Actors and actions: The role of agent behavior in infants' attribution of goals

Twelve-month-old infants attribute goals to both familiar, human agents and unfamiliar, non-human agents. They also attribute goal-directedness to both familiar actions and unfamiliar ones. Four conditions examined information 12-month-olds use to determine which actions of an unfamiliar agent are goal-directed. Infants who witnessed the agent interact contingently with a human confederate encoded the agent's actions as goal-directed; infants who saw a human confederate model an intentional stance toward the agent without the agent's participation, did not. Infants who witnessed the agent align itself with one of two potential targets before approaching that target encoded the approach as goal-directed; infants who did not observe the self-alignment did not encode the approach as goal-directed. A possible common underpinning of these two seemingly independent sources of information is discussed.     

The schema provokes a disparity of false recollection between actions and objects in an everyday scene

We explored the effect of the schema on recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects in an everyday scene. At first, participants watched slides of a man cooking in a kitchen. The man performed schema‐consistent actions, and schema‐consistent objects were left. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. We confirmed three main results. First, participants made more false recognitions for schema‐consistent distracters than for schema‐inconsistent distracters with more “remember” judgments accompanied by perceptual, thought, and contextual details, and with more “know” judgments. Second, participants made more false recognitions for schema‐consistent object distracters than for schema‐consistent action distracters. Third, participants more frequently recognized schema‐consistent action targets than schema‐consistent object targets with more “remember” judgments. Both action memory and object memory were reconstructed under the schema, provoking false recognitions for schema‐consistent distracters. However, the memories of schema‐consistent action targets were so recollective that they could prevent false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters.     

The effects of schema on recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects

We examined how the schema affects recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects. First, participants watched consecutive slides that described a man in the kitchen. In the slides, the man performed schema‐consistent actions and schema‐inconsistent actions, and schema‐consistent objects and schema‐inconsistent objects were left in the kitchen space. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. For objects, the discrimination between targets and distracters was more accurate for schema‐inconsistent items than for schema‐consistent items, owing to perceptual, thought, and emotional recollections for schema‐inconsistent object targets. For actions, schema‐consistent targets were more frequently recognized than schema‐inconsistent targets, with more remember judgments based on perceptual and contextual recollections. While item‐specific information of schema‐inconsistent targets could be elaborated for objects, the perceptual details and the contextual relationship of schema‐consistent targets could be elaborated for actions. We also found less false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters than for schema‐consistent object distracters. The retrieval of the perceptual details of schema‐consistent action targets could prevent false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters.