Regarding a Regress

Is there a successful regress argument against intellectualism? In this article I defend the negative answer. I begin by defending Stanley and Williamson's (2001) critique of the contemplation regress against Noë (2005). I then identify a new argument – the employment regress – that is designed to succeed where the contemplation regress fails, and which I take to be the most basic and plausible form of a regress argument against intellectualism. However, I argue that the employment regress still fails. Drawing on the previous discussion, I criticise further regress arguments given by Hetherington (2006) and Noë (2005).     

Spatial part-set cuing facilitation

Cole, Reysen, and Kelley [2013. Part-set cuing facilitation for spatial information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, &; Cognition, 39, 1615–1620] reported robust part-set cuing facilitation for spatial information using snap circuits (a colour-coded electronics kit designed for children to create rudimentary circuit boards). In contrast, Drinkwater, Dagnall, and Parker [2006. Effects of part-set cuing on experienced and novice chess players’ reconstruction of a typical chess midgame position. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 102(3), 645–653] and Watkins, Schwartz, and Lane [1984. Does part-set cuing test for memory organization? Evidence from reconstructions of chess positions. Canadian Journal of Psychology/Revue Canadienne de Psychologie, 38(3), 498–503] showed no influence of part-set cuing for spatial information when using chess boards. One key difference between the two procedures was that the snap circuit stimuli were explicitly connected to one another, whereas chess pieces were not. Two experiments examined the effects of connection type (connected vs. unconnected) and cue type (cued vs. uncued) on memory for spatial information. Using chess boards (Experiment 1) and snap circuits (Experiment 2), part-set cuing facilitation only occurred when the stimuli were explicitly connected; there was no influence of cuing with unconnected stimuli. These results are potentially consistent with the retrieval strategy disruption hypothesis, as well as the two- and three-mechanism accounts of part-set cuing.     

Real Objects Can Impede Conditional Reasoning but Augmented Objects Do Not

In this study, Knauff and Johnson‐Laird's (2002) visual impedance hypothesis (i.e., mental representations with irrelevant visual detail can impede reasoning) is applied to the domain of external representations and diagrammatic reasoning. We show that the use of real objects and augmented real (AR) objects can control human interpretation and reasoning about conditionals. As participants made inferences (e.g., an invalid one from "if P then Q" to "P"), they also moved objects corresponding to premises. Participants who moved real objects made more invalid inferences than those who moved AR objects and those who did not manipulate objects (there was no significant difference between the last two groups). Our results showed that real objects impeded conditional reasoning, but AR objects did not. These findings are explained by the fact that real objects may over‐specify a single state that exists, while AR objects suggest multiple possibilities.     

Categorical Equivalence Between $$\varvec{PMV}_{\varvec{f}}$$ PMV f -Product Algebras and Semi-Low $$\varvec{f}_{\varvec{u}}$$ f u -Rings

Studia Logica - An explicit categorical equivalence is defined between a proper subvariety of the class of $${ PMV}$$ -algebras, as defined by Di Nola and Dvure?enskij, to be called $${...     

Feature and Configuration in Face Processing: Japanese Are More Configural Than Americans

Previous work suggests that Asians allocate more attention to configuration information than Caucasian Americans do. Yet this cultural variation has been found only with stimuli such as natural scenes and objects that require both feature‐ and configuration‐based processing. Here, we show that the cultural variation also exists in face perception—a domain that is typically viewed as configural in nature. When asked to identify a prototypic face for a set of disparate exemplars, Japanese were more likely than Caucasian Americans to use overall resemblance rather than feature matching. Moreover, in a speeded identity‐matching task, Japanese were more accurate than Americans in identifying the spatial configuration of features (e.g., eyes). Together, these findings underscore the robustness of culture’s influences on cognition.     

When conveying a message may hurt the relationship: Cultural differences in the difficulty of using an answering machine

Cultures differ in their emphasis on the two core functions of communication, conveying information and maintaining the relationship. Because answering machines primarily serve the former function, their use may show cultural differences. Leaving a message is cognitively more taxing for Japanese than Americans, as indicated by poorer performance on a secondary task (Study 1). This performance decrement reflects that Japanese allocated more cognitive resources to tailoring the message to the recipient, consistent with their culture’s higher emphasis on relationship goals. Such cross-cultural differences were not restricted to the laboratory situation. Although equally likely to own an answering machine, Japanese reported a higher rate of hanging up when reaching an answering machine than Americans (Study 2). The difficulties that Japanese experience when leaving a message on an answering machine are partly due to the lack of feedback channel. Theoretical implications are discussed.     

Zero-Value Physical Quantities

Synthese - To state an important fact about the photon, physicists use such expressions as (1) “the photon has zero (null, vanishing) mass” and (2) “the photon is (a) massless...