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by ALBERTO VOLTOLINI 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2009,90(3):402-418
In a very recent paper (forthcoming), Dominic McIver Lopes has claimed that pictures perceptually ground demonstrative reference to depicted objects. If as I think Lopes is right, this has important consequences for the debate on the semantics/pragmatics divide. For one can exploit Lopes' claim in order to provide one more argument in favour of the well-known contextualist thesis that wide context has not only both a pre- and a post-semantic role, but also a semantic role – to put it in Perry's (1997 ) terms. 相似文献
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by TIMOTHY SCHOETTLE 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2009,90(1):98-115
It is possible for a person and their environment to be physically identical each day and yet the representational content of their beliefs about color are inverted. Each day they utter the same words, 'Wow! The colors of everything have switched again today.' In uttering these words, they express a different proposition each day. This supports the view held by Reichenbach and Carnap that when it comes to representations of colored objects, relations of similarity and difference are fundamental. There are no such things as colors like 'redness' and 'greenness' apart from the particular things we call red and green. 相似文献
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by JOHN K. DAVIS 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2009,90(1):21-40
Moral and legal judgments sometimes depend on personal traits in this sense: the subject offers good reasons for her judgment, but if she had a different social or ideological background, her judgment would be different. If you would judge the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion differently if you were not a secular liberal, is your judgment really based on the arguments you find convincing, or do you find them so only because you are a secular liberal? I argue that a judgment can be based on the considerations the subject claims as justification even when it depends on personal traits. 相似文献
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by JASON TAYLOR 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2009,90(3):388-401
One way of assessing the philosophical literature on causation is to consider views on the nature of the causal relation. Early theorists were 'monists', taking there to be one causal relation. More recent theorists, however, have turned to pluralism, which holds that the causal relation is only accurately captured by two (or more) relations. I argue that one way of being a pluralist – the way which takes there to be exactly two types of causation – is self defeating, if it promises to handle intuitions about all causal situations. I illustrate the point via neuron diagrams. 相似文献