Bad Luck Once Again

In a recent article in this journal, Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe sketch an account of indeterminist free will designed to avoid the luck objection that has been wielded to such effect against event‐causal libertarianism. They argue that if decision‐making is an indeterministic process and not an event or series of events, the luck objection will fail. I argue that they are wrong: the luck objection is equally successful against their account as against existing event‐causal libertarianisms. Like the event‐causal libertarianism their account is meant to supplant, the process view cannot offer a reasons explanation of the agent’s choice itself; that choice is explained by nothing except chance. The agent therefore fails to exercise freedom‐level control over it.     

A Review of: Growing Up With Autism: Working With School-Age Children and Adolescents With Autism,edited by Robin L. Gabriels and Dina E. Hill (Eds.).

The influence of adult presence, peer smiling, and peer praise on the unprogrammed generalization of physical sharing over time was investigated. During free play three groups of five preschool children were taught to share toys via a behavioral training package composed of instructions, modeling, behavior rehearsal, prompts, and praise. Immediately following free play the children were given art materials and observed in the presence of different adults. An ABA design with a manipulation of adult presence nested within east phase was used. For all three groups, regardless of the adult presence manipulation, treatment facilitated sharing in both settings. In addition, two groups continued to share in both settings after termination of the training. The presence of an adult was necessary for unprogrammed maintenance of treatment gains in both settings whereas peer smiling and peer praise were not. Observer presence suppressed physical sharing and smiling prior to, during, and after treatment. Implications for behavioral assessment and applied significance are discussed.     

Brief Book,Software, and Test Announcements

This study extended previous cross-cultural work regarding the tripartite model of anxiety and depression by developing Serbian translations of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale for Children (PANAS–C), the Physiological Hyperarousal Scale for Children (PH–C), and the Affect and Arousal Scale (AFARS). Characteristics of the scales were examined using 449 students (M age = 12.61 years). Applying item retention criteria established in other studies, PH–C, PANAS–C, and AFARS translations with psychometric properties similar to English-language versions were identified. Preliminary validation of the scales was conducted using a subset of 194 students (M age = 12.37 years) who also completed measures of anxiety and depression. Estimates of reliability, patterns of correlations among scales, and age and gender differences were consistent with previous studies with English-speaking samples. Findings regarding scale validity were mixed, although consistent with existing literature. Serbian translations of the PH–C, PANAS–C, and AFARS mirror the original English-language scales in terms of both strengths and weaknesses.     

PRESENTISM, TRUTHMAKERS, AND GOD

The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter ) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. In this paper I identify five constraints that an adequate presentist response must satisfy. In light of these constraints, I examine and reject responses by Bigelow, Keller, Crisp, and Bourne. Consideration of how these responses fail, however, points toward a proposal that works; one that posits God's memories as truthmakers for truths about the past. I conclude that presentists have, in the truthmaker objection, considerable incentive to endorse theism.     

THE PASSIONS OF PUNISHMENT

I criticize an increasingly popular set of arguments for the justifiability of punishment. Some philosophers try to justify punishment by appealing to what Peter Strawson calls the reactive attitudes – emotions like resentment, indignation, remorse and guilt. These arguments fail. The view that these emotions commit us to punishment rests on unsophisticated views of punishment and of these emotions and their associated behaviors. I offer more sophisticated accounts of punishment, of these emotions and of their associated behaviors that are consistent with Abolitionism, the view that punishment is unjustified.     

DAVIDSON AND FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY: PARATAXIS AND SELF-EXPRESSION

Donald Davidson's explanation of first-person authority turns on an ingenious account of speakers' knowledge of meaning. It nonetheless suffers from a structural defect and yields, at best, expressive know-how for speakers. I argue that an expressivist strand already latent in Davidson's paratactic treatment of the semantics of belief attribution can be exploited to repair the defect, and so to yield a plausible account of first-person authority.     

INDIVIDUAL PROCREATIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM

The question I address in this paper is whether and under what conditions it is morally right to bring a person into existence. I defend the commonsensical thesis that, other things being equal, it is morally wrong to create a person who will be below some threshold of quality of life, even if the life of this potential person, once created, will nevertheless be worth living. However commonsensical this view might seem, it has shown to be problematic because of the so-called 'Non-Identity Problem'. Both utilitarian and rights-based approaches have been unable to provide a solution to this problem. I rest my thesis on two premises: that causing a disability or impairment in a future person is prima facie wrong, so long as we can avoid causing such a disability to that very person; and that reproduction, under normal conditions, is prima facie morally indifferent. From these two premises, I conclude that it is prima facie wrong to bring into existence a person with a non-trivial disability or impairment (which might be, nonetheless, compatible with a worthwhile life), even if the only available alternative is to remain childless.