PERFECTION AND DESIRE: SPINOZA ON THE GOOD

While Spinoza claims that our good is both what increases our essential power and what helps us to satisfy our desires, he admits that people desire things that do not increase their power. This paper addresses this problem by arguing that Spinoza conceives of desires as expressions of our conatus , so that satisfying our desires necessarily increases our power and vice versa. This reading holds, in opposition to recent work, that Spinoza upholds a desire-satisfaction theory of the good, though an unusual one, since our good is only determined by desires arising from our conatus , in other words, active desires.     

IN DEFENCE OF NATURAL DAYLIGHT

Objects appear different as the illumination under which they are perceived varies. This fact is sometimes thought to pose a problem for the view that colours are mind‐independent properties: if a coloured object appears different under different illuminations, then under which illumination does the object appear the colour it really is? I argue that given the nature of natural daylight, and certain plausible assumptions about the nature of the colours it illuminates, there is a non‐arbitrary reason to suppose that it is under natural daylight that we are able to perceive the real colours of objects.     

SELF-DEFENSE, INNOCENT AGGRESSORS, AND THE DUTY OF MARTYRDOM

On the traditional doctrine of self-defense, defensive force is permissible not only against Culpable Aggressors but against Innocent Aggressors as well (for example, psychotic aggressors). Some moral philosophers have recently challenged this view, arguing that one may not harm innocent attackers because morality requires culpability as an essential condition of being liable to defensive force. This essay examines and rejects this challenge as both a violation of common sense and as insufficiently grounded in convincing reasons from moral theory.     

Oppression and Responsibility: a Wittgensteinian Approach to Social Practices and Moral Theory

Book reviewed:
O'Connor, Peg, Oppression and Responsibility: a Wittgensteinian Approach to Social Practices and Moral Theory , The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002, 151 pp., ISBN 0-271-02202-7.