When getting angry is smart: emotional preferences and emotional intelligence

People who prefer to feel useful emotions, even when they are unpleasant to experience, must understand emotions and seek to regulate them in strategic ways. Such people, therefore, may be more emotionally intelligent compared with people who prefer to feel emotions that may not be useful for the context at hand, even if those emotions are pleasant to experience. We tested this hypothesis by measuring emotional intelligence and preferences to feel pleasant and unpleasant emotions in contexts in which they are likely to be useful or not. We found significant positive associations between emotional intelligence and preferences for useful emotions, even when controlling for trait emotional experiences and cognitive intelligence. People who prefer to feel anger when confronting others tend to be higher in emotional intelligence, whereas people who prefer to feel happiness in such contexts tend to be lower in emotional intelligence. Such findings are consistent with the idea that wanting to feel bad may be good at times, and vice versa.     

Should people pursue feelings that feel good or feelings that do good? Emotional preferences and well-being

Is it adaptive to seek pleasant emotions and avoid unpleasant emotions all the time or seek pleasant and unpleasant emotions at the right time? Participants reported on their preferences for anger and happiness in general and in contexts in which they might be useful or not (i.e., confrontations and collaborations, respectively). People who generally wanted to feel more happiness and less anger experienced greater well-being. However, when emotional preferences were examined in context, people who wanted to feel more anger or more happiness when they were useful, and people who wanted to feel less of those emotions when they were not useful, experienced greater well-being. Such patterns could not be explained by differences in the perceived usefulness of emotions, intelligence, perceived regulatory skills, emotional acceptance, social desirability, or general emotional preferences. These findings demonstrate that people who want to feel unpleasant emotions when they are useful may be happier overall. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Views of Genetics Health Professionals on the Return of Genomic Results

As exome and whole genome sequencing become clinically available, the potential to receive a large number of clinically relevant but incidental results is a significant challenge in the provision of genomic counseling. We conducted three focus groups of a total of 35 individuals who were members of ASHG and/or NSGC, assessing views towards the return of genomic results. Participants stressed that patient autonomy was primary. There was consensus that a mechanism to return results to the healthcare provider, rather than patient, and to streamline integration into the electronic health record would ensure these results had the maximal impact on patient management. All three focus groups agreed that pharmacogenomic results were reasonable to return and that they were not felt to be stigmatizing. With regard to the return of medically relevant results, there was much debate. Participants had difficulty in consistently assigning specific diseases to ‘bins’ that were considered obligatory versus optional for disclosure. Consensus was reached regarding the importance of informed consent and pretest counseling visits to clarify what the return of results process would entail. Evidence based professional guidelines should continue to be developed and regularly revised to assist in consistently and appropriately providing genomic results to patients.     

Resolving Conflicts in Natural and Grammatical Gender Agreement: Evidence from Eye Movements

The present research investigated the attraction phenomenon, which commonly occurs in the domain of production but is also apparent in comprehension. It particularly focused on its accessibility to conceptual influence, in analogy to previous findings in production in Hebrew (Deutsch and Dank, J Mem Lang, 60:112–143, 2009). The experiments made use of the contrast between grammatical and natural gender in Hebrew, using complex subject noun phrases containing head nouns and prepositional phrases with local nouns. Noun phrases were manipulated to produce (a) matches and mismatches in grammatical gender between heads and local nouns; and (b) inanimate nouns and animate nouns with natural gender that served either as head or as local nouns. These noun phrases were the subjects of sentences that ended with predicates agreeing in gender with the head noun, with the local noun, or both. The ungrammatical sentences were those in which the gender of the predicate and the head noun did not match. To assess the impact of conflicts in grammatical and natural gender on the time course of reading, participants’ eye movements were monitored. The results revealed clear disruptions in reading the predicate due to grammatical-gender mismatches with head and local nouns, in analogy to attraction in production. When the head nouns conveyed natural gender these effects were amplified, but variations in the natural gender of local nouns had negligible consequences. The results imply that comprehension and production are similarly sensitive to the control of grammatical agreement by grammatical and natural gender in subject noun phrases.     

Whose social values? Evaluating Canada’s ‘death of evidence’ controversy

With twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy of science’s unfolding acceptance of the nature of scientific inquiry being value-laden, the persistent worry has been that there are no means for legitimate negotiation of the social or non-epistemic values that enter into science. The rejection of the value-free ideal in science has thereby been coupled with the spectres of indiscriminate relativism and bias in scientific inquiry. I challenge this view in the context of recently expressed concerns regarding Canada's death of evidence controversy. The worry, raised by Stathis Psillos, is that as constructivist accounts of science demoted the previously secure status of evidence for drawing justified conclusions in science, we were left with no rational delineation between the right and wrong values for science. The implication for the death of evidence controversy is that we may have no rational grounds for claiming that the Canadian Government is wrong to interfere with scientific enterprise. But he does offer another avenue for reaching the conclusion that the wrong social values are directing the current stifling of some sectors of Canadian science. Psillos draws from standpoint epistemologies to devise a salient defence of ‘valuing evidence’ as a universalizable social value. That is, government bodies ought to enable scientific research via adequate funding as well as political non-interference. In this paper, I counter that (i) non-epistemic values can be rationally evaluated and that (ii) standpoint epistemology’s universalizable standpoint provides an inadequate framework for negotiating social values in science. Regarding (i), I draw from the evidence-based medicine debate in philosophy of medicine and from feminist empiricist investigations into the science–values relationship in order to make the argument for empirically driven value arbitration. If social values can be rationally chosen in the context of justification, then we can have grounds for charging the Canadian leadership with being ‘at war with science’. (ii) I further argue that my recommended empiricist methodology is preferable to Psillos’s search for universalizable perspectives for negotiating social values in science because the latter method permits little more than the trivial conclusion that evidence is valuable to science.     

Evidence for utilitarian motives in emotion regulation

This investigation demonstrates that emotion regulation can be driven by considerations of utility per se. We show that as participants prepared for a negotiation, those who were motivated to confront (vs. collaborate with) another person believed that anger would be more useful to them. However, only participants who were motivated to confront another and expected to receive a monetary reward for their performance (i.e., high utility), were motivated to increase their anger in preparation for the negotiation. Participants who were motivated to confront another but did not expect their performance to be rewarded (i.e., low utility), did not try to increase their anger, even though they expected anger to be useful in the negotiation. Such patterns demonstrate that people are motivated to experience even unpleasant emotions to maximise utility.     

Signaling when (and when not) to be cautious and self-protective: impulsive and reflective trust in close relationships

A dual process model is proposed to explain how automatic evaluative associations to the partner (i.e., impulsive trust) and deliberative expectations of partner caring (i.e., reflective trust) interact to govern self-protection in romantic relationships. Experimental and correlational studies of dating and marital relationships supported the model. Subliminally conditioning more positive evaluative associations to the partner increased confidence in the partner's caring, suggesting that trust has an impulsive basis. Being high on impulsive trust (i.e., more positive evaluative associations to the partner on the Implicit Association Test; Zayas & Shoda, 2005) also reduced the automatic inclination to distance in response to doubts about the partner's trustworthiness. It similarly reduced self-protective behavioral reactions to these reflective trust concerns. The studies further revealed that the effects of impulsive trust depend on working memory capacity: Being high on impulsive trust inoculated against reflective trust concerns for people low on working memory capacity.     

Imitation and repetition of prosodic contour in vocal interaction at 3 months

This study investigates vocal imitation of prosodic contour in ongoing spontaneous interaction with 10- to 13-week-old infants. Audio recordings from naturalistic interactions between 20 mothers and infants were analyzed using a vocalization coding system that extracted the pitch and duration of individual vocalizations. Using these data, the authors categorized a sample of 1,359 vocalizations on the basis of 7 predetermined contours. Pairs of identical successive vocalizations were considered to be imitations if they involved both partners or repetitions if they were produced by the same partner. Results show that not only do mothers and infants imitate and repeat prosodic contour types in the course of vocal interaction but they do so selectively. Indeed, different contours are imitated and repeated by each partner. These findings suggest that imitation and repetition of prosodic contours have specific functions for communication and vocal development in the 3rd month of life.     

Age of acquisition estimates for 1,208 ambiguous and polysemous words

Age of acquisition (AoA) estimates are provided for 3,460 senses of 1,208 words (i.e., words with multiple meanings e.g., duck). The AoA rating estimates appear to be relatively consistent across participants. The Spearman-Brown split-half reliability coefficient is .95, while the correlations between each participant’s ratings and the overall mean ratings yielded correlation coefficients between .325 to .794 with a mean of .69 (SD = .10). These estimates will be of use to those interested in: (a) the influence of AoA on word processing, (b) the influence of AoA on meaning access, (c) the structure of semantic memory, and (d) developmental trends in lexical ambiguity resolution. These AoA estimates can be downloaded from the Psychonomic Society’s Web archive of norms, stimuli, and data at .