Motivated Reasoning in an Explore-Exploit Task

The current research investigates how prior preferences affect causal learning. Participants were tasked with repeatedly choosing policies (e.g., increase vs. decrease border security funding) in order to maximize the economic output of an imaginary country and inferred the influence of the policies on the economy. The task was challenging and ambiguous, allowing participants to interpret the relations between the policies and the economy in multiple ways. In three studies, we found evidence of motivated reasoning despite financial incentives for accuracy. For example, participants who believed that border security funding should be increased were more likely to conclude that increasing border security funding actually caused a better economy in the task. In Study 2, we hypothesized that having neutral preferences (e.g., preferring neither increased nor decreased spending on border security) would lead to more accurate assessments overall, compared to having a strong initial preference; however, we did not find evidence for such an effect. In Study 3, we tested whether providing participants with possible functional forms of the policies (e.g., the policy takes some time to work or initially has a negative influence but eventually a positive influence) would lead to a smaller influence of motivated reasoning but found little evidence for this effect. This research advances the field of causal learning by studying the role of prior preferences, and in doing so, integrates the fields of causal learning and motivated reasoning using a novel explore-exploit task.     

Moral Rationalism and the Normativity of Constitutive Principles

Recently, Christine Bratu and Mortiz Dittmeyer have argued that Christine Korsgaard’s constitutive project fails to establish the normativity of practical principles (such as the fundamental principle of morality) because it fails to show why a principle’s being constitutive of a practice shows that one ought to conform to that principle. They argue that in many cases a principle’s being constitutive of a practice has no bearing on whether one ought to conform to it. In this paper I argue that Bratu and Dittmeyer’s argument fails in three important respects. First, they fail to recognize the ways in which Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian view departs from more orthodox Kantian views. Second, they fail to recognize the respect in which Korsgaard’s view is a version of moral rationalism. Third, they overlook an important scope ambiguity in an important premise of their argument. A sensible way of resolving this ambiguity gives the constitutivist a reasonable response.     

On the nonautomaticity of visual word processing: electrophysiological evidence that word processing requires central attention

The present study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to determine the degree to which people can process words while devoting central attention to another task. Experiments 1-4 measured the N400 effect, which is sensitive to the degree of mismatch between a word and the current semantic context. Experiment 5 measured the P3 difference between low- and high-frequency words. Because these effects can occur only if a word has been identified, both ERP components index word processing. The authors found that the N400 effect (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) and the P3 difference (Experiment 5) were strongly attenuated for Task 2 words presented nearly simultaneously with Task 1. No such attenuation was found when the Task 1 stimulus was presented but required no response (Experiment 2). Strong attenuation was also evident when the Task 2 word was presented before the Task 1 stimulus (Experiment 4), suggesting that central resources are not allocated to stimuli first-come, first-served but rather are strategically locked to Task 1. The authors conclude that visual word processing is not fully automatic but rather requires access to limited central attentional resources.     

Violent and disruptive behavior among drug-involved prisoners: relationship with psychiatric symptoms

This study examines the relationship between psychiatric symptoms and violent/disruptive behavior among 192 inmates who participated in prison-based substance abuse treatment. Participants came from two sites able to provide narrative reports of disciplinary actions in the Criminal Justice Drug Abuse Treatment Studies' Co-Occurring Disorders Screening Instrument study. In multivariate logistic models, a lifetime history of thought insertion/control ideation (OR, 11.6; 95% CI, 1.8-75.2), antisocial personality disorder (OR, 3.3; 95% CI, 1.2-8.9), and disciplinary action related to possession of controlled substances or contraband (OR, 4.9; 95% CI, 1.9-12.3) were associated with increased risk for violent or disruptive behavior while in prison, whereas lifetime phobic symptoms (OR, 0.2; 95% CI, 0.1-0.54) and high school graduation (OR, 0.4; 95% CI, 0.2-1.0) were associated with a decreased risk of violence and disruptive behavior in general. We conclude that, among inmates in substance abuse treatment, symptoms that increase risk for violence or disruptive behavior include thought control/insertion ideation and disciplinary infractions related to controlled substances, contraband, or failure to participate in assigned programs, as well a history of antisocial personality disorder.     

Freeze or flee? Negative stimuli elicit selective responding

Humans preferentially attend to negative stimuli. A consequence of this automatic vigilance for negative valence is that negative words elicit slower responses than neutral or positive words on a host of cognitive tasks. Some researchers have speculated that negative stimuli elicit a general suppression of motor activity, akin to the freezing response exhibited by animals under threat. Alternatively, we suggest that negative stimuli only elicit slowed responding on tasks for which stimulus valence is irrelevant for responding. To discriminate between these motor suppression and response-relevance hypotheses, we elicited both lexical decisions and valence judgments of negative words and positive words. Relative to positive words (e.g., kitten), negative words (e.g., spider) elicited slower lexical decisions but faster valence judgments. Results therefore indicate that negative stimuli do not cause a generalized motor suppression. Rather, negative stimuli elicit selective responding, with faster responses on tasks for which stimulus valence is response-relevant.     

Head up, foot down: object words orient attention to the objects' typical location

Many objects typically occur in particular locations, and object words encode these spatial associations. We tested whether such object words (e.g., head, foot) orient attention toward the location where the denoted object typically occurs (i.e., up, down). Because object words elicit perceptual simulations of the denoted objects (i.e., the representations acquired during actual perception are reactivated), we predicted that an object word would interfere with identification of an unrelated visual target subsequently presented in the object's typical location. Consistent with this prediction, three experiments demonstrated that words denoting objects that typically occur high in the visual field hindered identification of targets appearing at the top of the display, whereas words denoting low objects hindered target identification at the bottom of the display. Thus, object words oriented attention to and activated perceptual simulations in the objects' typical locations. These results shed new light on how language affects perception.     

An asymmetric effect of relational integration on recognition memory

Two experiments assessed whether conceptual relations (e.g., contains: COOKIE JAR) facilitate the retrieval of concepts (e.g., COOKIE and JAR) from long-term memory. The CARIN model of nominal combination asserts that conceptual relations are represented with and selected from the modifier noun (COOKIE). Thus, the model predicts that relational integration will facilitate memory for modifiers but not for head nouns (JAR). In Experiment 1, concepts were studied in pairs and were then tested individually. Recognition accuracy was higher for modifiers than for head nouns. In Experiment 2, the studied concepts (e.g., COOKIE JAR) were tested in the context of a new pair that instantiated either the same relation (e.g., COOKIE plate) or a different relation (e.g., COOKIE crumb). Recognition was again better for modifiers than for head nouns, but only when the same conceptual relation was instantiated at both study and test. Thus, results indicate that conceptual relations (a) facilitate recognition memory, and (b) are associated more strongly with the modifier than with the head noun.     

What Fitness Can’t Be

Recently advocates of the propensity interpretation of fitness have turned critics. To accommodate examples from the population genetics literature they conclude that fitness is better defined broadly as a family of propensities rather than the propensity to contribute descendants to some future generation. We argue that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper ramifications of the examples they cite. These examples demonstrate why there are factors outside of propensities that determine fitness. We go on to argue for the more general thesis that no account of fitness can satisfy the desiderata that have motivated the propensity account.