Preschoolers' perspective taking in word learning: do they blindly follow eye gaze?

When learning new words, do children use a speaker's eye gaze because it reveals referential intent? We conducted two experiments that addressed this question. In Experiment 1, the experimenter left while two novel objects were placed where the child could see both, but the experimenter would be able to see only one. The experimenter returned, looked directly at the mutually visible object, and said either, "There's the [novel word]!" or "Where's the [novel word]?" Two- through 4-year-olds selected the target of the speaker's gaze more often on there trials than on where trials, although only the older children identified the referent correctly at above-chance levels on trials of both types. In Experiment 2, the experimenter placed a novel object where only the child could see it and left while the second object was similarly hidden. When she returned and asked, "Where's the [novel word]?" 2- through 4-year-olds chose the second object at above-chance levels. Preschoolers do not blindly follow gaze, but consider the linguistic and pragmatic context when learning a new word.     

Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke’s Criticisms of Constitutivism

Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke’s arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism per se, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility a constitutivist can avoid reliabilism. I then argue that the resulting view is preferable to Peacocke’s own account of self-knowledge.     

The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false beliefs

Assessing what other people know and believe is critical for accurately understanding human action. Young children find it difficult to reason about false beliefs (i.e., beliefs that conflict with reality). The source of this difficulty is a matter of considerable debate. Here we show that if sensitive-enough measures are used, adults show deficits in a false-belief task similar to one used with young children. In particular, we show a curse-of-knowledge bias in false-belief reasoning. That is, adults' own knowledge of an event's outcome can compromise their ability to reason about another person's beliefs about that event. We also found that adults' perception of the plausibility of an event mediates the extent of this bias. These findings shed light on the factors involved in false-belief reasoning and are discussed in light of their implications for both adults' and children's social cognition.     

The origins of cognitive dissonance: evidence from children and monkeys

In a study exploring the origins of cognitive dissonance, preschoolers and capuchins were given a choice between two equally preferred alternatives (two different stickers and two differently colored M&M's, respectively). On the basis of previous research with adults, this choice was thought to cause dissonance because it conflicted with subjects' belief that the two options were equally valuable. We therefore expected subjects to change their attitude toward the unchosen alternative, deeming it less valuable. We then presented subjects with a choice between the unchosen option and an option that was originally as attractive as both options in the first choice. Both groups preferred the novel over the unchosen option in this experimental condition, but not in a control condition in which they did not take part in the first decision. These results provide the first evidence of decision rationalization in children and nonhuman primates. They suggest that the mechanisms underlying cognitive-dissonance reduction in human adults may have originated both developmentally and evolutionarily earlier than previously thought.     

Shyness, sociability, and the use of computer-mediated communication in relationship development.

Computer-mediated communication (CMC) offers its users a reduced-cues environment, a chosen degree of identifiability to others, and a forum to express facets of one's self. Previous research suggests CMC is more appealing than traditional forms of communication to certain individuals whose desires to be sociable with others are prohibited by social inhibitions. The present study predicted that individuals who indicated higher levels of both shyness and sociability would be able to express their true-selves to a greater extent online. Their relationships online would grow more quickly and be more satisfying relative to others. The pattern of results supports our hypotheses, except for the predicted relationship between true-self expression and CMC use. Suggestions for future research as well as implications for the application of CMC use in therapy for certain populations are addressed.     

Suppression effects on musical and verbal memory

Three experiments contrasted the effects of articulatory suppression on recognition memory for musical and verbal sequences. In Experiment 1, a standard/comparison task was employed, with digit or note sequences presented visually or auditorily while participants remained silent or produced intermittent verbal suppression (saying "the") or musical suppression (singing "la"). Both suppression types decreased performance by equivalent amounts, as compared with no suppression. Recognition accuracy was lower during suppression for visually presented digits than during that for auditorily presented digits (consistent with phonological loop predictions), whereas accuracy was equivalent for visually presented notes and auditory tones. When visual interference filled the retention interval in Experiment 2, performance with visually presented notes but not digits was impaired. Experiment 3 forced participants to translate visually presented music sequences by presenting comparison sequences auditorily. Suppression effects for visually presented music resembled those for digits only when the recognition task required sensory translation of cues.     

Distinguishing between social reinforcement and social elicitation

The theoretical, procedural, analytic, and interpretive components of Poulson's (1983, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 36, 471–489) study were considered in an effort to clarify the distinction between social reinforcement and social elicitation. Contrary to Poulson's contention, DRO was not, and cannot by definition be, a control for reinforcement. More importantly, the speciestypical, social nature of the infant probably reflects the collaborative influence of elicitation and reinforcement. By carefully unravelling these two interacting processes, future conditioning studies might specially enhance our knowledge of early social development.     

Comment on 'Measuring Machiavellianism with Mach V: a psychometric investigation'

A recent article (Shea & Beatty, 1983) attacks the reliability, triadic-choice format, and validity of the Mach V. The issues of meaningful versus statistical criteria, differing perspectives of bias, and reliability-validity independence are raised in challenge. Although the Mach V may have some construct validity problems, Shea and Beatty's call for a new measure of Machiavellionism is not supported by their article.