六祖惠能的偈语中的心学思想探究

六祖的偈语是其禅学思想的肇始和集中体现,其中蕴含着丰富的心学思想。概括起来,它所蕴含的心学思想主要表现在以下几个方面:心的本体性与修心; 心无与心存; 心悟; 静心等。这些思想既是一种哲学思想,也是一种宗教思想,同时也是一种人们修心处世之道。它们给予当代人以很大的启迪作用和借鉴价值,在当今社会仍有重要的现实价值。     

对“整体性”的批判性反思——关于马克思主义理论的整体性研究的一个方法论问题

人们对以往关于马克思主义理论的不正确的、模糊的认识的批判,是引起重新反思马克思理论学说的整体性的直接导因,而决定这一导因出现的,恰恰是人们满足其现实的社会生活需要及其知识结构发展需要的程度和方式的变化。进而言之,当代全球化发展所越来越凸显的解决全     

具身社会认知：认知心理学的生态学转向

具身社会认知是具身认知同社会认知对话的产物,这种对话从三个维度展开,即具身自我认知、具身人际认知、具身群体认知。本研究不仅论证了具身认知的视角提高了传统社会认知心理学的生态效度,而且从进化心理学、镜像神经元视角对具身社会认知的现象进行了探析。具身社会认知作为一种研究思潮,面临着许多挑战：(1)具身社会认知是对行为主义研究范式的回归;(2)具(体)身(体)是社会认知过程的一种附带现象。     

西方心理学中两种文化的分裂及其整合

金布尔的研究证实西方心理学中的“科学”与“人文”两种文化倾向的存在。科学主义的盛行和对经的不满与反动,实证主义,现象学和释义学的影响,学派和组织的门户之见是心理不中形成两种文化的主要原因;自然科学模式与人文科学模式的对立,方法中心对问题中心,价值中立说对价值负荷说是心理学中两种文化对立和分裂的主要表现。     

试论现象学的特征及其对心理学中人文主义的影响

现象学对于心理学家来说,它的意义是明显的：支持了意识的研究、内省方法的使用,并且为表象等内在心理现象的研究提供了理论基础;现象学的科学观是一种非实证主义的观点,为人文主义心理学家以非自然科学模式塑造心理学奠定了哲学基础;作为一种方法论,它与实证主义的方法论截然对立,它在心理学方法论上的特色是整体描述、问题中心、非还原论等原则。     

内隐学习“三高”特征的实验研究

本研究在社会认知的人物特征识别范畴内,探讨在高强度练习和准确反馈条件下,内隐学习的高选择力、高潜力以及高密度贮存三大特征。实验采用一种测量内隐和外显学习的新方法,要求被试学会把像片按其组合特征分类。这些特征包括人物姿势的正侧面(显著维度特征),人物容貌的美丑(非显著维度特征)。结果表明:(1)非显著特征的学习,内隐被试表现出更大且显著的底层规则的迁移,比外显被试具有更高的选择力。(2)内隐被试表现出高潜力的内隐知识。(3)信息论处理揭示了内隐知识传递和贮存的高密性和高效性。     

The effect of the physical versus mental presence of a high-powered person on consumers' healthy food choices

Consumers make distinct food choices when they see versus when they think about a powerful person. This research identifies two scenarios involving the presence of a high-powered other, physical presence versus mental presence, and examines the effect of the physical and mental presence of a high-powered other on consumers' healthy food choices. Conducting six experiments, we show that the physical presence of a high-powered other increases one's self-enhancement motivation and leads to healthier food choices, while the mental presence of a high-powered other increases one's perceived constraints and leads to unhealthy food choices. We also find that interpersonal closeness moderates the positive effect of the physical presence of a high-powered other on healthy food choices but does not moderate the negative effect of the mental presence of a high-powered other on healthy food choices.     

Individual differences in harm-related moral values are associated with functional integration of large-scale brain networks of emotional regulation

Emotions affects moral judgements, and controlled cognitive processes regulate those emotional responses during moral decision making. However, the neurobiological basis of this interaction is unclear. We used a graph theory measurement called participation coefficient (‘PC’) to quantify the resting-state functional connectivity within and between four meta-analytic groupings (MAGs) associated with emotion generation and regulation, to test whether that measurement predicts individual differences in moral foundations-based values. We found that the PC of one of the MAGs (MAG2) was positively correlated with one of the five recognized moral foundations–the one based on harm avoidance. We also found that increased inter-module connectivity between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and middle temporal gyrus with other nodes in the four MAGs was likewise associated with higher endorsement of the Harm foundation. These results suggest that individuals' sensitivity to harm is associated with functional integration of large-scale brain networks of emotional regulation. These findings add to our knowledge of how individual variations in our moral values could be reflected by intrinsic brain network organization and deepen our understanding of the relationship between emotion and cognition during evaluations of moral values.     

Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility

It’s widely accepted that higher-order defeaters, i.e., evidence that one’s belief is formed in an epistemically defective way, can defeat doxastic justification. However, it’s yet unclear how exactly such kind of defeat happens. Given that many theories of doxastic justification can be understood as fitting the schema of proper basing on propositional justifiers, we might attempt to explain the defeat either by arguing that a higher-order defeater defeats propositional justification or by arguing that it defeats proper basing. It has been argued that the first attempt is unpromising because a variety of prominent theories of propositional justification don’t imply that we lose propositional justification when gaining higher-order defeaters. This leads some scholars to take the second attempt. In this paper, I criticize this second attempt, and I defend the first attempt by arguing that a theory of propositional justification that requires intellectual responsibility can nicely account for higher-order defeat. My proposal is that we lose doxastic justification when we gain higher-order defeaters because there is no intellectually responsible way for us to maintain our original beliefs due to the defeaters.