The Effects of a Learning Station on the Completion and Accuracy of Math Homework for Middle School Students

We studied the effects of a Learning Station on the completion and accuracy of math homework of middle school students who had chronic homework problems. The Learning Station was a three sided free-standing panel with theoretically and empirically-based components involving (a) stimulation (color, music, activity breaks, and choice) and (b) self-attention (mirror and self-monitoring). Two students who used the Station tripled their accuracy and the amount of homework completed as assessed in a multiple baseline across participants design. One student with high academic abilities elected not to use the intervention, because he worked quickly (albeit carelessly) at school to complete his homework during baseline and during intervention. The practical and research implications of the findings are discussed.     

Post-choice information processing by pigeons

In a conditional discrimination (matching-to-sample), a sample is followed by two comparison stimuli, one of which is correct, depending on the sample. Evidence from previous research suggests that if the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect response (the so-called penalty-time procedure), acquisition by pigeons is facilitated. The present research tested the hypothesis that the penalty-time procedure allows the pigeons to review and learn from the maintained stimulus display following an incorrect choice. It did so by including a penalty-time group for which, following an incorrect choice, the sample changed to match the incorrect comparison, thus providing the pigeons with post-choice misinformation. This misinformation group acquired the matching task significantly slower than the standard penalty-time group (that had no change in the sample following an error). Furthermore, acquisition of matching by a control group that received no penalty time fell midway between the other two groups, suggesting that the pigeons did not merely take more care in making choices because of the aversiveness of penalty-time. Thus, it appears that in the acquisition of matching-to-sample, when the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect choice, the pigeons can review or acquire information from the display. This is the first time that such an effect has been reported for a nonhuman species.     

WITHIN‐TRIAL CONTRAST: WHEN IS A FAILURE TO REPLICATE NOT A TYPE I ERROR?

Vasconcelos, Urcuioli, and Lionello-DeNolf (2007) report the results of five experiments that fail to replicate the results of our within-trial contrast study (Clement, Feltus, Kaiser, & Zentall, 2000) and suggest that our results may represent a Type I Error. We believe that this conclusion is not warranted because (a) there is considerable evidence in support of the effect and (b) the amount of training that they gave to their pigeons prior to test may not have been sufficient to observe the effect reliably. We suggest that when sufficient training is provided, reliable contrast can be found.     

Risk should be objectively defined: comment on Pelé and Sueur

Pelé and Sueur (2013) propose that optimal decisions depend on delay of reinforcement, accuracy (probability or magnitude of reinforcement), and risk. The problem with this model is delay and accuracy are easy to define, but according to Pelé and Sueur the third, risk, depends on the animal’s perceived or “interpreted” risk rather than actual (experienced) risk. Thus, choice of the smaller more immediate reward over the larger delayed reward (the delay discounting function) is viewed by the authors as optimal because delay is associated with increased risk (due to potential competition or predation). But perceived risk is assessed by the decision made (e.g., the slope of the discounting function), and since there is virtually no actual risk involved, by default if there is no independent means of measuring risk, according to Pelé and Sueur, all choices can be viewed as optimal. Thus, optimality is an untestable concept. We suggest that risk be defined by the actual risk (given sufficient experience to judge it) and under conditions in which there is no actual risk (or risk is controlled), when animals choose an alternative that provides a lower rate of access to food, that one considers such choice to be suboptimal.     

Transitive inference by pigeons: Does the geometric presentation of the stimuli make a difference?

In studies of transitive inference (TI), nonhuman animals are typically trained with the following 5-term task: A+B?, B+C?, C+D?, D+E? where the letters stand for arbitrary stimuli and [+] indicates that choice is reinforced and [?] indicates that choice is not reinforced. A TI effect is found when, given the untrained test pair BD, subjects choose B. TI effects have been found in many nonhuman species. Although reinforcement history has been posited as an account of the TI effect, it has failed to account for a variety of conditions under which TI effects have been found. A more cognitive account of TI is that organisms are able to form a representation of the series (A > B > C > D > E). In support of this hypothesis, Roberts and Phelps (Psychol Sci 5:368–374, 1994) found that presentation of the pairs of stimuli in a linear arrangement facilitated TI performance by rats, whereas presentation of the pairs of stimuli in a circular arrangement did not. Using methods adapted from Roberts and Phelps, we trained pigeons on either a linear or a circular arrangement of stimuli with the 5-term task. Results indicated that on the BD test pair, pigeons trained with a circular arrangement did not differ from those trained with a linear arrangement. Furthermore, we found that memory for training pairs was variable and was highly correlated with degree of TI. The results suggest that regardless of how pigeons are able to represent the stimuli, choice was not affected by the spatial arrangement of the stimuli during training.     

Less means more for pigeons but not always

When humans are asked to judge the value of a set of objects of excellent quality, they often give this set higher value than those same objects with the addition of some of lesser quality. This is an example of the affect heuristic, often referred to as the less-is-more effect. Monkeys and dogs, too, have shown this suboptimal effect. But in the present experiments, normally hungry pigeons chose optimally: a preferred food plus a less--preferred food over a more-preferred food alone. In Experiment 2, however, pigeons on a less-restricted diet showed the suboptimal less-is-more effect. Choice on control trials indicated that the effect did not result from the novelty of two food items versus one. The effect in the less-food-restricted pigeons appears to result from the devaluation of the combination of the food items by the presence of the less-preferred food item. The reversal of the effect under greater food restriction may occur because, as motivation increases, the value of the less-preferred food increases faster than the value of the more-preferred food, thus decreasing the difference in value between the two foods.     

Social learning in humans and nonhuman animals: theoretical and empirical dissections

The past decade has seen a resurgent, concerted interest in social learning research comparing human and nonhuman animals. In this special issue, we present a synthesis of work that consolidates what is currently known and provides a platform for future research. Consequently, we include both new empirical studies and novel theoretical proposals describing work with both human children and adults and a range of nonhuman animals. In this introduction, we describe the background of this special issue and provide a context for each of the eight articles it contains. We hope such introduction will not only help the reader synthesize the interdisciplinary views that characterize this broad field, but also stimulate development of new methods, concepts, and data.     

Sunk cost: pigeons (Columba livia), too, show bias to complete a task rather than shift to another

The sunk cost effect involves the bias to stay with an alternative because one has already invested resources, even when there is a better alternative available. In a series of experiments, at various points during a 30-peck requirement, pigeons (Columba livia) could choose between completing the response requirement (at a different location in Experiment 1 or the same location in Experiments 3 and 4) and switching to a constant number of pecks. In three experiments, the pigeons showed a bias to complete the pecks already started, even when that required more pecking. We also demonstrated that the bias depended on the initial investment and was not produced merely because the pigeons preferred a variable alternative over a fixed alternative. The deviation from optimal choice suggests that pigeons show a bias similar to the sunk cost effect in humans.     

Too dog tired to avoid danger: Self-control depletion in canines increases behavioral approach toward an aggressive threat

This study investigated whether initial self-control exertion by dogs would affect behavioral approach toward an aggressive threat. Dogs were initially required to exert self-control (sit still for 10 min) or not (caged for 10 min) before they were walked into a room in which a barking, growling dog was caged. Subject dogs spent 4 min in this room but were free to choose where in the room they spent their time. Approaching the unfamiliar conspecific was the predisposed response, but it was also the riskier choice (Lindsay, 2005). We found that following the exertion of self-control (in comparison with the control condition), dogs spent greater time in proximity to the aggressor. This pattern of behavior suggests that initial self-control exertion results in riskier and more impulsive decision making by dogs.