Don’t make me angry,you wouldn’t like me when I’m angry: Volitional choices to act or inhibit are modulated by subliminal perception of emotional faces

Volitional action and self-control—feelings of acting according to one’s own intentions and in being control of one’s own actions—are fundamental aspects of human conscious experience. However, it is unknown whether high-level cognitive control mechanisms are affected by socially salient but nonconscious emotional cues. In this study, we manipulated free choice decisions to act or withhold an action by subliminally presenting emotional faces: In a novel version of the Go/NoGo paradigm, participants made speeded button-press responses to Go targets, withheld responses to NoGo targets, and made spontaneous, free choices to execute or withhold the response for Choice targets. Before each target, we presented emotional faces, backwards masked to render them nonconscious. In Intentional trials, subliminal angry faces made participants more likely to voluntarily withhold the action, whereas fearful and happy faces had no effects. In a second experiment, the faces were made supraliminal, which eliminated the effects of angry faces on volitional choices. A third experiment measured neural correlates of the effects of subliminal angry faces on intentional choice using EEG. After replicating the behavioural results found in Experiment 1, we identified a frontal-midline theta component—associated with cognitive control processes—which is present for volitional decisions, and is modulated by subliminal angry faces. This suggests a mechanism whereby subliminally presented “threat” stimuli affect conscious control processes. In summary, nonconscious perception of angry faces increases choices to inhibit, and subliminal influences on volitional action are deep seated and ecologically embedded.     

Knowledge applied to new domains: The unconscious succeeds where the conscious fails

A common view holds that consciousness is needed for knowledge acquired in one domain to be applied in a novel domain. We present evidence for the opposite; where the transfer of knowledge is achieved only in the absence of conscious awareness. Knowledge of artificial grammars was examined where training and testing occurred in different vocabularies or modalities. In all conditions grammaticality judgments attributed to random selection showed above-chance accuracy (60%), while those attributed to conscious decisions did not. Participants also rated each string’s familiarity and performed a perceptual task assessing fluency. Familiarity was predicted by repetition structure and was thus related to grammaticality. Fluency, though increasing familiarity, was unrelated to grammaticality. While familiarity predicted all judgments only those attributed to random selection showed a significant additional contribution of grammaticality, deriving primarily from chunk novelty. In knowledge transfer, as in visual perception (Marcel, 1993), the unconscious may outperform the conscious.     

Unconscious structural knowledge of form-meaning connections

We investigated the implicit learning of a linguistically relevant variable (animacy) in a natural language context (namely, the relation of forms of determiners to semantics). Trial by trial subjective measures indicated that exposure to a form–animacy regularity led to unconscious knowledge of that regularity. Under the same conditions, people did not learn about another form–meaning regularity when a linguistically arbitrary variable was used instead of animacy (size relative to a dog). Implicit learning is constrained to acquire unconscious knowledge about features with high prior probabilities of being relevant in that domain.     

Two Languages, One Vocabulary

Two cultures (scientific and clinical) speaking different theoretical languages reside in psychology. The categorical structure of scientific language is based on sensorially, linearly, and analytically formatted cognitive processes (common sense). The categorical structure of the clinical language is formatted for cognitive processes accommodating nonsensory, nonlinear information about purposive personality processes. Clinically and scientifically oriented psychologists have difficulty communicating with one another because of underlying paradigmatic differences in their languages. Unfortunately, both cultures use the same sensory-system–based vocabulary, which leads to the unwitting and confusing assumption that they are speaking the same language.     

From Fame to Glory. The Case of Prince Friedrich of Homburg

The paper examines the value of glory and offers a conception of it, which is developed by criticising other accounts and by arguing that the Homeric and the Biblical traditions have a remarkably similar, converging view on glory. A more detailed analysis of Heinrich von Kleist's The Prince Friedrich of Homburg serves to deepen this view and outline an account of glory that rests on the following claims: it is different from, although not entirely opposite to, fame; it is related to victory, to abundant, everlasting life, and to a certain type of passivity and dialogical contemplation.     

Temporal constraints of the word blindness posthypnotic suggestion on Stroop task performance

The present work investigated possible temporal constraints on the posthypnotic word blindness suggestion effect. In a completely within-subjects and counterbalanced design 19 highly suggestible individuals performed the Stroop task both with and without a posthypnotic suggestion that they would be unable to read the word dimension of the Stroop stimulus, both when response-stimulus interval (RSI) was short (500 ms) or equivalent to previous studies (3500 ms). The suggestion reduced Stroop interference in the short RSI condition (54 vs. 6 ms) but not in the long RSI condition (52 vs. 56 ms), and did not affect Stroop facilitation. Our results suggest that response to the suggestion involves reactive top-down control processes that persist only if levels of activation can be maintained. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Conscious and unconscious thought in artificial grammar learning

Unconscious Thought Theory posits that a period of distraction after information acquisition leads to unconscious processing which enhances decision making relative to conscious deliberation or immediate choice (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Support thus far has been mixed. In the present study, artificial grammar learning was used in order to produce measurable amounts of conscious and unconscious knowledge. Intermediate phases were introduced between training and testing. Participants engaged in conscious deliberation of grammar rules, were distracted for the same period of time, or progressed immediately from training to testing. No differences in accuracy were found between intermediate phase groups acting on decisions made with meta-cognitive awareness (either feeling-based intuitive responding or conscious rule- or recollection-based responding). However, the accuracy of guess responses was significantly higher after distraction relative to immediate progression or conscious deliberation. The results suggest any beneficial effects of 'unconscious thought' may not always transfer to conscious awareness.     

The speed of metacognition: Taking time to get to know one’s structural knowledge

The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments (conscious structural knowledge) decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure (unconscious structural knowledge), and guess responses (unconscious judgment knowledge) were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. Conversely, the deadline decreased the proportion of conscious structural knowledge in favour of guessing. Unconscious structural knowledge can be applied rapidly but becomes more reliable with additional metacognitive processing time whereas conscious structural knowledge is an all-or-nothing response that cannot always be applied rapidly. These dissociations corroborate quite separate theories of recognition (dual-process) and metacognition (higher order thought and cross-order integration).