幼儿不同情绪状态对其智力操作的影响

本实验结果显示:1)在16至18个月的婴儿中,愉快和痛苦情绪对其问题解决的操作有不同的影响。愉快组被试比痛苦组被试的操作效果明显优越;体现在“直接抓取”、“注视”和“顺利获得”三种操作策略中。2)愉快和痛苦两种情绪的不同强度与操作效果之间的相关是不同的。愉快组显示为一种曲线相关,即过高或过低的情绪唤醒不如适中的唤醒水平使操作效果达到最优。痛苦组显示为一种直线相关,即痛苦强度越大,操作效果越差。     

Smoking and academic performance

Smokers and nonsmokers were compared on three aspects of academic achievement. Although exactly the same percentage of smokers and nonsmokers passed the first-year university examination, smokers obtained significantly higher marks. Similarly, smokers achieved significantly higher marks in their final year examinations in comparison with nonsmokers. Finally, a comparison of the tutorial essay marks of the smokers and nonsmokers again showed that smokers obtained significantly higher marks than nonsmokers. These data are consistent with the idea that ambitious students adopt smoking in the belief that it will help them study and sustain concentration.     

Feedback during exposure to inescapable shocks and subsequent shock-escape performance

In two experiments, we assessed the ability of a feedback stimulus during helplessness training to reduce the performance deficits common to inescapable shock. In each experiment, four groups of rats were exposed to either escapable shock (E), inescapable shock with a feedback stimulus following shock termination (Y-FS), inescapable shock with no feedback stimulus (Y-NFS), or no shock (N). The feedback stimulus eliminated the interference effects of inescapable shock when tested with an FR-3 lever press escape task (Experiment 1) or on an FR-1 task with a 3-s delay between the response and shock termination (Experiment 2). These results suggest that stress-induced biochemical changes may mediate the interference effects seen in inescapably shocked rats.     

Time reallocation in a multiresponse environment: Effects of restricting response classes

Four adult male rats were each placed for three hours daily into an apparatus that provided individual compartments for six separate location-defined responses. The available responses consisted of: (1) the opportunity to turn off room lighting, producing darkness; (2) the opportunity to view a female rat; (3) the opportunity to turn off white noise; (4) the opportunity to drink; (5) the opportunity to eat; and (6) "other," representing time in the hallway between compartments. Each subject underwent a series of conditions characterized as an A-B-A-C-A design. Manipulations consisted of the removal of a low-probability response (darkness) and of a high-probability response (escape from noise) in a counter-balanced manner across subjects. The dependent measure for all subjects was the percentage of total session time spent in each compartment. Four predictive rules concerning the redistribution of behavior after response restriction were tested, including the constant-ratio rule, equal time redistribution, the most probable alternative, and the sequential-dependency rule. The results indicate no support for any of the four predictive rules and suggest that empirical assessment of restriction effects is necessary in reinforcement studies involving temporally extended responses.     

Decisional processing in paranoid and non-paranoid schizophrenics

40 schizophrenic subjects, divided into paranoid/non-paranoid categories and 14 normal controls were presented a task which involved making "same-different" judgments during random presentations of a series of visual comparison stimuli with a standard which represented the midpoint of the stimulus continuum. Using Sternberg's Choice RT paradigm for studying the locus of cognitive deficit, difficulty at the response-selection stage was manipulated while holding other stages constant. It was predicted that paranoids would have shorter RTs at easy decision points and longer RTs at difficult decision points relative to non-paranoids. The directions of the differences were as predicted but did not attain statistical significance. Both schizophrenic groups, compared to normals, made significantly fewer "same" responses on those trials where the comparison and standard were most similar.     

HOW CULTURE MADE US UNIQUELY HUMAN

This article argues that understanding human uniqueness requires recognizing that we are a cultural species whose evolution has been driven by the interaction among genes and culture for over a million years. Here, I review the basic argument, incorporate recent findings, and highlight ongoing efforts to apply this approach to more deeply understand both the universal aspects of our cognition as well as the variation across societies. This article will cover (1) the origins and evolution of our capacities for culture, (2) examples of specialized mental abilities such as those related to mechanical causality, prestige, and cooperation, and (3) recent efforts to apprehend our capacities for abstraction. I close by discussing common canards that generate confusion in mapping what makes us human.     

Behavioral extremity moderates the association between certainty in attitudes about COVID and willingness to engage in mitigation-related behaviors

People generally intend to act more on beliefs and attitudes about which they have greater certainty. However, we introduce a boundary condition to the positive association between certainty and behavioral intentions—behavioral extremity. Uncertainty about a threatening issue like COVID-19 can be disconcerting, and we propose that uncertain people cope in part through increased openness to extreme actions like accepting risky medical treatments and aggression toward those defying mitigation policies. Testing this, we compiled and analyzed all the data on certainty about COVID-19 mitigation policies and willingness to engage in mitigation-related behaviors that our lab collected during the pandemic (6 samples, 20 behaviors, Ns up to 1496). External ratings of the behaviors' extremity moderated certainty-willingness associations: whereas greater certainty was associated with increased willingness to engage in moderate behaviors (the typical result), lower certainty was associated with increased willingness to engage in extreme behaviors, especially among those worried about becoming ill.