Pitting intuitive and analytical thinking against each other: The case of transitivity

Identifying which thinking mode, intuitive or analytical, yields better decisions has been a major subject of inquiry by decision-making researchers. Yet studies show contradictory results. One possibility is that the ambiguity is due to the variability in experimental conditions across studies. Our hypothesis is that decision quality depends critically on the level of compatibility between the thinking mode employed in the decision and the nature of the decision-making task. In two experiments, we pitted intuition and analytical thinking against each other on tasks that were either mainly intuitive or mainly analytical. Thinking modes, as well as task characteristics, were manipulated in a factorial design, with choice transitivity as the dependent measure. Results showed higher choice consistency (transitivity) when thinking mode and the characteristics of the decision task were compatible.     

Natural extinction: A criterion shift phenomenon

Previous detection performances obtained in a multi-varied contrast environment showed that observers tend to report significantly less the occurrence of the relatively lower contrast targets and significantly more the occurrence of the higher contrast ones than in conditions where each of these stimuli was tested in isolation (Gorea & Sagi, 2000). This criterion shift phenomenon is a form of contrast-dependent extinction in normal observers. To add more ground to the analogy between this type of “natural” extinction and the stroke-related one, we present a series of experiments where identical targets are displayed (1) at the same eccentricity but in opposite hemifields (along both the horizontal and vertical meridians), (2) at different eccentricities, and (3) where different spatial frequency targets of equal contrasts are displayed at the same eccentricity. Hemifield, eccentricity, and spatial frequency manipulations were intended to entail sensitivity differences for identical contrast stimuli. Some observers showed up to 3 and 1.5 d'-units differences between their left and right and between their upper and lower hemifields, respectively. Although observers may show significant response biases even for isolated stimuli as well as for equally visible ones presented together, it is always the case that they use higher response criteria (extinction) for the less visible targets and lower response criteria for the more visible ones (counter-extinction) when these stimuli are mixed in one experimental block. The observed criterion shifts translate into as much as three times more “Not seen” responses for the less visible targets and into about 1.3 times more “Seen” responses for the more visible ones. Taken together, the present data support the notion that at least some forms of extinction (and perhaps neglect) are contingent on relative sensory/perceptual impairments and that they reflect more or less drastic forms of criterion/decision shifts.     

Must coping options be severely limited during stressful events: Testing the interaction between primary and secondary appraisals

Abstract

It is assumed that psychological stress develops in personally relevant events when situational demands tax or exceed coping resources (i.e., when coping options are severely limited). Despite the central role of this proposition in defining stress, it has been little investigated due to conceptual overlap in definitions of primary and secondary appraisals. In the present work, the interaction between primary and secondary appraisals was used in order to test this proposition, employing non-overlapping definitions of appraisal components. Appraisals were manipulated independently, using written scenarios of stressful occupational episodes, each with three levels of personal stakes and three levels of coping options. Results indicated that the appraisal factors exerted main, but not interaction, effects on negative and positive moods. This means that emotional response increases in proportion to the level of personal stakes in the encounter, with coping potential acting as independent predictor, rather than moderator variable. Contrary to expectations, therefore, emotional distress might develop under conditions where situational demands fall short of exerting all the available resources for coping. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Within- and between-culture variation: individual differences and the cultural logics of honor, face, and dignity cultures

The CuPS (Culture × Person × Situation) approach attempts to jointly consider culture and individual differences, without treating either as noise and without reducing one to the other. Culture is important because it helps define psychological situations and create meaningful clusters of behavior according to particular logics. Individual differences are important because individuals vary in the extent to which they endorse or reject a culture's ideals. Further, because different cultures are organized by different logics, individual differences mean something different in each. Central to these studies are concepts of honor-related violence and individual worth as being inalienable versus socially conferred. We illustrate our argument with 2 experiments involving participants from honor, face, and dignity cultures. The studies showed that the same "type" of person who was most helpful, honest, and likely to behave with integrity in one culture was the "type" of person least likely to do so in another culture. We discuss how CuPS can provide a rudimentary but integrated approach to understanding both within- and between-culture variation.     

Products of Modal Logics. Part 3: Products of Modal and Temporal Logics

In this paper we improve the results of [2] by proving the product f.m.p. for the product of minimal n-modal and minimal n-temporal logic. For this case we modify the finite depth method introduced in [1]. The main result is applied to identify new fragments of classical first-order logic and of the equational theory of relation algebras, that are decidable and have the finite model property.     

The materialist mentality revisited

My thanks to Jacob Joshua Ross for his helpful advice, and to an anonymous reviewer for detailed and useful comments on an earlier version of this essay.