Composites, compromises, and CHARM: what is the evidence for blend memory representations?

Metcalfe's (1990) distributed memory model simulates many misinformation effects by assuming representations that superimpose information from multiple sources. In the present article, two types of evidence are reviewed for such "blend" representations: composite recollections, including items from both the original and postevent sources (e.g., a previously seen intersection is remembered with a subsequently suggested stop sign), and compromise recollections, including features that cannot be exclusively associated with either source (e.g., a green car that was later suggested to be blue is remembered as bluish green). The considerable evidence for composite recollections provides little support for blend representations. Compromise recollections, though seemingly more persuasive, are both rare and interpretable without postulating blend representations. Speculation is made about potential findings that would support blend representations.     

Alternatives to the fixed-set model: A review of appraisal models of emotion

Over several decades, appraisal theory has emerged as a prominent theoretical framework explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, and has stimulated a great deal of theorising and empirical research. Despite the large amount of research in this area, there are many aspects of appraisal theory and research that remain unclear or problematic. In this review, we identify a common assumption of many appraisal theories—the fixed appraisal set—and argue that this assumption, combined with a lack of explicit theorising about the predicted relationship between appraisals and emotions, leads to a lack of clarity in both appraisal models and the empirical testing of those models. We recommend that appraisal theorists move in a direction already taken by a small number of theorists, and adopt the starting assumption of a variable appraisal set. We further suggest that theories of concepts and categorisation may inform theorising about appraisal–emotion relationships.     

Is culture a problem for social psychology?

Culture has been regarded as an anathema to psychology as an empiricist research tradition. Despite the explosive growth of research on culture and psychology over the last decade of the 20th century and its importance in Asian social psychology, the ontological and epistemological tension between psychology as a science and psychology as a cultural/historical discipline introduced in the writings of the thinkers of the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment still lingers on in the contemporary discourse of psychology. Clifford Geertz once ominously suggested that cultural psychology may have chewed more than it can. In the present paper, the interpretive turn in social science as exemplified by writings of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur is reviewed and how it may impinge on the practice of Asian social psychology as an empirical science in methodological, epistemological, and ontological respects is discussed. It is argued here that the current practice of Asian social psychology is largely, though not entirely, free of the challenges mounted by these theorists, and that Asian social psychology has an advantage of not being encumbered by this traditional tension due to a monist ontology that is prevalent in Asia.     

Exploring the perceptual spaces of faces, cars and birds in children and adults

While much developmental research has focused on the strategies that children employ to recognize faces, less is known about the principles governing the organization of face exemplars in perceptual memory. In this study, we tested a novel, child-friendly paradigm for investigating the organization of face, bird and car exemplars. Children ages 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12 and adults were presented with 50/50 morphs of typical and atypical face, bird and car parent images. Participants were asked to judge whether the 50/50 morph more strongly resembled the typical or the atypical parent image. Young and older children and adults showed a systematic bias to the atypical faces and birds, but no bias toward the atypical cars. Collectively, these findings argue that by the age of 3, children encode and organize faces, birds and cars in a perceptual space that is strikingly similar to that of adults. Category organization for both children and adults follows Krumhansl's (1978) distance-density principle in which the similarity between two exemplars is jointly determined by their physical appearance and the density of neighboring exemplars in the perceptual space.     

The preferred level of face categorization depends on discriminability

People usually categorize objects more quickly at the basic level (e.g., “dog”) than at the subordinate (e.g., “collie”) or superordinate (e.g., “animal”) levels. Notable exceptions to this rule include objects of expertise, faces, or atypical objects (e.g., “penguin,” “poodle”), all of which show faster than normal subordinate-level categorization. We hypothesize that the subordinate-level reaction time advantage for faces is influenced by their discriminability relative to other faces in the stimulus set. First, we replicated the subordinate-level advantage for faces (Experiment 1) and then showed that a basic-level advantage for faces can be elicited by increasing the perceptual similarity of the face stimuli, making discrimination more difficult (Experiment 2). Finally, we repeated both effects within subjects, showing that individual faces were slower to be categorized in the context of similar faces and more quickly categorized among diverse faces (Experiment 3).     

Enhanced recognition of emotional stimuli in the chimpanzee (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Pan troglodytes</Emphasis>)

Humans often have a better memory of emotional events than neutral events. From the comparative-cognitive perspective, we explored the enhancement of recognition memory by emotion in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) using a serial probe recognition task. In this task, we sequentially presented a list of pictures to subjects and then tested their recognition of specific pictures from within the list. We selected pictures of aggressive chimpanzees as emotional stimuli and less tensed, relaxed chimpanzees as neutral stimuli. In Experiment 1, we gave four-item lists to two young chimpanzees; one showed significantly greater recognition of pictures depicting aggressive chimpanzees than neutral ones. In Experiment 2, this chimpanzee was further tested using a recognition task with eight-item lists. The subject again showed better recognition of emotional stimuli than neutral. Furthermore, the presence of an emotional stimulus in the list also facilitated recognition of the neutral item immediately following it. Overall, although only one of the two chimpanzees showed enhanced recognition memory by emotional stimuli, this is the first demonstration of such a response in the chimpanzee. The findings are discussed in comparison with those of human studies.     

Subjectively divided tone components in the gap transfer illusion

When a long glide with a short temporal gap in its middle crosses with a continuous short glide at the temporal midpoint of both glides, the gap is perceived in the short glide instead of in the long glide. In the present article, we tested possible explanations for this "gap transfer illusion" by obtaining points of subjective equality of the pitches and durations of the two short tones that are subjectively divided by the gap. The results of two experiments showed that neither an explanation in terms ofenvelope patterns nor explanations in terms of combinationtones or acoustic beats could account for the perception of the short tones in the gap transfer illusion. Rather, the results were compatible with the idea that the illusory tones were formed by the perceptual integration of onsets and offsets of acoustically different sounds. Implications for the perceptual construction of auditory events are discussed.     

Is the loss of diagnosticity of the eye region of the face a common aspect of acquired prosopagnosia?

A recent study published in this journal has shown an abnormal performance at discriminating differences with respect to the eyes of unfamiliar faces in two acquired prosopagnosic patients, but preserved processing of the mouth region. Here we extend these findings by showing a similar lack of sensitivity to the eyes in the very same face matching experiment for the prosopagnosic patient PS, who also showed normal performance for detecting differences in the mouth region. These results complement previously published evidence that the patient PS presents a lack of sensitivity to diagnostic information located on the eyes of familiar faces during individual face recognition tasks. More generally, they indicate that the impaired processing of the eyes of faces is a fundamental aspect of acquired prosopagnosia that can arise following damage to different brain localizations.     

Synthesized views can improve face recognition

It is well known that a new face studied from one view is often difficult to identify from another. This viewpoint dependence has detrimental implications for forensic practice. To compensate for this problem, we employed synthesized face images in the training session of a standard old/new recognition task. Observers in the experimental conditions learned one or more synthesized face images along with an original photograph of the face in a different view, whereas observers in the control conditions learned only the original photograph of the face. It was found that the experimental conditions consistently produced better recognition accuracy than the control conditions. We conclude that synthesized face views can be used to facilitate person identification in forensic applications. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contact and other‐race effects in configural and component processing of faces

Other‐race faces are generally recognized more poorly than own‐race faces. There has been a long‐standing interest in the extent to which differences in contact contribute to this other‐race effect (ORE). Here, we examined the effect of contact on two distinct aspects of face memory, memory for configuration and for components, both of which are better for own‐race than other‐race faces. Configural and component memory were measured using recognition memory tests with intact study faces and blurred (isolates memory for configuration) and scrambled (isolates memory for components) test faces, respectively. Our participants were a large group of ethnically Chinese individuals who had resided in Australia for varying lengths of time, from a few weeks to 26 years. We found that time in a Western country significantly (negatively) predicted the size of the ORE for configural, but not component, memory. There was also a trend for earlier age of arrival to predict smaller OREs in configural, but not component, memory. These results suggest that memory for configural information in other‐race faces improves with experience with such faces. However, as found for recognition memory generally, the contact effects were small, indicating that other factors must play a substantial role in cross‐race differences in face memory.