Automatic Emotion Regulation

How do people effectively regulate their emotional reactions? Why are some people better at this than others? Most prior research has addressed these questions by focusing on deliberate forms of emotion regulation. We argue that this focus has left out an important aspect of emotion regulation, namely, automatic emotion regulation (AER). Our review of the behavioral literature suggests that AER is pervasive in everyday life, and has far‐reaching consequences for individuals’ emotions. However, the behavioral literature has yet to address the mechanisms underlying the observed effects. Because it is difficult to directly measure the processes involved in AER, evidence from neuroscientific studies is particularly helpful in addressing these questions. Our review of the neuroscientific literature suggests distinct neural bases for different types of AER, which provides important clues about the cognitive and behavioral processes that might be involved in AER.     

The homophily and centrality of LGBQ youth: A new story?

Social Psychology of Education - The social acceptance of LGBQ individuals changed dramatically over the past several decades, which calls into question extant research suggesting that LGBQ youth...     

Relapse/Recurrence Prevention in Major Depressive Disorder: 26-Month Follow-Up of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy Versus an Active Control

We conducted a 26-month follow-up of a previously reported 12-month study that compared mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) to a rigorous active control condition (ACC) for depressive relapse/recurrence prevention and improvements in depressive symptoms and life satisfaction. Participants in remission from major depression were randomized to an 8-week MBCT group (n = 46) or the ACC (n = 46). Outcomes were assessed at baseline; postintervention; and 6, 12, and 26 months. Intention-to-treat analyses indicated no differences between groups for any outcome over the 26-month follow-up. Time to relapse results (MBCT vs. ACC) indicated a hazard ratio = .82, 95% CI [.34, 1.99]. Relapse rates were 47.8% for MBCT and 50.0% for ACC. Piecewise analyses indicated that steeper declines in depressive symptoms in the MBCT vs. the ACC group from postintervention to 12 months were not maintained after 12 months. Both groups experienced a marginally significant rebound of depressive symptoms after 12 months but were still improved at 26 months compared to baseline (b = –4.12, p <= .008). Results for life satisfaction were similar. In sum, over a 26-month follow-up, MBCT was no more effective for preventing depression relapse/recurrence, reducing depressive symptoms, or improving life satisfaction than a rigorous ACC. Based on epidemiological data and evidence from prior depression prevention trials, we discuss the possibility that both MBCT and ACC confer equal therapeutic benefit. Future studies that include treatment as usual (TAU) control conditions are needed to confirm this possibility and to rule out the potential role of time-related effects. Overall findings underscore the importance of comparing MBCT to TAU as well as to ACCs.     

Explicit and implicit emotion regulation: a dual-process framework

It is widely acknowledged that emotions can be regulated in an astonishing variety of ways. Most research to date has focused on explicit (effortful) forms of emotion regulation. However, there is growing research interest in implicit (automatic) forms of emotion regulation. To organise emerging findings, we present a dual-process framework that integrates explicit and implicit forms of emotion regulation, and argue that both forms of regulation are necessary for well-being. In the first section of this review, we provide a broad overview of the construct of emotion regulation, with an emphasis on explicit and implicit processes. In the second section, we focus on explicit emotion regulation, considering both neural mechanisms that are associated with these processes and their experiential and physiological consequences. In the third section, we turn to several forms of implicit emotion regulation, and integrate the burgeoning literature in this area. We conclude by outlining open questions and areas for future research.     

Superior encoding enhances recall in color-graphemic synesthesia

Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which particular stimuli, such as letters or sound, generate a secondary sensory experience in particular individuals. Reports of enhanced memory in synesthetes raise the question of its cognitive and neurological substrates. Enhanced memory in synesthetes could arise from the explicit or implicit use of a synesthetic cue to aid memory, from changes unique to the synesthete brain, or from both, depending on the task. To assess this question, we tested nine color-graphemic synesthetes using standardized neuropsychological measures that should not trigger color-graphemic synesthesia (visuo-spatial tests) and measures that should trigger color-graphemic synesthesia (verbal tasks). We found a synesthetic advantage on both types of tests, primarily in the initial encoding of information. The pattern of results adds to existing evidence of advantages in synesthetic memory, as well as provides novel evidence that synesthetes may have enhanced encoding rather than superior recall. Synesthetes learn more initially, rather than forgetting less over time.     

A mechanism for reducing delay discounting by altering temporal attention

Rewards that are not immediately available are discounted compared to rewards that are immediately available. The more a person discounts a delayed reward, the more likely that person is to have a range of behavioral problems, including clinical disorders. This latter observation has motivated the search for interventions that reduce discounting. One surprisingly simple method to reduce discounting is an "explicit-zero" reframing that states default or null outcomes. Reframing a classical discounting choice as "something now but nothing later" versus "nothing now but more later" decreases discount rates. However, it is not clear how this "explicit-zero" framing intervention works. The present studies delineate and test two possible mechanisms to explain the phenomenon. One mechanism proposes that the explicit-zero framing creates the impression of an improving sequence, thereby enhancing the present value of the delayed reward. A second possible mechanism posits an increase in attention allocation to temporally distant reward representations. In four experiments, we distinguish between these two hypothesized mechanisms and conclude that the temporal attention hypothesis is superior for explaining our results. We propose a model of temporal attention whereby framing affects intertemporal preferences by modifying present bias.