What if Wittgenstein could speak Japanese?

ABSTRACT

Wittgenstein’s criticism of the notion of ‘private language’ is related to the putative centrality of “being“ and the ‘subject-predicate’ distinction . However, his efforts would prove to be more fruitful if he could use data from Japanese language. There is a list of Japanese terms to translate ‘being’: sonzai, de-aru, ga-aru, and iru. Among all of their variants, the only subject-predicate-form-related expression is the combination of the ‘Y ga Z aru’-part of ‘X wa Y ga Z aru.’ Hence, Japanese subject-predicate-form-related expressions are not as fundamental as their western counterparts. Insofar as ‘pain’ is concerned, in Japanese, there are two series of expressions on pain: in the first one, the notion of pain is deobjectied and hence immune to subject-predicate logic, while in the second one, it is barely objectified in a limited sense. Hence, a Japanese speaker could avoid the fallacy of attributing subjective sensations to a particular person.