Similarity and attribution in concept combination: Reply to Wisniewski

Wisniewski raises several important points in his comment on our study of the (non)role of similarity in concept combination. He notes that feature diagnosticity is an important factor in property attribution. He also points out that relational interpretations of combined concepts depend on thematic role plausibility, not constituent similarity. We agree with both of these points. Wisniewski further identifies a possible item artifact that might account for our results. However, reexamination of those items fails to support this hypothesis. Wisniewski also claims that an alignment process is necessary to specify how an attributed property should be instantiated in the combined concept. We argue instead that postcomprehension elaboration processes can account for specific property instantiations. Finally, we suggest that the perceived similarity between the constituents of a combined concept is an outcome of the comprehension process, not a prior condition for, or an integral part of, that process.     

Saccadic eye movements during reading

Exposure duration and sequential redundancy are major determinants of report accuracy for textual displays. Increased emission of left-to-right saccades to both word strings and letter strings are associated with sequential redundancy. Such saccades are more frequent when words rather than pseudowords are viewed. The pattern of scanning is not simply left to right, and certain patterns of eye movements are associated positively with accuracy of report. These are a function of the sequential constraints of the display and are stronger for word strings than for letter strings. Presence of a word elicits more left-to-right saccades than does a pseudoword, even at exposures too short for a second fixation to be useful. In that case, there is no difference between redundant and nonredundant pseudowords. There is no redundancy effect at short exposures of pseudosentences.     

On a neglected feature of moral agency

Two conditions have been thought necessary and sufficient for a person to be morally responsible. The first is a control condition: an agent must control the actions for which she is held responsible. The second is an epistemic condition: an agent must know, or have the right kind of cognitive relationship to, the relevant features of what she is doing. Debate about moral responsibility among contemporary philosophers can be neatly divided into two circles, with each circle attending narrowly to one of these two conditions. I argue that these separate debates should not be had so separately. The two conditions on moral responsibility interact in a way that has been neglected. An agent's possession of knowledge, and her capacity to attain knowledge, increase that agent's control in a sense relevant to the control condition on moral responsibility. Conversely, an agent's control of her actions can be used to acquire knowledge in a sense relevant to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. It is in this way that a sort of feedback loop arises between the epistemic condition and the control condition—each is capable of augmenting the degree to which their possessor satisfies the other. I argue that this interaction has important implications for each debate.     

Motivated Reasoning in an Explore-Exploit Task

The current research investigates how prior preferences affect causal learning. Participants were tasked with repeatedly choosing policies (e.g., increase vs. decrease border security funding) in order to maximize the economic output of an imaginary country and inferred the influence of the policies on the economy. The task was challenging and ambiguous, allowing participants to interpret the relations between the policies and the economy in multiple ways. In three studies, we found evidence of motivated reasoning despite financial incentives for accuracy. For example, participants who believed that border security funding should be increased were more likely to conclude that increasing border security funding actually caused a better economy in the task. In Study 2, we hypothesized that having neutral preferences (e.g., preferring neither increased nor decreased spending on border security) would lead to more accurate assessments overall, compared to having a strong initial preference; however, we did not find evidence for such an effect. In Study 3, we tested whether providing participants with possible functional forms of the policies (e.g., the policy takes some time to work or initially has a negative influence but eventually a positive influence) would lead to a smaller influence of motivated reasoning but found little evidence for this effect. This research advances the field of causal learning by studying the role of prior preferences, and in doing so, integrates the fields of causal learning and motivated reasoning using a novel explore-exploit task.     

Moral Rationalism and the Normativity of Constitutive Principles

Recently, Christine Bratu and Mortiz Dittmeyer have argued that Christine Korsgaard’s constitutive project fails to establish the normativity of practical principles (such as the fundamental principle of morality) because it fails to show why a principle’s being constitutive of a practice shows that one ought to conform to that principle. They argue that in many cases a principle’s being constitutive of a practice has no bearing on whether one ought to conform to it. In this paper I argue that Bratu and Dittmeyer’s argument fails in three important respects. First, they fail to recognize the ways in which Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian view departs from more orthodox Kantian views. Second, they fail to recognize the respect in which Korsgaard’s view is a version of moral rationalism. Third, they overlook an important scope ambiguity in an important premise of their argument. A sensible way of resolving this ambiguity gives the constitutivist a reasonable response.     

What Fitness Can’t Be

Recently advocates of the propensity interpretation of fitness have turned critics. To accommodate examples from the population genetics literature they conclude that fitness is better defined broadly as a family of propensities rather than the propensity to contribute descendants to some future generation. We argue that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper ramifications of the examples they cite. These examples demonstrate why there are factors outside of propensities that determine fitness. We go on to argue for the more general thesis that no account of fitness can satisfy the desiderata that have motivated the propensity account.     

An Instrumental Variable Estimator for Mixed Indicators: Analytic Derivatives and Alternative Parameterizations

Psychometrika - Methodological development of the model-implied instrumental variable (MIIV) estimation framework has proved fruitful over the last three decades. Major milestones include...