ABCs of principal–agent interactions: Accurate predictions,biased processes,and contrasts between working and delegating

We experimentally investigate people’s evaluations of incentive pay contracts and people’s predictions of others’ evaluations of incentive pay contracts. We emphasize that the construction of evaluations and predictions often includes two substeps, involving likelihood judgment and likelihood weighting. Predictors appear to be biased at both substeps but in opposing directions. Accurate overall predictions thus sometimes reflect two errors that are of the same magnitude and thereby offset. Moreover, predictions can become more inaccurate if one step is debiased but the other is left untouched. Importantly, principals deciding whether to delegate a task are susceptible to just one of the biases. Delegation assessments are thus often flawed, reflecting a single error that is not offset.     

Positivity ratio of flourishing individuals: Examining the moderation effects of methodological variations and chronological age

We tested the relationship between flourishing and positivity ratio while accounting for different measures of affect and rating scale formats. We further examined age-related differences in positivity ratio. Studies 1 and 2 showed that positivity ratio is affected by the measure used, but not by the rating scale format. Study 3 further showed that positivity ratio is higher among older adults. The above pattern of methodological variations was replicated in Study 4 with daily ratings of emotions and in Study 5 where emotions were rated on an extended scale. Study 5 also replicated the aforementioned age effect. Together these studies suggest that positivity ratio is moderated by methodological variants and individual differences, such as chronological age. Future studies should account for these possible moderation effects when exploring the positivity ratio and its relationship to flourishing.     

Money, Kisses, And Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk

Prospect theory's S-shaped weighting function is often said to reflect the psychophysics of chance. We propose an affective rather than psychophysical deconstruction of the weighting function resting on two assumptions. First, preferences depend on the affective reactions associated with potential outcomes of a risky choice. Second, even with monetary values controlled, some outcomes are relatively affect-rich and others relatively affect-poor. Although the psychophysical and affective approaches are complementary, the affective approach has one novel implication: Weighting functions will be more S-shaped for lotteries involving affect-rich than affect-poor outcomes. That is, people will be more sensitive to departures from impossibility and certainty but less sensitive to intermediate probability variations for affect-rich outcomes. We corroborated this prediction by observing probability-outcome interactions: An affect-poor prize was preferred over an affect-rich prize under certainty, but the direction of preference reversed under low probability. We suggest that the assumption of probability-outcome independence, adopted by both expected-utility and prospect theory, may hold across outcomes of different monetary values, but not different affective values.     

Comparison, Grouping, and Preference

How does the attractiveness of a particular option depend on comparisons drawn between it and other alternatives? We observe that in many cases, comparisons hurt: When the options being compared have both meaningful advantages and meaningful disadvantages, comparison between options makes each option less attractive. The effects of comparison are crucial in choice problems involving grouped options, because the way in which options are grouped influences which comparisons are likely to be made. In particular, we propose that grouping focuses comparison, making within-group comparisons more likely than between-group comparisons. Consistent with this prediction, experimental results showed that grouping hurts: An option is more likely to be chosen when alone than when part of a group.     

Why Induction Is No Cure For Baldness

The paper aims at establishing that the premises of both the inductive and the multi‐premised versions of the sorites argument are not apparently acceptable and that, therefore, sorites‐type arguments do not constitute logical or conceptual paradoxes. Rather, it is suggested that such arguments are most properly and fruitfully described as skeptical challenges. A secondary goal of the paper is to focus attention to the unduly neglected inductive version of the argument.     

Consciousness-Body-Time: How Do People Think Lacking Their Body?

War captivity is an extreme traumatic experience typically involving exposure to repeated stressors, including torture, isolation, and humiliation. Captives are flung from their previous known world into an unfamiliar reality in which their state of consciousness may undergo significant change. In the present study extensive interviews were conducted with fifteen Israeli former prisoners of war who fell captive during the 1973 Yom Kippur war with the goal of examining the architecture of human thought in subjects lacking a sense of body (disembodiment) as a result of confinement and isolation. Analysis of the interviews revealed that threats to a normal sense of body often lead to a loss of the sense of time as an objective dimension. Evidence suggests that the loss of the sense of body and the loss of the sense of time are in fact connected; that is, they collapse together. This breakdown in turn results in a collapse of the sense of self.