Similarity and attribution in concept combination: Reply to Wisniewski

Wisniewski raises several important points in his comment on our study of the (non)role of similarity in concept combination. He notes that feature diagnosticity is an important factor in property attribution. He also points out that relational interpretations of combined concepts depend on thematic role plausibility, not constituent similarity. We agree with both of these points. Wisniewski further identifies a possible item artifact that might account for our results. However, reexamination of those items fails to support this hypothesis. Wisniewski also claims that an alignment process is necessary to specify how an attributed property should be instantiated in the combined concept. We argue instead that postcomprehension elaboration processes can account for specific property instantiations. Finally, we suggest that the perceived similarity between the constituents of a combined concept is an outcome of the comprehension process, not a prior condition for, or an integral part of, that process.     

Motivated Reasoning in an Explore-Exploit Task

The current research investigates how prior preferences affect causal learning. Participants were tasked with repeatedly choosing policies (e.g., increase vs. decrease border security funding) in order to maximize the economic output of an imaginary country and inferred the influence of the policies on the economy. The task was challenging and ambiguous, allowing participants to interpret the relations between the policies and the economy in multiple ways. In three studies, we found evidence of motivated reasoning despite financial incentives for accuracy. For example, participants who believed that border security funding should be increased were more likely to conclude that increasing border security funding actually caused a better economy in the task. In Study 2, we hypothesized that having neutral preferences (e.g., preferring neither increased nor decreased spending on border security) would lead to more accurate assessments overall, compared to having a strong initial preference; however, we did not find evidence for such an effect. In Study 3, we tested whether providing participants with possible functional forms of the policies (e.g., the policy takes some time to work or initially has a negative influence but eventually a positive influence) would lead to a smaller influence of motivated reasoning but found little evidence for this effect. This research advances the field of causal learning by studying the role of prior preferences, and in doing so, integrates the fields of causal learning and motivated reasoning using a novel explore-exploit task.     

On a neglected feature of moral agency

Two conditions have been thought necessary and sufficient for a person to be morally responsible. The first is a control condition: an agent must control the actions for which she is held responsible. The second is an epistemic condition: an agent must know, or have the right kind of cognitive relationship to, the relevant features of what she is doing. Debate about moral responsibility among contemporary philosophers can be neatly divided into two circles, with each circle attending narrowly to one of these two conditions. I argue that these separate debates should not be had so separately. The two conditions on moral responsibility interact in a way that has been neglected. An agent's possession of knowledge, and her capacity to attain knowledge, increase that agent's control in a sense relevant to the control condition on moral responsibility. Conversely, an agent's control of her actions can be used to acquire knowledge in a sense relevant to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. It is in this way that a sort of feedback loop arises between the epistemic condition and the control condition—each is capable of augmenting the degree to which their possessor satisfies the other. I argue that this interaction has important implications for each debate.     

Recent Developments in the Treatment of Depression

The cognitive and behavioral interventions can be as efficacious as antidepressant medications and more enduring, but some patients will be more likely to respond to one than the other. Recent work has focused on developing sophisticated selection algorithms using machine-learning approaches that answer the question, “What works best for whom?” Moreover, the vast majority of people suffering from depression reside in low- and middle-income countries where access to either psychotherapy or medications is virtually nonexistent. Great strides have been made in training nonspecialist providers (known as task sharing) to overcome this gap. Finally, recent work growing out of evolutionary psychology suggests that antidepressant medications may suppress symptoms at the expense of prolonging the underlying episode so as to increase the risk of relapse whenever someone tries to stop. We address each of these developments and their cumulative implications.     

“Turn Now,My Vindication Is at Stake”: Military Moral Injury and Communities of Faith

Pastoral Psychology - The purpose of this article is to describe and analyze how communities of faith can overcome key barriers and fulfill their responsibility to respond to the moral injury of...     

Review of Hendrik Stoker,Conscience: phenomena and theories,Notre Dame,IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2018

Continental Philosophy Review -     

Happiness Enrichment and Sustainable Happiness

Applied Research in Quality of Life - Sustainable happiness research has recently received renewed attention. Studies present exercises intended to enhance happiness. A comprehensive process by...     

Freeze or flee? Negative stimuli elicit selective responding

Humans preferentially attend to negative stimuli. A consequence of this automatic vigilance for negative valence is that negative words elicit slower responses than neutral or positive words on a host of cognitive tasks. Some researchers have speculated that negative stimuli elicit a general suppression of motor activity, akin to the freezing response exhibited by animals under threat. Alternatively, we suggest that negative stimuli only elicit slowed responding on tasks for which stimulus valence is irrelevant for responding. To discriminate between these motor suppression and response-relevance hypotheses, we elicited both lexical decisions and valence judgments of negative words and positive words. Relative to positive words (e.g., kitten), negative words (e.g., spider) elicited slower lexical decisions but faster valence judgments. Results therefore indicate that negative stimuli do not cause a generalized motor suppression. Rather, negative stimuli elicit selective responding, with faster responses on tasks for which stimulus valence is response-relevant.     

On the nonautomaticity of visual word processing: electrophysiological evidence that word processing requires central attention

The present study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to determine the degree to which people can process words while devoting central attention to another task. Experiments 1-4 measured the N400 effect, which is sensitive to the degree of mismatch between a word and the current semantic context. Experiment 5 measured the P3 difference between low- and high-frequency words. Because these effects can occur only if a word has been identified, both ERP components index word processing. The authors found that the N400 effect (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) and the P3 difference (Experiment 5) were strongly attenuated for Task 2 words presented nearly simultaneously with Task 1. No such attenuation was found when the Task 1 stimulus was presented but required no response (Experiment 2). Strong attenuation was also evident when the Task 2 word was presented before the Task 1 stimulus (Experiment 4), suggesting that central resources are not allocated to stimuli first-come, first-served but rather are strategically locked to Task 1. The authors conclude that visual word processing is not fully automatic but rather requires access to limited central attentional resources.