Are obsessive-compulsive tendencies related to reliance on external proxies for internal states? Evidence from biofeedback-aided relaxation studies

This article presents two studies that examine the hypothesis that obsessive-compulsive (OC) tendencies are associated with a general deficiency in subjective conviction, which leads to seeking and reliance on external proxies to compensate for that deficiency. We examined this hypothesis using a biofeedback-aided relaxation procedure. In Study 1 low OC participants performed better on a relaxation task than high OC participants. More importantly, viewing the biofeedback monitor (an external proxy for the internal state of relaxation) had a different effect on the two groups: Whereas high OC participants performed better, low OC participants did not. In addition, when given the opportunity, high OC participants requested the biofeedback monitor more than did the low OC participants. In Study 2 high OC participants were more affected by false biofeedback when judging their level of relaxation compared to low OC participants. Real relaxation level differences between the two false biofeedback phases among the two groups were not found. These results provide preliminary support for the hypothesis that obsessive-compulsive disorder is associated with deficient subjective conviction in internal states and increased reliance on external proxies. Implications for the understanding of OCD-related rules and rituals as well as for cognitive therapy for OCD are discussed.     

Bridging in social networks: Who are the people in structural holes and why are they there?

The current paper examines the psychological characteristics of people who link tightly connected cliques to each other with friendship ties. Based on the work of sociologist Georg Simmel, I argue that these people are characterized by two separate motivations, which I call entrepreneurial and relationship-building motivations. Using a complete network from a heterogeneous class of Jewish-, Arab-, and Druze-Israelis, I provide the first empirical evidence of their existence. Gould and Fernandez's brokerage roles were calculated for each participant, and triad proportions from each brokerage type were correlated with well-established psychological questionnaires. Results indicate the existence of two psychologically distinct network orientations, easily interpretable in terms of Simmel's analysis of processes in triads.     

No Place Like Home? Potential Pathways to Loneliness in Older Adults Under the Care of a Live-In Foreign Home Care Worker

The arrangement in which frail older adults from the developed world are cared for in their homes by individuals from the developing world has become increasingly prevalent worldwide. In Israel, this arrangement is termed foreign home care. In this article, the authors first describe the global phenomenon of foreign home care of frail older adults as well as the more local characteristics of this arrangement in Israel. The authors then describe the concept of loneliness. Based on empirical and theoretical knowledge in the field of loneliness, the authors argue that older adults under live-in foreign home care may be particularly prone to feelings of loneliness for several reasons: some that are general to older adults with cognitive or physical disability and others that are specific to this particular caregiving arrangement. The authors conclude by providing ideas for future practice and research on this highly vulnerable group that, to date, has received only minimal research attention.     

Asymmetries Between Positives and Negatives

How people react to negatives (what they dislike) is not always symmetric to how they react to positives (what they like). We propose a theoretical framework that links three potentially general types of positive–negative asymmetries: asymmetry in prediction errors (people err more when predicting others' attitudes about positives than about negatives), asymmetry in consensus (people agree more among themselves about negatives than about positives), and asymmetry in base rates (there are more negatives than positives). Our theory further explores a moderator for these asymmetries – importance of the stimulus to the self: greater importance engenders greater positive–negative asymmetries. We provide empirical evidence for our theory and discuss the boundaries and implications of our propositions and findings.     

Civic Republicanism and Education: Democracy and Social Justice in School

The republican political tradition, which originated in Ancient Rome and picked up by several early-modern thinkers, has been revived in the last couple of decades following the seminal works of historian Quentin Skinner and political theorist Philip Pettit. Although educational questions do not normally occupy the center stage in republican theory, various theorists working within this framework have already highlighted the significance of education for any functioning republic. Looking at educational questions through the lens of freedom as non-domination has already yielded important insights to discussions of political education. However, consideration of the existing republican educational discourse in light of the wide range of issues discussed in Pettit’s recent works reveals that it suffers from two major lacunae. First, it does not take into consideration the distinction (and deep connection) between democracy and social justice that has become central to Pettit’s republicanism. Thus, the current discussion focuses almost exclusively on education for democratic citizenship and hardly touches upon social justice. Second, the current literature thinks mainly in terms of educating future citizens, rather than conceiving of students also as political agents in the present, and of school itself as a site of non-domination. This paper aims at filling these voids, and it will therefore be oriented along two intersecting axes: the one between democracy and justice, and the other between future citizenship in the state and present citizenship at school. The resulting four categories will organize the discussion: future citizens and democracy; future citizens and social justice; present citizens and democracy; present citizens and social justice. This will not only enable us to draw a clearer line between the civic republican and liberal educational theories, but also make civic republican education a viable alternative to current educational approaches.     

An old problem for the new rationalism

A well known skeptical paradox rests on the claim that we lack warrant to believe that we are not brains in a vat (BIVs). The argument for that claim is the apparent impossibility of any evidence or argument that we are not BIVs. Many contemporary philosophers resist this argument by insisting that we have a sort of warrant for believing that we are not BIVs that does not require having any evidence or argument. I call this view ‘New Rationalism’. I argue that New Rationalists are committed to there being some evidence or argument for believing that we are not BIVs anyway. Therefore, New Rationalism, since its appeal is that it purportedly avoids the problematic commitment to such evidence or argument, undermines its own appeal. We cannot avoid the difficult work of coming up with evidence or argument by positing some permissive sort of warrant.     

Games,Rules, and Practices

We present and defend a view labeled “practiceism” which provides a solution to the incompatibility problems. The classic incompatibility problem is inconsistency of: 1. Someone who intentionally violates the rules of a game is not playing the game.

2. In many cases, players intentionally violate the rules as part of playing the game (e.g. fouling to stop the clock in basketball).

The problem has a normative counterpart: 1’. In normal cases, it is wrong for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game.

2’. In many normal cases, it is not wrong for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game (e.g. fouling to stop the clock in basketball).

According to both formalism and informalism, the rules of the game include the formal rules of the game. Both traditional positions avoid the incompatibility problems by rejecting 1 and 1'. Practiceism rejects 2 and 2’: it maintains that the rules are the rules manifested in playing the game, not the formal rules.

Practiceism presents two theses: (a) the real rules of the game are the rules players follow: the practice determines the rules, and not vice versa. (b) the (first order) rules of a game determine what is legitimate within the game.