Assessing vividness of mental imagery: The Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire

Mental imagery may occur in any sensory modality, although visual imagery has been most studied. A sensitive measure of the vividness of imagery across a range of modalities is needed: the shorter version of Bett's Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery (Sheehan, 1967 , J. Clin. Psychology, 23, 386) uses outdated items and has an unreliable factor structure. We report the development and initial validation of the Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire (Psi‐Q) comprising items for each of the following modalities: Vision, Sound, Smell, Taste, Touch, Bodily Sensation, and Emotional Feeling. An exploratory factor analysis on a 35‐item form indicated that these modalities formed separate factors, rather than a single imagery factor, and this was replicated by confirmatory factor analysis. The Psi‐Q was validated against the Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (Reisberg et al., 2003 , Appl. Cogn. Psychology, 17, 147) and Marks' ( 1995 , J. Mental Imagery, 19, 153) Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire‐2 (VVIQ‐2). A short 21‐item form comprising the best three items from the seven factors correlated with the total score and subscales of the full form, and with the VVIQ‐2. Inspection of the data shows that while visual and sound imagery is most often rated as vivid, individuals who rate one modality as strong and the other as weak are not uncommon. Findings are interpreted within a working memory framework and point to the need for further research to identify the specific cognitive processes underlying the vividness of imagery across sensory modalities.     

Dimensions of Religiousness and Spirituality as Predictors of Well-Being in Advanced Chronic Heart Failure Patients

We examined relationships between seven dimensions of religion/spirituality (RS) (forgiveness, daily spiritual experiences, belief in afterlife, religious identity, religious support, public practices, and positive RS coping) and three dimensions of well-being (physical, mental, and existential) in a sample of 111 patients with advanced chronic heart failure. Participants completed questionnaires at baseline and 3 months later. Results showed that fairly high levels of RS were reported on all seven dimensions. Furthermore, RS dimensions were differentially related to well-being. No aspect of RS was related to physical well-being, and only a few aspects were related to mental well-being. Forgiveness was related to less subsequent depression, while belief in afterlife was related to poorer mental health. All aspects of RS were related to at least one aspect of existential well-being. In particularly, daily spiritual experiences were linked with higher existential well-being and predicted less subsequent spiritual strain. These results are consistent with the view that in advanced disease, RS may not affect physical well-being but may have potent influences on other aspects of well-being, particularly existential aspects.     

Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief,Affect and Rationality

I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non‐rational animals do. Beliefs are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us] immediately.” Aristotle's claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non‐vacuous universal claims, but this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle's cognitive science resolves a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings.     

Beliefs and environmental behavior: The moderating effect of emotional intelligence

Recent decades have seen a proliferation of studies aiming to explain how pro‐environmental behavior is shaped by attitudes, values and beliefs. In this study, we have included an aspect in our analysis that has been rarely touched upon until now, that is, the intelligent use of emotions as a possible component of pro‐environmental behavior. We applied the Trait Meta Mood Scale‐24 (TMMS‐24) and the New Environmental Paradigm scale to a sample of 184 male and female undergraduate students. We also carried out correlation and hierarchical regression analyses of blocks. The results show the interaction effects of the system of environmental beliefs and the dimensions of emotional intelligence on glass recycling attitudes, intentions and behavior. The results are discussed from the perspective of research on how the management of emotions guides thought and behavior.     

Causal explanation in the face of contradiction

Previous work has shown that predictions can be mediated by mechanistic beliefs. The present study shows that such mediation only occurs in the face of contradictory, and not corroborative, evidence. In four experiments, we presented participants with causal statements describing a common-cause structure (E₁←C→E₂). Then we informed them of the states of C and E₁ and asked them to judge the likelihood of E₂. In Experiments 1 and 2, we manipulated whether the mechanisms supporting the two effects were the same or different, and whether the evidence presented confirmed or contradicted the participants’ expectations. The relation between the mechanisms only influenced predictions when evidence contradicted the expectations, but not when it was consistent. In Experiments 3 and 4, we used a common-cause structure with identical mechanisms. We manipulated the order in which predictions were made. When confirmatory predictions were made before contradictory predictions, mechanistic modulation was not observed in the confirmatory case. In contrast, the modulation was found when confirmatory predictions were made after contradictory ones. The results support the contradiction hypothesis that causal structure is revised during prediction, but only in the face of unexpected evidence.