Parental Monitoring During Early Adolescence Deters Adolescent Sexual Initiation: Discrete-Time Survival Mixture Analysis

We used discrete-time survival mixture modeling to examine 5,305 adolescents from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth regarding the impact of parental monitoring during early adolescence (ages 14–16) on initiation of sexual intercourse and problem behavior engagement (ages 14–23). Four distinctive parental-monitoring groups were identified and labeled as “High,” “Increasing,” “Decreasing,” and “Low”. About 68% of adolescents received a high level of parental monitoring from ages 14 to 16 (High), 6 and 9% respectively exhibited an accelerated (Increasing) and a decelerated trajectory (Decreasing), and 17% had consistently low parental monitoring (Low). Relative to participants in the Low group, adolescents in the High group delayed sexual initiation by 1.5 years. Males, relative to females, were more likely to have had a low trajectory of parental monitoring, and were more likely to initiate sexual intercourse before age 14. In contrast to White Adolescents, Hispanics and Blacks were less likely to receive High parental monitoring, and had a higher rate of early sexual initiation before age 14. The study demonstrates the temporal relationship of parental monitoring with adolescent sexual initiation from a longitudinal perspective. An increase of parental monitoring across ages is accompanied with a decrease of sexual risk. The continual high level of parental monitoring from ages 14 to 16 also mitigated the risk of engagement in substance use and delinquent behaviors from ages 14 to 23.     

Myths, models, and metaphors: Religion as model and the philosophy of science

Clifford Geertz's widely-used paper ‘Religion as a Cultural System’, makes the claim that ‘the importance of religion lies in its capacity to serve … as a source of general, yet distinctive conceptions of the world, the self and the relations between them …—its model of aspect—and of rooted, no less distinctive “mental” dispositions—its model for aspect’. However, apart from a highly critical article by Nancy Frankenberry and Hans Penner (1999) little attempt has been made to investigate this understanding of religion as model. This paper briefly considers the validity of Frankenberry and Penner's criticism and investigates possible applications of the elaborate analysis of models and metaphors in the philosophy of science since the time of Mary Hesse to the analysis of religious phenomena.     

Contemporary religious studies and science—A postcritical witches' brew

The six preceding essays are written at different levels and range over a complex set of issues which are representative of the methodological and theoretical disorder one finds in religious studies, today. So disordered is religious studies that it should be considered pre-scientific (perhaps like Alchemy), instead of a science. However, out of these essays, a common set of themes emerge. These are: contextualism, reduction, scientific or critical realism, explanation, and scientific models. An examination of the arguments of each of the preceding essays shows a wide variety of views, although two general positions can be discerned: on one hand, the reductionist-contextualist-realist position is (approximately) occupied by Geertz, Goldberg, Saler, and Segal, on the other hand, the anti-reductionist-contextualist-constructivist position is (approximately) occupied by Jensen and Rennie. To conclude, the author of this response paper makes an argument for a scientific approach to the study of religions which is moderately reductionist, contextualist, and critical realist but one which is also capacious enough to include hermeneutical explanation and the role of models in religious studies.     

When cognitive scientists become religious, science is in trouble: On neurotheology from a philosophy of science perspective

Since the 1990s medical technology has afforded exciting possibilities for studying the brain. Together with knowledge accrued through psychology and psychiatry, it has set the stage for pioneering research and stimulated disciplines such as Social Neuroscience, the Cognitive Science of Religion, Cognitive Anthropology, and Cognitive Archaeology. Another discipline has arisen, Neurotheology, which is interested in the brain and religious experience. Early proponents such as d'Aquili and Newberg had a religious agenda in their work. Others, such as members of Transcendental Meditation, have used experimental and brain studies to legitimate religious agendas. Experiential shamanists have embarked on a similar legitimation process. The differences between science and therapy and spirituality have been blurred or denied. Neurotheological attempts to discover areas of the brain responsible for religious experiences have led to untenable results. The fact that such research has passed the peer review process of leading psychological, psychiatric, and neurological journals is perhaps more indicative of the pervasiveness of religiosity throughout American society than of objective brain science. This essay argues that neurotheology is an example of the struggle between confessional and critical approaches to the study of religion. The main difference is that the battlefield of this struggle is the brain.