Truth-ratios,process, task,and knowledge

In this paper, I delineate two major problems facing reliabilist approaches in epistemology. I argue that Alvin Goodman's (1986) position fails to solve either problem. I then suggest an alternative reliabilist approach that ties truth-ratio assessments to particular, well-specified cognitive tasks. I claim that a well-specified cognitive task is an empirical hypothesis about a system that involves the specification of input and output types and nomic correlations (including statistical correlations) that underlie the system's performance. On my approach, one characterizes processes by reference to the system's dispositions across the situations consistent with the task. Characterization is best understood as revealing a strategy or a set of strategies for generating outputs from inputs relying on certain nomic correlations associated with the task.     

Accreditation Standards for University and College Counseling Centers

The accreditation standards outlined in the article are used by the International Association of Counseling Services, Inc., as the basis for the formal accreditation of college and university counseling programs throughout the United States and Canada. They reflect the program elements and practice standards that are deemed essential in a counseling center that provides high-quality services to students.     

College Students' Perceptions of the Relationship Between Fee and Counseling

Fee as a variable that could have an impact on college students' perceptions of counseling was explored because of the authentic concerns about college counseling centers needing to charge direct fees for their services. Participants (N = 350) represented a cross-section of potential consumers of psychological services, not just individuals currently receiving services. On an overt level, fees seemed to be less influential in counseling considerations, but were taken into account on a more covert level. This study supports the psychological literature, which suggests that fee is not the most important factor in clients' decisions to seek counseling. Implications for counselors, administrators, researchers, and program planners are discussed.     

Do locally defined feature discontinuities capture attention?

Results from previous visual search studies have suggested that abrupt onsets produce involuntary shifts of attention (i.e., attentional capture), but discontinuities in simple features such as color and brightness do not (Jonides & Yantis, 1988). In the present study we tested whether feature discontinuities (i.e., “singletons”) can produce attentional capture in a visual search task if defined “locally” or over a small spatial range. On each trial, a variable number of letters appeared, one of which differed from the others in color or intensity. The location of this singleton was uncorrelated with target location. Local discontinuities were created by embedding the letters in a dot texture. In Experiment 1, display size effects for singleton targets were not reduced with the addition of a background dot texture. Similar results were obtained in Experiment 2, regardless of variations in texture density. Experiment 3 confirmed that when targets are defined by a color or intensity singleton, they are detected preattentively, and that increasing texture density yields faster detection. We conclude that the spatial range over which feature discontinuities are defined may influence the guidance of spatial attention, but it has no influence on their ability to capture attention.     

Explanation and the theory of questions

In The Scientific Image B. C. van Fraassen argues that a theory of explanation ought to take the form of a theory of why-questions, and a theory of this form is what he provides. Van Fraassen's account of explanation is good, as far as it goes. In particular, van Fraassen's theory of why-questions adds considerable illumination to the problem of alternative explanations in psychodynamics. But van Fraassen's theory is incomplete because it ignores those classes of explanations that are answers not to why-questions but to how-questions. In this article I provide a unified theory of explanatory questions that comprehends both how-questions and why-questions, and I show that a question-theoretic approach to explanation can be defended independently of van Fraassen's programme of Constructive Empiricism.