Applying Recommendations from the Literature on Stereotype Threat: Two Field Studies

Purpose  

The objective of these two studies was to apply recommendations from the literature on stereotype threat to reduce the magnitude of subgroup differences in an employment context.     

Can unconscious knowledge allow control in sequence learning?

This paper investigates the conscious status of both the knowledge that an item is legal (judgment knowledge) and the knowledge of why it is legal (structural knowledge) in sequence learning. We compared ability to control use of knowledge (Process Dissociation Procedure) with stated awareness of the knowledge (subjective measures) as measures of the conscious status of knowledge. Experiment 1 showed that when people could control use of judgment knowledge they were indeed conscious of having that knowledge according to their own statements. Yet Experiment 2 showed that people could exert such control over the use of judgment knowledge when claiming they had no structural knowledge: i.e. conscious judgment knowledge could be based on unconscious structural knowledge. Further implicit learning research should be clear over whether judgment or structural knowledge is claimed to be unconscious as the two dissociate in sequence learning.     

Fluency does not express implicit knowledge of artificial grammars

It is commonly held that implicit knowledge expresses itself as fluency. A perceptual clarification task was used to examine the relationship between perceptual processing fluency, subjective familiarity, and grammaticality judgments in a task frequently used to produce implicit knowledge, artificial grammar learning (AGL). Four experiments examined the effects of naturally occurring differences and manipulated differences in perceptual fluency, where decisions were based on a brief exposure to test-strings (during the clarification task only) or normal exposure. When perceptual fluency was not manipulated, it was weakly related to familiarity and grammaticality judgments, but unrelated to grammatical status and hence not a source of accuracy. Counterbalanced grammatical and ungrammatical strings did not differ in perceptual fluency but differed substantially in subjective familiarity. When fluency was manipulated, faster clarifying strings were rated as more familiar and were more often endorsed as grammatical but only where exposure was brief. Results indicate that subjective familiarity derived from a source other than perceptual fluency, is the primary basis for accuracy in AGL. Perceptual fluency is found to be a dumb heuristic influencing responding only in the absence of actual implicit knowledge.     

No two cues are alike: Depth of learning during infancy is dependent on what orients attention

Human infants develop a variety of attentional mechanisms that allow them to extract relevant information from a cluttered multimodal world. We know that both social and nonsocial cues shift infants’ attention, but not how these cues differentially affect learning of multimodal events. Experiment 1 used social cues to direct 8- and 4-month-olds’ attention to two audiovisual events (i.e., animations of a cat or dog accompanied by particular sounds) while identical distractor events played in another location. Experiment 2 directed 8-month-olds’ attention with colorful flashes to the same events. Experiment 3 measured baseline learning without attention cues both with the familiarization and test trials (no cue condition) and with only the test trials (test control condition). The 8-month-olds exposed to social cues showed specific learning of audiovisual events. The 4-month-olds displayed only general spatial learning from social cues, suggesting that specific learning of audiovisual events from social cues may be a function of experience. Infants cued with the colorful flashes looked indiscriminately to both cued locations during test (similar to the 4-month-olds learning from social cues) despite attending for equal duration to the training trials as the 8-month-olds with the social cues. Results from Experiment 3 indicated that the learning effects in Experiments 1 and 2 resulted from exposure to the different cues and multimodal events. We discuss these findings in terms of the perceptual differences and relevance of the cues.     

Helping children apply their knowledge to their behavior on a dimension-switching task

To investigate why 3-year-olds have difficulty in switching sorting dimensions, children of 3 and 4 years were tested in one of four conditions on Zelazo's card sort task: standard, sleeve, label and face-up. In the standard condition, children were required to sort blue-truck and red-star cards under either a blue-star or red-truck model card, first by color or shape, and then by the other dimension. Here 3-year-olds sorted correctly until the dimension changed; they continue to sort by the initial dimension. The sleeve condition (placing the sorting cards in an envelope prior to sorting) had little effect. In the label condition, the child labeled the relevant sorting dimension on each trial. Most 3-year-olds succeeded; evidently their labeling helped them refocus their attention, overcoming ‘attentional inertia’ (the pull to continue attending to the previously relevant dimension). In the face-up condition, attentional inertia was strengthened because sorted cards were left face-up; 4-year-olds performed worse than in the standard condition. We posit that attentional inertia is the core problem for preschoolers on the card sort task.