Subjective measures of implicit knowledge that go beyond confidence: Reply to Overgaard et al.

Overgaard, Timmermans, Sandberg, and Cleeremans (2010) ask if the conscious experience of people in implicit learning experiments can be explored more fully than just confidence ratings allow. We show that confidence ratings play a vital role in such experiments, but are indeed incomplete in themselves: in addition, use of structural knowledge attributions and ratings of fringe feelings like familiarity are important in characterizing the phenomenology of the application of implicit knowledge.     

Developmental aspects of consciousness: how much theory of mind do you need to be consciously aware?

When do children become consciously aware of events in the world? Five possible strategies are considered for their usefulness in determining the age in question. Three of these strategies ask when children show signs of engaging in activities for which conscious awareness seems necessary in adults (verbal communication, executive control, explicit memory), and two of the strategies consider when children have the ability to have the minimal form of higher-order thought necessary for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, respectively. The tentative answer to the guiding question is that children become consciously aware between 12 and 15 months (+/-3 months).     

Hypnotic suggestibility,cognitive inhibition,and dissociation

We examined two potential correlates of hypnotic suggestibility: dissociation and cognitive inhibition. Dissociation is the foundation of two of the major theories of hypnosis and other theories commonly postulate that hypnotic responding is a result of attentional abilities (including inhibition). Participants were administered the Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form C. Under the guise of an unrelated study, 180 of these participants also completed: a version of the Dissociative Experiences Scale that is normally distributed in non-clinical populations; a latent inhibition task, a spatial negative priming task, and a memory task designed to measure negative priming. The data ruled out even moderate correlations between hypnotic suggestibility and all the measures of dissociation and cognitive inhibition overall, though they also indicated gender differences. The results are a challenge for existing theories of hypnosis.     

Lack of correlation between hypnotic susceptibility and various components of attention

The purpose of our study was to measure the relationship between performance on various attentional tasks and hypnotic susceptibility. Healthy volunteers (N = 116) participated in a study, where they had to perform several tasks measuring various attention components in a waking state: sustained attention, selective or focused attention, divided attention and executive attention in task switching. Hypnotic susceptibility was measured in a separate setting by the Waterloo-Stanford Groups Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form C (WSGC).We found no significant correlation between any of the attentional measures and hypnotic susceptibility. Highly hypnotizables did not prove to be superior to or worse than the other individuals in any of the tests.These results do not support the neuropsychophysiological model of hypnosis, as they show no consistent relationship between hypnotic susceptibility and waking attentional performance.     

Gambling on the unconscious: A comparison of wagering and confidence ratings as measures of awareness in an artificial grammar task

We explore three methods for measuring the conscious status of knowledge using the artificial grammar learning paradigm. We show wagering is no more sensitive to conscious knowledge than simple verbal confidence reports but is affected by risk aversion. When people wager rather than give verbal confidence they are less ready to indicate high confidence. We introduce a “no-loss gambling” method which is insensitive to risk aversion. We show that when people are just as ready to bet on a genuine random process as their own classification decisions, their classifications are still above baseline, indicating knowledge participants are not aware of having. Our results have methodological implications for any study investigating whether people are aware of knowing.     

The determination of content

I identify a notion of compositionality at the intersection of the different notions philosophers, linguists, and psychologists are concerned with. The notion is compositionality of expression content: the idea that the content of a complex expression in a context of its utterance is determined by its syntactic structure and the contents of its constituents in the contexts of their respective utterances. Traditional arguments from productivity and systematicity cannot establish that the contents of linguistic expressions are compositionally determined in this sense. I present a novel argument for this thesis.     

Psychological Disturbances in Patients With Sphincter of Oddi Dysfunction

Sphincter of Oddi dysfunction (SOD) is a functional gastrointestinal disorder (FGID), which causes pancreatobiliary-type pain, cholestasis, and/or pancreatitis. Only a few studies have assessed the level of psychological distress in this population compared to healthy subjects or patients with other gastrointestinal disorders. In this study, we examined the self-reported level of psychological distress and certain psychiatric symptoms of SOD patients, and we compared them to depressed patients as well as healthy subjects. The results indicate that SOD patients have significantly lower levels of global and specific symptoms compared to depressed patients. When compared to healthy subjects, SOD patients expressed significantly higher levels of irritability–oversensitivity, and there was a trend toward higher levels of somatization.     

Differences in the types of musical regularity learnt in incidental- and intentional-learning conditions

Several studies have found learning of biconditional grammars only under intentional rule-search conditions (e.g., Johnstone & Shanks, 2001). Memorization of strings merely led to the learning of chunks. We used a musical grammar, a diatonic inversion, that is a type of biconditional grammar. Participants either were required to memorize a set of grammatical tunes (incidental learning), or were asked to search for the underlying rule whilst being given feedback about their performance (intentional learning). The results showed that participants in the incidental-learning condition did not learn the inversion rule and merely acquired explicit knowledge about chunks. However, participants in the intentional-learning condition learnt both the inversion rule and chunks.