Consumers make distinct food choices when they see versus when they think about a powerful person. This research identifies two scenarios involving the presence of a high-powered other, physical presence versus mental presence, and examines the effect of the physical and mental presence of a high-powered other on consumers' healthy food choices. Conducting six experiments, we show that the physical presence of a high-powered other increases one's self-enhancement motivation and leads to healthier food choices, while the mental presence of a high-powered other increases one's perceived constraints and leads to unhealthy food choices. We also find that interpersonal closeness moderates the positive effect of the physical presence of a high-powered other on healthy food choices but does not moderate the negative effect of the mental presence of a high-powered other on healthy food choices. 相似文献
Emotions affects moral judgements, and controlled cognitive processes regulate those emotional responses during moral decision making. However, the neurobiological basis of this interaction is unclear. We used a graph theory measurement called participation coefficient (‘PC’) to quantify the resting-state functional connectivity within and between four meta-analytic groupings (MAGs) associated with emotion generation and regulation, to test whether that measurement predicts individual differences in moral foundations-based values. We found that the PC of one of the MAGs (MAG2) was positively correlated with one of the five recognized moral foundations–the one based on harm avoidance. We also found that increased inter-module connectivity between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and middle temporal gyrus with other nodes in the four MAGs was likewise associated with higher endorsement of the Harm foundation. These results suggest that individuals' sensitivity to harm is associated with functional integration of large-scale brain networks of emotional regulation. These findings add to our knowledge of how individual variations in our moral values could be reflected by intrinsic brain network organization and deepen our understanding of the relationship between emotion and cognition during evaluations of moral values. 相似文献
It’s widely accepted that higher-order defeaters, i.e., evidence that one’s belief is formed in an epistemically defective way, can defeat doxastic justification. However, it’s yet unclear how exactly such kind of defeat happens. Given that many theories of doxastic justification can be understood as fitting the schema of proper basing on propositional justifiers, we might attempt to explain the defeat either by arguing that a higher-order defeater defeats propositional justification or by arguing that it defeats proper basing. It has been argued that the first attempt is unpromising because a variety of prominent theories of propositional justification don’t imply that we lose propositional justification when gaining higher-order defeaters. This leads some scholars to take the second attempt. In this paper, I criticize this second attempt, and I defend the first attempt by arguing that a theory of propositional justification that requires intellectual responsibility can nicely account for higher-order defeat. My proposal is that we lose doxastic justification when we gain higher-order defeaters because there is no intellectually responsible way for us to maintain our original beliefs due to the defeaters.
The aim of this study was to evaluate perception of body image and anxiety of 221 university students presenting to the dermatology outpatient clinic with a skin disease and 205 students without skin disease. Analysis of anxiety and body image scores yielded differences by sex and age in both groups. The group with skin disease had lower scores on body image. Acne vulgaris seems to be the most disturbing among the skin diseases, and this was more prominent in younger patients. 相似文献