interdisciplinary purview that could include a distinct theological dimension, must include God as an explanatory factor. Less nuanced than standard theological thought about divine intervention—including a range of opinions from supernaturalism, to occasionalism, to providential and deistic naturalism—this trend would blur the epistemological differences between religion and science by appeal to claimed knowledge sources such as inspiration and revelation and thus undermine the achievements of evidence-based science and establish particularistic religious beliefs as standard explanatory accounts. The concern to include a spiritual, in contrast to a religious or theist, dimension in psychological theory is welcome; but elaborated approaches, such as my own and those of Roberto Assagioli, Viktor Frankl, and Ken Wilber, open to varied theological applications, already exist. 相似文献