算法拒绝的三维动机理论

算法拒绝意指尽管算法通常能比人类做出更准确的决策, 但人们依然更偏好人类决策的现象。算法拒绝的三维动机理论归纳了算法主体怀疑、道德地位缺失和人类特性湮没这三个主要原因, 分别对应信任、责任和掌控三种心理动机, 并对应改变算法拒绝的三种可行方案: 提高人类对算法的信任度, 强化算法的主体责任, 探索个性化算法设计以突显人对算法决策的控制力。未来研究可进一步以更社会性的视角探究算法拒绝的发生边界和其他可能动机。     

Do 12.5-month-old infants consider what objects others can see when interpreting their actions?

The present research examined whether 12.5-month-old infants take into account what objects an agent knows to be present in a scene when interpreting the agent's actions. In two experiments, the infants watched a female human agent repeatedly reach for and grasp object-A as opposed to object-B on an apparatus floor. Object-B was either (1) visible to the agent through a transparent screen; (2) hidden from the agent (but not the infants) by an opaque screen; or (3) placed by the agent herself behind the opaque screen, so that even though she could no longer see object-B, she knew of its presence there. The infants interpreted the agent's repeated actions toward object-A as revealing a preference for object-A over object-B only when she could see object-B (1) or was aware of its presence in the scene (3). These results indicate that, when watching an agent act on objects in a scene, 12.5-month-old infants keep track of the agent's representation of the physical setting in which these actions occur. If the agent's representation is incomplete, because the agent is ignorant about some aspect of the setting, infants use the agent's representation, rather than their own more complete representation, to interpret the agent's actions.     

Young infants’ reasoning about physical events involving inert and self-propelled objects

The present research examined whether 5- to 6.5-month-old infants would hold different expectations about various physical events involving a box after receiving evidence that it was either inert or self-propelled. Infants were surprised if the inert but not the self-propelled box: reversed direction spontaneously (Experiment 1); remained stationary when hit or pulled (Experiments 3 and 3A); remained stable when released in midair or with inadequate support from a platform (Experiment 4); or disappeared when briefly hidden by one of two adjacent screens (the second screen provided the self-propelled box with an alternative hiding place; Experiment 5). On the other hand, infants were surprised if the inert or the self-propelled box appeared to pass through an obstacle (Experiment 2) or disappeared when briefly hidden by a single screen (Experiment 5). The present results indicate that infants as young as 5 months of age distinguish between inert and self-propelled objects and hold different expectations for physical events involving these objects, even when incidental differences between the objects are controlled. These findings are consistent with the proposal by Gelman, R. (1990). First principles organize attention to and learning about relevant data: Number and the animate–inanimate distinction as examples. Cognitive Science, 14, 79–106, Leslie, A. M. (1994). ToMM, ToBY, and Agency: Core architecture and domain specificity. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 119–148). New York: Cambridge University Press, and others that infants endow self-propelled objects with an internal source of energy. Possible links between infants’ concepts of self-propelled object, agent, and animal are also discussed.     

Do 10-month-old infants understand others' false beliefs?

As adults, we know that others’ mental states, such as beliefs, guide their behavior and that these mental states can deviate from reality. Researchers have examined whether young children possess adult-like theory of mind by focusing on their understanding about others’ false beliefs. The present research revealed that 10-month-old infants seemed to interpret a person’s choice of toys based on her true or false beliefs about which toys were present. These results indicate that like adults, even preverbal infants act as if they can consider others’ mental states when making inferences about others’ actions.     

Can a self-propelled box have a goal? Psychological reasoning in 5-month-old infants

Some researchers have suggested that infants' ability to reason about goals develops as a result of their experiences with human agents and is then gradually extended to other agents. Other researchers have proposed that goal attribution is rooted in a specialized system of reasoning that is activated whenever infants encounter entities with appropriate features (e.g., self-propulsion). The first view predicts that young infants should attribute goals to human but not other agents; the second view predicts that young infants should attribute goals to both human and nonhuman agents. The present research revealed that 5-month-old infants (the youngest found thus far to attribute goals to human agents) also attribute goals to nonhuman agents. In two experiments, infants interpreted the actions of a self-propelled box as goal-directed. These results provide support for the view that from an early age, infants attribute goals to any entity they identify as an agent.     

Reasoning about a hidden object after a delay: evidence for robust representations in 5-month-old infants

The present research examined two alternative interpretations of violation-of-expectation findings that young infants can represent hidden objects. One interpretation is that, when watching an event in which an object becomes hidden behind another object, infants form a prediction about the event's outcome while both objects are still visible, and then check whether this prediction was accurate. The other interpretation is that infants' initial representations of hidden objects are weak and short-lived and as such sufficient for success in most violation-of-expectation tasks (as objects are typically hidden for only a few seconds at a time), but not more challenging tasks. Five-month-old infants succeeded in reasoning about the interaction of a visible and a hidden object even though (1) the two objects were never simultaneously visible, and (2) a 3- or 4-min delay preceded the test trials. These results provide evidence for robust representations of hidden objects in young infants.     

独生子与非独生子在入园适应方面的比较研究

本研究有六个小班的96名三岁至四岁半的儿童参加,其中48名为非独生子,48名为本班的配对独生子。使用的方法为观察与问卷。结果表明:三至四岁半的独生子与非独生子入幼儿园第一个月的适应行为无显著差异。报告也讨论了影响入园困难的因素,研究入园问题的良好指标以及有效的教学措施等。     

Communicating the validity of structured job interviews with graphical visual aids

The structured job interview is often resisted by human resource (HR) professionals despite its superior predictive validity compared to the traditional unstructured interview. However, HR professionals may underestimate the utility of structured interviews because of how validity information is presented. Three online experiments with MTurk samples were conducted to examine the effect of statistical visual aids (Binomial effect size display; expectancy chart; icon array) on people's perceived usefulness of validity information and intentions toward using the structured interview. Results showed that graphical visual aids (expectancy chart and icon array) were perceived as more useful for communicating validity evidence than a nongraphical effect size display. People also judged the structured interview as more useful and were more willing to use it when validity evidence was presented graphically. Individual differences in graph literacy and nationality were also examined.     

独生子与非独生子行为特点的比较研究

本研究有151名三至四岁半的幼儿园儿童参加,其中48名为非独生子,103名为独生子(其中48名为配对独生子)。所用方法为观察、评价和问卷。结果表明:三至四岁半儿童的性格无特异性与两端性。报告也讨论了独生子与非独生子行为和性格无显著差异的原因。此外,作者还提出:不同的环境反馈和儿童行为的有意性,会导致儿童的“双重性格”。     

算法决策趋避的过程动机理论

算法常用于决策, 但相较于由人类做出的决策, 即便内容相同, 算法决策更容易引起个体反应的分化, 此即算法决策趋避。趋近指个体认为算法的决策比人类的更加公平、含有更少的偏见和歧视、也更能信任和接受, 回避则与之相反。算法决策趋避的过程动机理论用以解释趋避现象, 归纳了人与算法交互所经历的原初行为互动、建立类社会关系和形成身份认同三个阶段, 阐述了各阶段中认知、关系和存在三种动机引发个体的趋避反应。未来研究可着眼于人性化知觉、群际感知对算法决策趋避的影响, 并以更社会性的视角来探究算法决策趋避的逆转过程和其他可能的心理动机。