Priming involuntary autobiographical memories in the lab

Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) are recollections of personal past that frequently and spontaneously occur in daily life. Initial studies by Mace (2005) showed that deliberately reminiscing about a certain lifetime period (e.g., high school) significantly increased the number of different IAMs from the same period in subsequent days, suggesting that priming may play a significant role in the retrieval of IAMs in everyday life. In the present study, we used a modified experimental paradigm, originally used by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008), to study IAMs under well-controlled laboratory conditions. Participants completed a monotonous vigilance task twice and reported the occurrence of any spontaneous thoughts that were later classed as IAMs or other thoughts. Priming was manipulated by having experimental participants reminiscing about high school period between the two vigilance tasks and control participants playing simple games. Results showed that participants in the experimental group reported IAMs relating to high school period more frequently during the second vigilance task than those in the control group. In the experimental group, the number of high school memories was marginally higher in the second vigilance task compared to the first vigilance task with the medium effect size, but this within subjects effect was not significant in the control group. Finally, priming also enhanced the retrieval of more remote IAMs in the experimental group compared to the control group. These results suggest that priming may play a significant role in the activation and recall of IAMs and open up interesting avenues for future research.     

On the Nature of Philosophy

This paper claims that what philosophy primarily does is interpret our notions, offer ways of understanding these notions that are not scientific in nature but not contrary to science either. The paper draws a distinction between conceptual analysis, a highly constrained enterprise that is supposed to bring to light what was in the concept all along, and the interpretation of notions, a creative enterprise that offers ways of understanding notions that were not already prefigured by the content of these notions—philosophy consists in the latter, not the former. It explains how these interpretations are justified and what the difference is between better and worse interpretations. The remainder of the paper is organized around three headings: philosophy and science, philosophy and language, and philosophy and progress. It claims that in philosophy there is no real progress, but that philosophy does move forward because the notions at issue are endlessly interpretable.