A Process Model of Causal Reasoning

How do we make causal judgments? Many studies have demonstrated that people are capable causal reasoners, achieving success on tasks from reasoning to categorization to interventions. However, less is known about the mental processes used to achieve such sophisticated judgments. We propose a new process model—the mutation sampler—that models causal judgments as based on a sample of possible states of the causal system generated using the Metropolis–Hastings sampling algorithm. Across a diverse array of tasks and conditions encompassing over 1,700 participants, we found that our model provided a consistently closer fit to participant judgments than standard causal graphical models. In particular, we found that the biases introduced by mutation sampling accounted for people's consistent, predictable errors that the normative model by definition could not. Moreover, using a novel experimental methodology, we found that those biases appeared in the samples that participants explicitly judged to be representative of a causal system. We conclude by advocating sampling methods as plausible process-level accounts of the computations specified by the causal graphical model framework and highlight opportunities for future research to identify not just what reasoners compute when drawing causal inferences, but also how they compute it.     

Nonmonetary and nonreciprocal freecycling: Motivations for participating in online alternative giving communities

This research examines consumers' participation in a nonmonetary, nonreciprocal form of online consumer exchange wherein consumers may decide to give only, receive only, or both give and receive. Given the lack of financial incentives or relational norms that would traditionally drive participation in this societally beneficial consumption activity for which we advance the term alternative giving, this research examines consumers' participation motivations. Are consumers, as prior research suggests, motivated to participate in alternative giving activities on the basis of prosocial motives or for other reasons? Through a content analysis of the online Freecycle Network, we found that participation is driven primarily by fundamental consumer needs and wants, though other prosocial, less materialistic factors are also drivers. Our findings also identify an inconsistency in product categories between what givers offer and what receivers seek, suggesting that supply–demand imbalances can emerge within alternative giving communities.     

The importance of being nonalignable: a critical test of the structural alignment theory of similarity

The structural alignment theory of similarity distinguishes 2 types of difference that may occur between stimuli: Alignable differences are those related to a commonality, whereas nonalignable differences are not related to a commonality. Alignment theory predicts that alignable differences should be more heavily weighted than nonalignable differences in similarity judgment. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that, contrary to this prediction, nonalignable differences exerted a greater impact than alignable differences in similarity and difference judgments of geometric stimuli. Experiment 3 revealed that the relative weight accorded a given difference was also affected by contextual constraints. Thus, although the experiments supported the validity of the distinction between alignable and nonalignable differences, results were discordant with the specific prediction of structural alignment theory.     

Attachment to objects as compensation for close others' perceived unreliability

Attachment theory posits that close interpersonal relationships provide people with psychological security across the lifespan. Research shows that when people perceive that close others are unreliable, they may seek alternative, non-social sources of security (e.g., deities). Building on this work, the authors hypothesized that attachment to objects compensates for threatened attachment security when close others are unreliable. Participants primed with close others', but not strangers', unreliability reported increased attachment to belongings (Study 1), and this effect was mediated by feelings of attachment anxiety (concern over close others' availability), but not attachment avoidance (avoiding emotional dependence; Study 2), suggesting that object attachment compensates for the perception that close others are unreliable rather than consistently rejecting. In Study 3, when a valued belonging was removed, participants primed with uncertainty about their relationships showed increased separation anxiety and motivation to reunite with the belonging, regardless of the belonging's perceived importance for facilitating relationships.     

Effects of electromyostimulation on knee extensors and flexors strength and steadiness in older adults

It is known that electromyostimulation (EMS) alone or superimposed over voluntary contraction (EV) can effectively improve muscle strength. However, the effect of this type of training on the ability to control force production at submaximal levels is unknown. The authors examined the effects of EV training on steadiness in force production of knee extensors and flexors in older adults. Forty participants, including 20 men and 20 women, 60-77 years of age, were randomly allocated into a control group (CG) and an electromyostimulation superimposed over voluntary contraction (EVG) group. The EVG performed 30 bilateral isometric knee extension and flexion contractions per session, 3 training sessions per week, for 6 weeks. The variations in force production, expressed in absolute (standard deviation [SD]) and relative (coefficient of variation [CV]) terms, were assessed in isometric contractions at 5%, 15% and 25% maximal voluntary contraction (MVC) levels. Results indicated that MVC increased in knee extension and flexion in EVG (p < .05) after the training; steadiness CV also improved at 15% MVC in knee flexion (p < .05) but no significant changes were found in knee extension and steadiness SD. The training-induced changes in MVC were not correlated to steadiness CV that might indicate different mechanisms underlying these adaptations.     

By the numbers: Structure-seeking individuals prefer quantitative over qualitative representations of personal value to compensate for the threat of unclear performance contingencies

What combination of dispositional and situational factors leads people to represent their personal value in quantitative terms (e.g., salary) rather than qualitative terms (e.g., virtue)? Integrating research on quantitative information seeking, dispositional epistemic motivation, and learned helplessness, the current article hypothesized that individuals high, but not low, in uncertainty avoidance (measured with the Personal Need for Structure Scale [PNS]) would prefer quantitative (over qualitative) value representations to compensate for the diminished self-esteem certainty caused by exposure to unclear performance contingencies. Accordingly, in Study 1 high-PNS participants exposed to unclear (vs. clear) performance contingencies in one domain (visual intelligence) preferred a quantitative value representation in another domain (verbal intelligence). Study 2 showed that this effect is mediated by self-esteem certainty, not self-esteem level. Study 3 included a failure feedback condition to further isolate the role of epistemic motivation, as distinct from self-enhancement motivation, in driving the tendency to quantify personal value.     

The real of the rabble: Žižek and the historical truth of the Hegelo-Lacanian dialectic

In this essay I attempt to answer a fundamental question about ?i?ek’s heterodox reading of Hegel’s dialectic: What project sustains this reading in the first place? That is, what is at stake for ?i?ek himself? The purpose of this essay is to develop in this fashion a reading of ?i?ek (since he does not programmatically answer this question), although not one that is necessarily meant to compete against other alternatives. My argument, then, is that ?i?ek’s ontological and hermeneutical project is ultimately political, that when ?i?ek says we need Hegel “now more than ever,” he has a political situation in mind. By finding an element of Hegel’s thought, the political subjectivity of the “rabble,” that resists the traditional picture of dialectical system (especially the critical picture of the post-structuralists), ?i?ek can overturn the distinction between Hegelian method and system by suggesting that there’s no comprehensible distinction at all. And by politicizing Hegel and drawing out the seeds of Lacanian thought that were nonetheless incomplete until Lacan, ?i?ek’s historiographical project takes on the character of ideological critique. As such, Hegel and Lacan reach us anew, as theoretical players in an anti-postmodern political gambit.     

Righteous or self‐righteous anger? Justice sensitivity moderates defensive outrage at a third‐party harm‐doer

While bystanders' outrage over moral transgressions may represent a genuine desire to restore justice, such expressions can also be self‐serving—alleviating guilt and bolstering one's moral status. Four studies examined whether individual differences in observer justice sensitivity (JS_O) moderate the degree to which outrage at third‐party harm‐doing reflects concerns about one's own moral identity rather than justice per se. Among participants low (vs. high) in JS_O, feelings of guilt predicted greater outrage and desire to punish a corporation's sweatshop labor practices (Studies 1 & 2). Furthermore, affirming one's personal moral identity reduced outrage and support for punishing a corporate harm‐doer among those low, but not high in JS_O (Studies 3 & 4). Similar moderation was absent for other forms of justice sensitivity and just world beliefs. Effects were not explained by negative affect, empathy, personal harm, or political orientation. Results suggest that JS_O uniquely differentiates defensive and justice‐driven moral outrage (150/150).     

“Inside out”: Appraisals for achievement emotions from constructive,positive, and negative feedback on writing

Even with the recent surge of research on achievement emotions, few studies have investigated emotions in feedback situations and the appraisals associated with such emotions. The purpose of this study was to examine emotion appraisals of constructive criticism, negative, and positive feedback, to aid us in determining whether these appraisals differed by feedback type. In a task asking them to provide open-ended responses as they imagined receiving feedback on a writing task, undergraduates (N?=?270) gave reasons for why they might experience unpleasant emotions from positive feedback and pleasant emotions from negative feedback along with reasons for both pleasant and unpleasant emotions emanating from constructive feedback. Open coding of responses yielded categories for each emotion-feedback pairing that, across all emotions, were collapsed into five appraisal categories: feedback suggests ways to improve, a mismatch between feedback and task exists, feedback targets the self or one’s ability, feedback says something about the relationship between feedback giver and receiver, and the task is judged for its value. Distributions of appraisal categories distinguished constructive feedback from positive and negative feedback. Implications are drawn for control-value theory and for classroom feedback practices.     

A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision

What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action to maximize utility. Their judgments contradicted a utilitarian principle they otherwise strongly endorsed. Exposure to this scenario led participants to revise their belief in the utilitarian principle, and this revision persisted over several hours. This method provides a new avenue for inducing belief revision.