Hairpulling and Skin Picking in Relation to Affective Distress and Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms

The current study examined the frequency and associated distress of both hairpulling and skin picking behaviors in 1,324 college students using the Massachusetts General Hospital Hairpulling Scale (MGHHS) and Skin Picking Scale (SPS). In this sample, many participants reported significant distress secondary to both hairpulling and skin picking. Participants who endorsed relatively frequent hairpulling or skin picking (N = 72) were scheduled for a follow-up testing session to further assess the relationship between these behaviors and measures of affective distress. Compared to a control sample, the follow-up sample endorsed significantly more symptoms of anxiety and stress reactivity, and had higher scores on a measure of obsessive-compulsive symptoms.

Economic pressure in African American families: a replication and extension of the family stress model

This study of 422 two-caregiver African American families, each with a 10-11-year-old focal child (54% girls), evaluated the applicability of the family stress model of economic hardship for understanding economic influences on child development in this population. The findings generally replicated earlier research with European American families. The results showed that economic hardship positively relates to economic pressure in families. Economic pressure was related to the emotional distress of caregivers, which in turn was associated with problems in the caregiver relationship. These problems were related to disrupted parenting practices, which predicted lower positive child adjustment and higher internalizing and externalizing symptoms. The results provide significant support for the family stress model of economic hardship and its generalizability to diverse populations.     

The siren song of implicit change detection

Although change blindness could suggest that observers represent far less of their visual world than their conscious experience leads them to believe, they could fail to detect changes even if they fully represent all details. Reports of implicit change detection in the absence of awareness are consistent with the notion that observers' representations are more complete than previously thought. However, to provide convincing evidence, studies must separate implicit detection from explicit processes. This article reexamines the 3 primary claims of implicit change detection and, after replicating original findings, provides theoretical and empirical support for alternative, explicit explanations. Even if observers do represent more of the scene than previously thought, change detection might occur only through explicit comparisons.     

Hand-scoring error rates in psychological testing

Despite the comprehensive treatment of test validity in most technical manuals, test authors appear to routinely assume that clients and professionals will score their instruments without error. Recently Allard and Faust challenged this assumption by suggesting that error rates "may not be rare or benign" and demonstrated that tests with more complex scoring procedures were associated with a greater number of scoring errors. This study investigated error rates that resulted from hand scoring seven psychometric tests commonly employed in psychological practice. Significant and serious error rates were identified for both psychologist and client scorers across all tests investigated. Scoring complexity was found to predict the base rate of scorer errors. The findings suggest that greater development in and attention to test-scoring procedures is required to restrict the likelihood of scorer error.     

Change blindness: past, present, and future

Change blindness is the striking failure to see large changes that normally would be noticed easily. Over the past decade this phenomenon has greatly contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and even consciousness. The surprising extent of change blindness explains its broad appeal, but its counterintuitive nature has also engendered confusions about the kinds of inferences that legitimately follow from it. Here we discuss the legitimate and the erroneous inferences that have been drawn, and offer a set of requirements to help separate them. In doing so, we clarify the genuine contributions of change blindness research to our understanding of visual perception and awareness, and provide a glimpse of some ways in which change blindness might shape future research.     

Do new objects capture attention?

The visual system relies on several heuristics to direct attention to important locations and objects. One of these mechanisms directs attention to sudden changes in the environment. Although a substantial body of research suggests that this capture of attention occurs only for the abrupt appearance of a new perceptual object, more recent evidence shows that some luminance-based transients (e.g., motion and looming) and some types of brightness change also capture attention. These findings show that new objects are not necessary for attention capture. The present study tested whether they are even sufficient. That is, does a new object attract attention because the visual system is sensitive to new objects or because it is sensitive to the transients that new objects create? In two experiments using a visual search task, new objects did not capture attention unless they created a strong local luminance transient.     

The dynamic events that capture visual attention: A reply to Abrams and Christ (2005)

We recently demonstrated that, contrary to previous findings, some types of irrelevant motion are capable of capturing our attention (Franconeri & Simons, 2003). Strikingly, whereas sitmulated looming (a dynamic increase in object size) captured attention, simulated receding (a decrease in object size) did not. Abrams and Christ (2003, 2005) have provided a different interpretation of this evidence, arguing that in each case attention was captured by the onset of motion rather than by motion per se. They argued that the only published finding inconsistent with their motion onset account is our evidence that simulated receding motion failed to capture attention. Abrams and Christ (2005) presented a receding object stereoscopically and found that it did capture attention, leading them to conclude that the motion onset account explains existing data more parsimoniously than our account does. Our reply has three parts. First, we argue that evidence of capture by receding motion is interesting but irrelevant to the debate over whether capture by motion requires a motion onset. Second, we show that the original empirical evidence in support of the motion onset claim (Abrams & Christ, 2003) put the motion-only condition at a critical disadvantage. We present a new experiment that demonstrates strong capture by motion in the absence of a motion onset, showing that motion onsets are not necessary for attention capture by dynamic events. Finally, we outline what is known about the set of dynamic events that capture attention.     

Moving and looming stimuli capture attention

Attention capture is often operationally defined as speeded search performance when an otherwise nonpredictive stimulus happens to be the target of a visual search. That is, if a stimulus captures attention, it should be searched with priority even when it is irrelevant to the task. Given this definition, only the abrupt appearance of a new object (see, e.g., Jonides & Yantis, 1988) and one type of luminance contrast change (Enns, Austen, Di Lollo, Rauschenberger, & Yantis, 2001) have been shown to strongly capture attention. We show that translating and looming stimuli also capture attention. This phenomenon does not occur for all dynamic events: We also show that receding stimuli do not attract attention. Although the sorts of dynamic events that capture attention do not fit neatly into a single category, we speculate that stimuli that signal potentially behaviorally urgent events are more likely to receive attentional priority.     

Presupposition and Accommodation: Understanding the Stalnakerian Picture

This paper offers a critical analysis ofStalnaker's work on presupposition (Stalnaker1973, 1974, 1979, 1999, 2002). The paperexamines two definitions of speakerpresupposition offered by Stalnaker – the familiar common ground view, and the earlier,less familiar, dispositional account – and howStalnaker relates this notion to the linguisticphenomenon of presupposition. Special attentionis paid to Stalnaker's view of accommodation. Iargue that given Stalnakers views,accommodation is not rightly seen as driven bythe presuppositional requirements ofutterances, but only by the interests ofspeakers in eliminating perceived differencesamong presuppositions. I also consider therevisions which are needed either to thedefinition of speaker presupposition or to thedefinition of sentence presupposition in lightof the possibility of informativepresupposition. In the concluding section, Idiscuss the ways in which some recent accountsof context and speaker presupposition departfrom their Stalnakerian foundations.     

Review Essay

Studies in East European Thought -