排序方式: 共有163条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
151.
152.
by TIMOTHY SCHOETTLE 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2009,90(1):98-115
It is possible for a person and their environment to be physically identical each day and yet the representational content of their beliefs about color are inverted. Each day they utter the same words, 'Wow! The colors of everything have switched again today.' In uttering these words, they express a different proposition each day. This supports the view held by Reichenbach and Carnap that when it comes to representations of colored objects, relations of similarity and difference are fundamental. There are no such things as colors like 'redness' and 'greenness' apart from the particular things we call red and green. 相似文献
153.
by JOHN K. DAVIS 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2009,90(1):21-40
Moral and legal judgments sometimes depend on personal traits in this sense: the subject offers good reasons for her judgment, but if she had a different social or ideological background, her judgment would be different. If you would judge the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion differently if you were not a secular liberal, is your judgment really based on the arguments you find convincing, or do you find them so only because you are a secular liberal? I argue that a judgment can be based on the considerations the subject claims as justification even when it depends on personal traits. 相似文献
154.
by JASON TAYLOR 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2009,90(3):388-401
One way of assessing the philosophical literature on causation is to consider views on the nature of the causal relation. Early theorists were 'monists', taking there to be one causal relation. More recent theorists, however, have turned to pluralism, which holds that the causal relation is only accurately captured by two (or more) relations. I argue that one way of being a pluralist – the way which takes there to be exactly two types of causation – is self defeating, if it promises to handle intuitions about all causal situations. I illustrate the point via neuron diagrams. 相似文献
155.
156.
157.
Suppose nothing exists. Then it is true that nothing exists. What makes that true? Nothing! So it seems that if nothing existed, then the principle that every truth is made true by something (the truthmaker principle) would be false. So if it is possible that nothing exists, a claim often called ‘metaphysical nihilism’, then the truthmaker principle is not necessary. This paper explores various ways to resolve this conflict without restricting metaphysical nihilism in such a way that it would become trivial and uninteresting. 相似文献
158.
by MATTHEW S. BEDKE 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2009,90(2):188-209
Having no recourse to ways of knowing about the natural world, ethical non-naturalists are in need of an epistemology that might apply to a normative breed of facts or properties, and intuitionism seems well suited to fill that bill. Here I argue that the metaphysical inspiration for ethical intuitionism undermines that very epistemology, for this pair of views generates what I call the defeater from cosmic coincidence. Unfortunately, we face not a happy union, but a difficult choice: either ethical intuitionism or ethical non-naturalism, but not both. 相似文献
159.
by JUAN COMESAÑA 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2009,90(1):1-20
It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability. 相似文献
160.
by KAREN STOHR 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2009,90(1):116-139
What do we do when a loved one is seriously messing up her life? While Kantianism describes the predicament nicely as a tension between love and respect, it is not well‐suited to resolving it. Kantian respect prevents minding another's business in cases where love demands it. Virtue ethics can readily explain the predicament as a tension between the virtues of sympathy and humility. Moreover, by changing the focus away from the other as a setter of ends and toward the would‐be‐benefactor's own degree of practical wisdom, virtue ethics permits a more nuanced set of loving responses to self‐destructive people. 相似文献