Reduced visual acuity is mirrored in low vision imagery

Research has examined the nature of visual imagery in normally sighted and blind subjects, but not in those with low vision. Findings with normally sighted subjects suggest that imagery involves primary visual areas of the brain. Since the plasticity of visual cortex appears to be limited in adulthood, we might expect imagery of those with adult-onset low vision to be relatively unaffected by these losses. But if visual imagery is based on recent and current experience, we would expect images of those with low vision to share some properties of impaired visual perception. We examined key parameters of mental images reported by normally sighted subjects, compared to those with early- and late-onset low vision, and with a group of subjects with restricted visual fields using an imagery questionnaire. We found evidence that those with reduced visual acuity report the imagery distances of objects to be closer than those with normal acuity and also depict objects in imagery with lower resolution than those with normal visual acuity. We also found that all low vision groups, like the normally sighted, image objects at a substantially greater distance than when asked to place them at a distance that ‘just fits’ their imagery field (overflow distance). All low vision groups, like the normally sighted, showed evidence of a limited visual field for imagery, but our group with restricted visual fields did not differ from the other groups in this respect. We conclude that imagery of those with low vision is similar to that of those with normal vision in being dependent on the size of objects or features being imaged, but that it also reflects their reduced visual acuity. We found no evidence for a dependence on imagery of age of onset or number of years of vision impairment.     

On a neglected feature of moral agency

Two conditions have been thought necessary and sufficient for a person to be morally responsible. The first is a control condition: an agent must control the actions for which she is held responsible. The second is an epistemic condition: an agent must know, or have the right kind of cognitive relationship to, the relevant features of what she is doing. Debate about moral responsibility among contemporary philosophers can be neatly divided into two circles, with each circle attending narrowly to one of these two conditions. I argue that these separate debates should not be had so separately. The two conditions on moral responsibility interact in a way that has been neglected. An agent's possession of knowledge, and her capacity to attain knowledge, increase that agent's control in a sense relevant to the control condition on moral responsibility. Conversely, an agent's control of her actions can be used to acquire knowledge in a sense relevant to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. It is in this way that a sort of feedback loop arises between the epistemic condition and the control condition—each is capable of augmenting the degree to which their possessor satisfies the other. I argue that this interaction has important implications for each debate.     

Motivated Reasoning in an Explore-Exploit Task

The current research investigates how prior preferences affect causal learning. Participants were tasked with repeatedly choosing policies (e.g., increase vs. decrease border security funding) in order to maximize the economic output of an imaginary country and inferred the influence of the policies on the economy. The task was challenging and ambiguous, allowing participants to interpret the relations between the policies and the economy in multiple ways. In three studies, we found evidence of motivated reasoning despite financial incentives for accuracy. For example, participants who believed that border security funding should be increased were more likely to conclude that increasing border security funding actually caused a better economy in the task. In Study 2, we hypothesized that having neutral preferences (e.g., preferring neither increased nor decreased spending on border security) would lead to more accurate assessments overall, compared to having a strong initial preference; however, we did not find evidence for such an effect. In Study 3, we tested whether providing participants with possible functional forms of the policies (e.g., the policy takes some time to work or initially has a negative influence but eventually a positive influence) would lead to a smaller influence of motivated reasoning but found little evidence for this effect. This research advances the field of causal learning by studying the role of prior preferences, and in doing so, integrates the fields of causal learning and motivated reasoning using a novel explore-exploit task.     

Presidential Address: Going Public: The Art and Science of Researching Domestic Violence and Religion

Going public with our research is both an “art” and a “science.” It involves elements of “vulnerability” and elements of “resiliency,” two key themes that have emerged in my program of research on domestic violence and religion. I harness the concepts of vulnerability and resiliency to argue that public engagement involves the scholar in an ongoing negotiation between the science and the art of disseminating his or her research results. The article concludes with references to our web‐based resources ( http://www.theraveproject.org ) and the way we have used stained glass to tell the story of research results.     

Moral Rationalism and the Normativity of Constitutive Principles

Recently, Christine Bratu and Mortiz Dittmeyer have argued that Christine Korsgaard’s constitutive project fails to establish the normativity of practical principles (such as the fundamental principle of morality) because it fails to show why a principle’s being constitutive of a practice shows that one ought to conform to that principle. They argue that in many cases a principle’s being constitutive of a practice has no bearing on whether one ought to conform to it. In this paper I argue that Bratu and Dittmeyer’s argument fails in three important respects. First, they fail to recognize the ways in which Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian view departs from more orthodox Kantian views. Second, they fail to recognize the respect in which Korsgaard’s view is a version of moral rationalism. Third, they overlook an important scope ambiguity in an important premise of their argument. A sensible way of resolving this ambiguity gives the constitutivist a reasonable response.     

Personality and Integrative Negotiations: A HEXACO Investigation of Actor,Partner, and Actor–Partner Interaction Effects on Objective and Subjective Outcomes

The present study sought to expand the literature on the relations of major dimensions of personality with integrative negotiation outcomes by introducing the HEXACO model, investigating both effects of the negotiators' and their counterparts' personality traits on objective and subjective negotiation outcomes, and investigating two interactions between the negotiators' and counterparts' personalities. One hundred forty‐eight participants completed the HEXACO‐100 measure of personality. Participants then engaged in a dyadic negotiation task that contained a mix of distributive and integrative elements (74 dyads). Measures of subjective experience and objective economic value were obtained, and actor–partner interdependence models were estimated. Personality was generally a better predictor of subjective experience than objective economic value. In particular, partner honesty‐humility, extraversion, and openness predicted more positive negotiation experiences. An actor–partner interaction effect was found for actor‐agreeableness by partner‐honesty‐humility on economic outcomes; agreeable actors achieved worse (better) economic outcomes when negotiating with partners that were low (high) on honesty‐humility. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

In the Face of Uncertainty: A Twin Study of Ambiguous Information,Anxiety and Depression in Children

Anxiety and depression share genetic influences, and have been associated with similar cognitive biases. Psychological theories of anxiety and depression highlight threat interpretations of ambiguity. Little is known about whether genes influence cognitive style, or its links to symptoms. We assessed ambiguous word and scenario interpretations, anxiety and depression symptoms in 300 8-year-old twin pairs. There were significant correlations between both negative interpretations of ambiguous words and scenarios and depression symptoms after controlling for anxiety symptoms (r = .13 and .31, respectively), but no significant correlations with anxiety independent of depression. Genetic effects ranged from 16% for depression to 30% for ambiguous word interpretations. Non-shared environmental influences were large (68–70%). Both genetic and environmental influences contributed to the association between depression and ambiguous scenario interpretations. These findings support psychological theories, which emphasise the role of environmental stress both on the development of threat interpretations and on their links with symptoms. The data also support a role for genetic influence on threat interpretations, which may mediate responses to stress.     

On the nonautomaticity of visual word processing: electrophysiological evidence that word processing requires central attention

The present study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to determine the degree to which people can process words while devoting central attention to another task. Experiments 1-4 measured the N400 effect, which is sensitive to the degree of mismatch between a word and the current semantic context. Experiment 5 measured the P3 difference between low- and high-frequency words. Because these effects can occur only if a word has been identified, both ERP components index word processing. The authors found that the N400 effect (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) and the P3 difference (Experiment 5) were strongly attenuated for Task 2 words presented nearly simultaneously with Task 1. No such attenuation was found when the Task 1 stimulus was presented but required no response (Experiment 2). Strong attenuation was also evident when the Task 2 word was presented before the Task 1 stimulus (Experiment 4), suggesting that central resources are not allocated to stimuli first-come, first-served but rather are strategically locked to Task 1. The authors conclude that visual word processing is not fully automatic but rather requires access to limited central attentional resources.     

Violent and disruptive behavior among drug-involved prisoners: relationship with psychiatric symptoms

This study examines the relationship between psychiatric symptoms and violent/disruptive behavior among 192 inmates who participated in prison-based substance abuse treatment. Participants came from two sites able to provide narrative reports of disciplinary actions in the Criminal Justice Drug Abuse Treatment Studies' Co-Occurring Disorders Screening Instrument study. In multivariate logistic models, a lifetime history of thought insertion/control ideation (OR, 11.6; 95% CI, 1.8-75.2), antisocial personality disorder (OR, 3.3; 95% CI, 1.2-8.9), and disciplinary action related to possession of controlled substances or contraband (OR, 4.9; 95% CI, 1.9-12.3) were associated with increased risk for violent or disruptive behavior while in prison, whereas lifetime phobic symptoms (OR, 0.2; 95% CI, 0.1-0.54) and high school graduation (OR, 0.4; 95% CI, 0.2-1.0) were associated with a decreased risk of violence and disruptive behavior in general. We conclude that, among inmates in substance abuse treatment, symptoms that increase risk for violence or disruptive behavior include thought control/insertion ideation and disciplinary infractions related to controlled substances, contraband, or failure to participate in assigned programs, as well a history of antisocial personality disorder.